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This report has been commissioned by the Gas and Electricity Markets Authority in support 
of the ‘Project TransmiT’ initiative, a review of transmission charging and associated 
connection arrangements. The terms of reference of this report are reproduced in Appendix 1.   
 
The objectives of Project TransmiT are to ensure that we have in place charging 
arrangements that facilitate the timely move to a low carbon energy sector whilst continuing 
to provide safe, secure, high quality network services at value for money to existing and 
future consumers. 
 
Past academic work has suggested high level principles that transmission charges should 
follow.  Stanford University’s Energy Modeling Forum listed six principles, in that “prices 
should: 
 
1. promote the efficient day/to/day operation of the bulk power market; 
2. signal locational advantages for investment in generation and demand; 
3. signal the need for investment in the transmission system; 
4. compensate the owners of existing transmission assets; 
5. be simple and transparent; and 
6. be politically implementable.”  (Green, 1997, p. 178) 
 
Brunekreeft et al (2005, p. 75) suggest that “ideally the structure of network charges should 
encourage: 
 
• The efficient short/run use of the network (dispatch order and congestion 
management;  
• Efficient investment in expanding the network; 
• Efficient signals to guide investment decisions by generation and load (where and at 
what scale to locate and with what choice of technology – base/load, peaking, etc); 
• Fairness and political feasibility; and 
• Cost recovery.” 
 
The present review is being undertaken in the following context. 
 
National Grid is obliged under its licence to have in place charging methodologies that 
facilitate competition, result in charges that, as far as is reasonably practicable, reflect the 
costs incurred by transmission licensees. 
 
The Department for Energy and Climate Change has recently made decisions on transmission 
access arrangements for generation in Great Britain (DECC, 2010b).  These are based on the 
principles of “connect and manage” and “socialisation of constraint costs”; in other words, 
generators should be allowed to connect to the transmission system as soon as local enabling 
works are completed, even if they or other generators would, more often than would be the 
case were the transmission design criteria completely complied with, be unable to generate at 
full capacity because of constraints on the wider transmission system; that they should be 
compensated for this inability to supply their full output, and that the costs of this 
compensation should be recovered from all users of the transmission system. 
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The European Union has set out requirements in the Directives 2009/28/EC on renewable 
energy and 2009/72/EC on the single energy market.  While in general these require 
transmission operators to connect users on a transparent and non/discriminatory basis, they 
also require renewable generators to be given priority access. While policy decisions made by 
the UK government are decisions that in principle could be reversed by that government, we 
assume that EU requirements are non/negotiable.  Regulation 1228/2003 sets out 
requirements for access to interconnectors between countries, again requiring transparent, 
preferably market/based, solutions.  
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It is has been outside the scope of the present short study to conduct detailed or quantitative 
analyses of the different arrangements considered. Rather, it is the intention to outline their 
main features in order to help inform debate on possible reforms and their industry and 
regulatory context, and for that debate to be made accessible to those within the industry who 
are neither specialist power system economists nor experienced power system engineers. 
 
Some of the background to the development of the electricity supply industry in Britain and 
some of the goals that have driven it are briefly described in section 2. This is intended to 
help the reader understand how the present transmission charging arrangements have arisen 
and their relationship with other aspects of the industry. 
 
A set of high level principles articulated by the team to help guide its review of transmission 
charging arrangements is set out in section 3. Arising out of these principles, a framework for 
assessment of different options is presented in section 4. 
 
In section 5, we present some ways of viewing transmission charging arrangements in terms 
of some of the main design variables. In section 6, we describe and discuss four principal 
transmission charging models that have been implemented in different places around the 
world, including the ‘investment cost related pricing’ (ICRP) approach that is currently used 
for the GB transmission system. We also present some discussion of a potential variation on 
ICRP. 
 
In section 7, a comparative discussion of the four main models is presented in the context of 
the assessment framework outlined in section 4. Finally, in section 8, some conclusions are 
presented. 
 
It should be noted that the following are not in scope and will not be addressed except in 
order to note their interaction with transmission charging arrangements in pursuit of the high 
level principles outlined in section 3: trading arrangements, access arrangements and 
mechanisms for financial support of low carbon generation. Furthermore, we have not 
conducted a review of transmission charging arrangements in other countries and understand 
that this has been commissioned separately by Ofgem as part of Project TransmiT. 
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In order to help illustrate some of the key issues and the relationships between different 
functions within the electricity supply industry (ESI), this section presents some of the 
context of the present review of transmission charging arrangements. It begins by tracing the 
development of the present industry structure in Britain and goes on to show how particular 
aspects of that structure seek to achieve a coordination of actions of different parties in such a 
way that the overall cost of electricity can be minimised, standards of reliability of supply 
achieved and ‘reasonable’ costs of electricity transmission recovered by the transmission 
owners and the system operator. It is the effectiveness of some of these arrangements that are 
now under review with consideration being given to alternatives that might better achieve the 
overall objectives that now include facilitation of renewable generation. 
 
 



		
	
		
 
In the days of a centrally planned electricity system, transmission and generation planners 
within the same organisation could coordinate their activities in light of each other’s 
proposals. The separation of ownership of generation and transmission in a liberalised ESI 
presents a particular challenge: 
 
• how can the overall best balance between access to energy for conversion to electricity, 
the cost of that access and the cost of electricity transmission be achieved while leaving 
generation developers (and consumers) free to make their own investment and operation 
decisions? 
 
Failure to achieve an appropriate balance would mean either that transmission capacity is 
over/provided relative to the location of generation or under/provided. The former means 
either that the transmission owner will not be permitted to fully recover the cost of the 
network or that network users’ charges for using the network are higher than they need be.  
 
Under/provision of transmission capacity, i.e. a relative lack of it, the absence of economic 
means of storing electrical energy on any large scale and the paucity of available ‘demand 
side management’ (DSM) measures (up to now, at least), mean that, at least some of the time, 
 
• at least some generation capacity in an area with surplus power available relative to 
demand cannot be used; 
• at least some generation capacity in an area with a deficit of power available relative to 
demand $ be used if reliability of supply to electricity users is not to be compromised. 
 
Price is not the sole determinant of the generation from which energy is bought – some 
generators cannot be used because of their location while others must be. As well as a 
facilitator of competition among generators, transmission capacity can then be seen, when 
there is inadequate generation available in an area to meet demand in that area, as a provider, 
via access to remote generation, of a reliable supply of electricity. However, minimisation of 
the overall cost of electricity – which includes the cost of transmission infrastructure – would 
suggest that some level of constraints should be accepted, albeit that the total cost of 
constraints depends not only on their volume, i.e. the number of MWh in a ‘typical’ year of 
	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operation, but also their price. Both of these are affected by the particular trading and 
transmission arrangements. 
 
With generation developers’ and operators’ decisions being independent of those of the 
owner and operator of the transmission system, the challenge is to articulate some signals that 
facilitate additional value from construction and utilisation of generation in a particular 
location up to the cost of additional transmission capacity connecting that location, or the 
value of additional transmission up to the cost of lack of access to particular generators. (In 
principle, locations of demand might be similarly influenced though this might only be 
effective for large, industrial consumers, the majority of electricity consumption being, 
hitherto at least, relatively insensitive to price signals. We thus concentrate on signals to 
influence location of generation). 
 
In simple terms, coordination of generation and transmission depends on answers to the 
following questions: 
 
• What is transmission for? Its historic development suggests that it might be thought of as 
having two main purposes, and given the challenges involved in valuing each of them, 
this can still be a useful way of thinking. That is, transmission is for (a) ‘security of 
supply’ and (b) ‘facilitation of competition’, or access to ‘economic’ generation1. 
• How is the ‘right’ level of transmission capacity determined, and how does that interact 
with generators’ decisions on where to site generation? (How can – or should – 
generators’ decisions be influenced?) 
 
The next section considers the above questions in more detail. 
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At present, in many jurisdictions, the task of the transmission planner is to take a set of access 
rights – maximum power injections or consumptions at each location – and follow some 
given process to determine whether some network reinforcement is required and its extent. 
This might be based on some ‘deterministic’ rule such as to facilitate all power transfers 
assuming a certain number of power stations are not operating or a characterisation of the 
probabilistic spread of transfers, or a more direct probabilistic comparison of the cost of 
reinforcement with the cost of restriction of power transfers in system operational timescales 
or the benefit of reducing the restriction. Depending on the prevailing trading arrangements, 
the operational cost/benefit might be identified in terms of the actions taken by the SO in a 
‘balancing mechanism’, constraint payments in a pool or the reduction in a locational 
marginal price. 
 
Since the 1970s, the basic rule used in Britain for identifying required power transfer 
capability on the main interconnected transmission system (the ‘MITS’) has been based 
primarily – but not exclusively – on an annual peak demand condition. The power flows to 
meet that demand depend on the dispatch of generation for which generators hold access 
                                                 
1 As will be presented in section 2.3, the promotion and integration of renewables now plays an important role. 
At present, in Britain this is largely being realised through government/mandated support to generators that 
falls outside the trading and transmission arrangements discussed here. For the purpose of our analysis and as 
discussed in section 4.1.1 below, we assume that situation to continue though we recognise that more direct 
support of renewables might be given through electricity trading and transmission arrangements.  
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rights; with a positive plant margin, there are clearly many possible dispatch patterns. What is 
taken as an initial reference for the transmission planner considers that there are multifarious 
influences – including economics and availability – that interact such that the long/term 
average per unit output of each generator of the same type (thermal, hydro or wind) is the 
same. The resulting pattern is then ‘stretched’ to give some margin for power transfers.  
 
It has been argued that the above initial methodology represents a hybrid between being 
‘reliability based’ and ‘economics based’, arguably being more strongly driven by the former 
than the latter (Bell, 2008). Although it is complemented by a probabilistic cost/benefit 
analysis that can drive investment in extra transmission additional to that identified by the 
basic rule, the starting point is, certainly, power rather than energy based. This is what the 
present transmission charging methodology attempts to reflect and will be discussed further 
in section 6.2 below. 
 
It is worth recalling that the current transmission planning process in Britain starts from a 
given set of access rights. What rights are already held by generators, what new rights are 
being sought – and where – and what those rights entail are clearly critical in driving 
transmission reinforcement or constraints in operational timescales. The combination of 
present rights and those future rights that have been offered to and accepted by, in particular, 
generators, drives planning of future transmission capacity. The ‘invest and connect’ 
philosophy that was in place until recently was intended to ensure that new generation and an 
appropriate level of transmission capacity to accommodate that new generation (alongside 
existing generation) would become available at the same time. However, since liberalisation 
of the industry in 1990, it has become increasingly apparent that a generator accepting an 
offer to connect does not guarantee that it will connect (Bell, 2002)2. Even if a generator is 
connected, a right to generate does not guarantee that a generator will do so at any one time. 
While it may be argued that the basic rule used in Britain since the 1970s for planning of 
capacity on the main interconnected system is insufficiently precise in reflecting the real 
costs and benefits of transmission (and, in particular, does not adequately reflect the 
characteristics of wind power3), it may also be argued that an apparently more precise 
analysis – based on explicit quantification of costs and benefits – is subject to considerable 
uncertainty and that present trading arrangements provide opportunities for exploitation of 
transmission constraints until they are reinforced away (Bell, 2010). 
 
Arrangements for the granting of access rights, what those access rights entail and trading 
arrangements are outside the scope of the present review. However, we note that they 
strongly influence the same issue that charging arrangements are designed to influence: an 
adequate coordination between generation and transmission such that the overall cost of 
electricity is minimised. (See section 4.1.1 below for further discussion of cost). It seems to 
us, and to many others, that the charging arrangements should provide a signal to influence 
where generators, in particular, should seek access rights and should reflect the consequences 
of different sets of access rights observable through the trading arrangements. 
 
Some of the interactions between transmission charging and trading arrangements and access 
rights are discussed in section 7.5. 
                                                 
2 In importing areas of the system, an existing generator that then withdraws or a mooted new generator that 
does not subsequently connect may give rise either to some other generators being constrained on or to a need 
for reinforcement of the network. 
3 A review of the basic rule for planning of the main interconnected transmission system was initiated in late 
2004. However, at time of writing, it is still not complete. 
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Various interactions between generators, the transmission owners (TOs) and the system 
operator (SO) are summarised pictorially in Figure 1 below. In it, the influences of one 
party’s actions on another can be seen4. 
 
It is against the above background that some particular current issues should be recognised: 
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• The UK, in common with the whole of the European Union, has legally binding targets 
for the proportion of energy used that comes from renewable sources; given the 
development of different alternatives to fossil fuels for heating, transport and electricity,  
meeting of the target depends largely on renewable electricity. 
• At present, the most economically attractive form of renewable electricity is wind power, 
and, in terms of the wind resource, the best areas for this tend to be in the north of Britain 
or offshore. These are far from the main demand centres and would require significant 
investment in additional transmission capacity. Upwards of 12.5GW of onshore wind 
generation capacity and 9GW of offshore capacity has been forecast to be deliverable by 
2020 (Pöyry, 2010), representing an investment of in excess of £43 billion5. The onshore 
transmission reinforcements to accommodate that have been estimated to cost £4.7 billion 
(ENSG, 2009)6. 
• Transmission access rights in the north of Britain have, arguably, already been ‘over/
allocated’ relative to existing transmission capacity. The evidence for this is the high level 
of constraint costs paid by the System Operator for constraints arising within Scotland 
and on the boundary with England. In respect of the ‘Cheviot boundary’ relating to 
exports of power from Scotland into England, these grew from around £30 million in 
                                                 
4 The intention is to show the interactions between generators and transmission licensees. To keep the image 
simple, interactions of both with the demand side have been omitted. 
5 Costs assumed to be £1200/kW for onshore and £3200/kW for offshore, (Mott MacDonald, 2010). 
6 The ‘bootstrap’ parallel HVDC connections that have been proposed are included within the onshore network 
costs as their purpose to directly interconnect different parts of the onshore network. 
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2007/8 to around £80 million in 2008/9, falling back to around £50 million in 2009/10 
(when constraint costs for the whole transmission system were around £160 million). In 
2010/11, the cost of Cheviot constraints was nearly £70 million. Within Scotland 
constraints have ranged from around £20 million in 2007/8, £50 million in 2008/9, £75 
million in 2009/10 and over £85 million in 2010/11 (Winser, 2010, Smith, 2010). 
• Under the previous ‘invest and connect’ approach to transmission planning and granting 
of access rights, the new wind farms seeking to connect in the north of Britain would 
have had to wait for appropriate network reinforcements to be carried out.7 In July 2010, 
the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) approved a new ‘connect and 
manage’ approach under which derogations against the transmission planning standards 
would be temporarily granted in order to allow generators (not only but especially wind 
farms) to connect ahead of completion of ‘deep’ reinforcements that the planning 
standards require (DECC, 2010c). (‘Connection works’ still need to be undertaken first).8 
Under this arrangement, the generators allowed to connect have firm access rights and are 
thus entitled to quote and be remunerated for balancing actions to reduce their output in 
the event of the wider network being export constrained. Ahead of reinforcement of the 
wider network, it would be expected that this would give rise to an increase in the total 
cost of constraints, perhaps significantly so.9 
 
A solution to the apparent shortage of transmission capacity connecting the north to south 
might be a greater degree of sharing of that capacity by generators. For example, some 
generators north of, say, boundary B7 in the Seven Year Statement – ‘Upper North’ – may be 
regarded as ‘baseload’ by virtue of their short/run marginal costs being very low, at least 
while power is available from them, e.g. Heysham, Hartlepool, Hunterston and Torness, and 
while it is windy, the wind farms. However, station efficiencies and fuel prices in recent years 
would suggest that others – Cockenzie, Longannet and Peterhead for example – have been 
marginal for at least some periods. In such situations, it would seem reasonable that marginal 
plant and wind farms ‘share’ transmission capacity. In other words, marginal fossil fuelled 
plant uses that network capacity not being used by wind farms. In other words, wind farms 
use that network capacity not being used by the marginal fossil/fuelled generators.  (It might 
be appropriate for the generators giving up firm use of system rights for some period to 
                                                 
7 It may be worth noting that the ‘appropriate’ level of reinforcements have been defined within the ‘Security 
and Quality of Supply Standard’ (SQSS) and are not designed to deliver constraint/free transmission. (It may 
also be acknowledged that what is the economically optimal level of transmission for a given generation 
background, and how to discover it, is the subject of ongoing debate).  
8 ‘Connect and manage’ might be characterised as ‘transmission follows generation’ (Baldick, 2011). Given a 
set of future access rights that are sought by generators, the ‘invest and connect’ approach might be 
characterised as ‘generation and transmission arrive together’. However, as has already been mentioned in 
section 2.2, the ‘correct’ amount of transmission is difficult to identify when there is uncertainty about which 
generators holding future access rights will exercise them, many industry stakeholders or their representatives 
having in the past been particularly concerned about the risk of ‘stranded assets’ consequential to over/building 
of transmission, Nonetheless, given the long lead times for investment in transmission and the ‘lumpiness’ of 
delivery of additional network capacity, many others (including Bell (2002) and Baldick (2011)) have argued 
that consumers’ long/term interests would be best served by at least some degree of ‘strategic’ or ‘anticipatory’ 
investment in transmission. (This has been described in Baldick (2011) as facilitating generation to follow 
transmission, or a ‘plan and price’ approach), Some issues around future access rights are briefly discussed in 
section 7.5.2 
9 As part of the work leading up to DECC approving ‘connect and manage’, various parties, including 
consultancies working on behalf of DECC (Redpoint 2010) and, separately, Ofgem (Frontier Economics 
2009), undertook forecasts of constraint costs under ‘connect and manage’. It may be noted that Redpoint’s 
and Frontier Economics’ forecasts differed markedly.  
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receive some kind of compensation.10) However, present access and trading arrangements do 
not lead to that outcome.  The ‘deterministic’ part of the present network design standard for 
the main interconnected system assumes only a limited amount of sharing; and transmission 
charges currently give no incentive to it. 
 
A fair proportion of transmission reinforcement actions on the main interconnected system in 
England and Wales in the last 20 years have been driven by closure of power stations in the 
midlands and south east, replaced largely by combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs) in the 
west and north (Hiorns, 1999). Others have involved underground cables in and around 
London to improve London import capability. Reinforcements could thus be seen to be 
necessary both for security of supply to the south/east and facilitation of access for newer, 
more economic power stations that made their decisions on where to locate in light of 
locational transmission pricing, the cost of access to gas and the gaining of planning 
permission. In light of the security of supply aspect, both transmission planning and 
locational pricing based on generation capacity and power flows at time of peak demand 
could be regarded as reasonable. However, the network reinforcements that are currently 
under consideration concern access for wind farms located towards the periphery of the 
system (ENSG, 2009), e.g. in Scotland or the north of England or off the east coast of 
England. None of them, on their own, can strongly be said to be necessary for security of 
supply, at least not in the short term. Partly as a consequence of the delay in a revised 
transmission planning standard being approved (which may, in any case, require explicit 
economic analysis as its basis rather than as a complement to another approach), justification 
for these reinforcements depends to a large extent on economic analysis, particularly 
constraint costs that arise at different times in the course of a year of operation. In other 
words, they depend on analysis of energy bought and sold. (Whether to base transmission 
charges on power or energy is one of the design choices that will be discussed in the next 
section.) 
 
For the longer term, we return to the question of the choices that can be made by developers 
of new generation facilities in terms of location. Where choices do exist, our first principle 
would suggest that they should be, in some way, incentivised to locate in areas that minimise 
the overall cost of electricity. In the case of a wind farm (and all other things being equal), the 
developer can compare the extra revenue arising from a higher load factor in a windier area 
with the extra cost of using the transmission system. Similarly, the developer of a new fossil/
fuelled power station with carbon capture facilities can compare the costs of access to fuel, 
CO2 storage and electricity transmission in one place with those in another. 
 
The difficulty often arises in respect of other issues. For example, can a wind farm developer 
be confident of gaining planning permission in a location that, from a simple economic point 
of view, seems ideal? If such considerations drive generation developers to locations in which 
the cost of electricity transmission breaks the commercial viability of their project and the 
consequence is a failure to satisfy renewable energy targets, to have sufficient generation 
capacity as to ensure a particular level of security of supply or both, then it would seem that 
some kind of intervention is required.  
                                                 
10 Such an idea was a feature of one of the suggested models for reformed transmission access. In it, generators 
prepared to give up rights for some period would quote a price for that relinquishment as part of their 
application for access (see section 7.5.2). The price they quote may seek to compensate for the difficulty of 
finding a buyer for their energy on a windy day. However, the possibility of quoting a ‘bid’ price in the current 
‘balancing mechanism’ arguably already represents such a possibility, though without some kind of forward 
contract, the system operator would have no certainty of that price. 
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It has been argued by some that ‘cost/reflective’ transmission charging as currently 
implemented is already deterring generation developers and putting the meeting of renewable 
energy targets at risk. Others point out that connection applications are still being received by 
the System Operator for connections in the more expensive zones, and connections are still 
taking place, so the deterrent does not seem to be strong. Without access to commercially 
sensitive information, it is difficult to verify the claim that transmission charges are making 
inordinate numbers of projects commercially unviable; besides, it is outside our present scope 
to do so. 
 
A final, significant element of the background to the present report should be noted: DECC’s 
consultation on ‘Electricity Market Reform’ published in December 2010 (DECC, 2010d). 
From our perspective, this opens up the following possibilities: 
 
• a shift of financial support mechanisms away from renewables towards ‘low carbon’ 
generation complemented by greater costs on burning of fossil fuels; 
• the central purchasing of generation capacity, which could be broken down into different 
plant types (for example in order to recognise that different types contribute differently to 
security of supply and CO2 reduction) and locations; 
• increased levels of financial support and certainty available to low carbon generation 
relative to now, levels that might be differentiated by technology and are yet to be 
determined. 
 
The second and third of these, in particular, might offset any perceived risks to the meeting of 
climate change mitigation objectives arising from high transmission charges in particular 
locations. On the other hand, the purchase of generation capacity only in certain regions 
might make a levelling off of transmission charges redundant. 
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In light of the regulatory and government background outlined in the introduction, we have 
articulated the following high/level principles which have guided our review of transmission 
charging arrangements. We first list the principles, then discuss each in more detail, and then, 
in section 4, set out our strategy for assessing how well particular proposals perform against 
these principles. 
 
 	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1. They should encourage efficient investment and operating decisions by the 
transmission companies, generation companies and consumers such that the overall 
cost of electricity is, as far as practicable, minimised. 
 
2. They should be consistent with the realisation of climate change mitigation targets set 
by government in the UK 
 
3. They must be compatible with EU directives and regulations 
 
4. They should be consistent with the future integration of energy markets across Europe 
 
5. They should not present undue barriers to the realisation of adequate security of 
supply 
 
6. They should not be over/sensitive to small changes in the transmission system and its 
users 
 
7. They should be as simple as possible to achieve their objectives, and no simpler 
 
8. They should command sufficient stakeholder support to be implementable 
 
 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We now offer some comments on each principle in turn. 
 
1. They should encourage efficient investment and operating decisions by the 
transmission companies, generation companies and consumers such that the overall 
cost of electricity is, as far as practicable, minimised 
 
A fundamental principle of a market economy is that decisions will be most efficient if those 
making them have to pay for the full consequences of their actions.  The implication is that a 
transmission user located at a node where their presence raises the system’s costs should pay 
more than a user located at a node where they reduce costs (for example by reducing the need 
for investment in enhanced network capacity as a consequence of increased power flows on 
the system).  Consider a potential system user who has the choice between two nodes on the 
transmission system, which may allow the same level of generation capacity but involve 
different direct costs to the individual user (i.e., excluding the cost of transmission charges) 
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or may have similar direct costs but offer different levels of output (e.g. load factors for a 
wind farm).  In the absence of a difference in transmission charges, the user should obviously 
prefer the node which offers it the lower direct cost or greater output.  If the benefit of doing 
so is lower than the additional cost imposed on the transmission system from choosing this 
node, however, the user’s choice will lead to a greater overall cost of electricity, or lower 
overall benefit, than the alternative.  If the user faced transmission charges which fully 
reflected the difference in the costs imposed on the transmission system, however, the user’s 
decision, in seeking to maximise its benefits net of transmission charges, would also 
maximise the benefits to the country as a whole. 
 
The arrangements should also give the transmission companies incentives to operate 
efficiently; for example, they should gain if they make cost/effective investments that have 
benefit in meeting their licence obligations to facilitate competition and contribute to security 
of supply.  
 
It is noted that failure to provide the ‘right’ level of transmission relative to the location of 
demand and the location and utilisation of generation would lead either to excessive volumes 
and cost of transmission constraints (and less open competition than would otherwise have 
been the case) or to excessive cost of transmission infrastructure. In both cases, the net 
consequence is higher electricity prices for consumers. 
 
2. They should be consistent with the realisation of climate change mitigation targets set 
by government in the UK  
 
The UK government has adopted policies to combat climate change, together with the 
devolved administrations.  For our purposes, the most important is the target, agreed under 
the EU Climate and Energy Package, to produce 15% of the UK’s final energy demand from 
renewable sources by 2020, a target which implies that between 30% and 40% of the UK’s 
electricity may need to come from renewables.  We note that many of the UK’s best 
renewable resources for electricity generation are remote from consumers, and some would 
require significant investment in the transmission system.  For a given level of support from 
other policies (currently the Renewables Obligation is the most important of these), the 
higher the transmission charges these generators have to pay to access these more remote 
resources, the less commercially attractive those locations will be to developers.  A 
renewable energy scheme in one of these locations could be made more commercially 
attractive if it received more support or was able to pay a lower transmission charge.  
However, either option will have financial consequences for the overall cost of electricity and 
hence for consumers. Furthermore, unless the support or charge reduction is tightly targeted, 
it will also have financial consequences for other, non/renewable generators.  If system 
access arrangements mean long delays before some of these generators can be connected to 
the grid, this could also jeopardise the 2020 targets.  We note that the government has 
recently agreed a package of measures to reform transmission access with the intention of 
removing these delays.  
 
3. They must be compatible with EU directives and regulations 
 
This is an absolute constraint in our work; we assume it would not be possible to change the 
relevant EU policies on an acceptable timetable, if at all.  The key principle of these policies 
is that transmission should be offered on the basis of regulated third party access to enable a 
Single European Energy Market.  In general, the concept of a single market implies that there 
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should be no discrimination between generators, but EU legislation also covers access to the 
grid by renewable generators and by combined heat and power stations.  Member States are 
required to give priority access to the grid (in terms of connection) to renewable generators, 
and priority in dispatch, whenever this is feasible.  They are allowed, but not required, to give 
priority to combined heat and power stations.  Where there are interconnectors between 
electricity systems, access to these should be allocated in a transparent manner, such as via 
auctions. 
 
4. They should be consistent with the future integration of energy markets across Europe 
 
In the short/term, Great Britain is likely to remain interconnected with Continental Europe 
and with Ireland via a relatively small number of links with a limited total capacity, which 
makes this principle less of a constraint than for a market with much higher capacity for 
transfers to neighbouring markets. Arrangements should be consistent with EU directives for 
treatment of interconnectors and remuneration of the costs of transfers of power originating 
in another country.   
 
The impact of transmission charges on international competition via wholesale electricity 
prices should be considered; broadly speaking, the charges paid by generators will have to be 
added to wholesale prices if those generators are to recover their costs.  Inside any one 
country, the impact of this on total costs passed through to consumers can be offset by the 
relative reduction of transmission charges faced by suppliers. However, when two countries 
trade power and generators face different transmission charges, those in the country with 
higher charges will be at a competitive disadvantage.  
 
5. They should not present undue barriers to the realisation of adequate security of 
supply 
 
‘Security of supply’ at a GB scale at present depends on short/term actions by, in the main, 
generators and the system operator in the management of generation and network assets and 
the scheduling and dispatch of generation. In the longer/term, it depends on adequate 
investment in generation capacity and network capacity that facilitates its use at key times. If 
the effect of some particular set of transmission charging arrangements was to disincentivise 
the making of generation capacity available in the short/term or investment in the longer/
term, security of supply would be compromised.  
 
6. They should not be over/sensitive to small changes in the transmission system and its 
users 
 
Uncertainty tends to discourage investment and can lead to inefficient outcomes.  If 
transmission charges are very sensitive to a small change in the transmission system, or in the 
‘background’ of generators or loads connected to it, then the impact on charges will be large 
and users will face an uncertain environment.  The principle of sending signals to encourage 
efficient decisions implies that charges should change in response to conditions on the 
system, but users’ payments (and the transmission companies’ revenues) should not become 
too volatile. 
 
7. They should be as simple as possible to achieve their objectives, and no simpler 
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If transmission charges and access arrangements are too complex, then only large companies 
will be able to respond to them and make efficient decisions – small users may make 
inappropriate decisions in response to signals that they cannot interpret in time, or may be 
completely blocked from entry.  This would be undesirable.  At the same time, the physical 
reality of the electric power system implies that costs will vary over space and time, and that 
apparently similar users in different places may require different works to be undertaken 
before they can be connected to the transmission system.  Transmission access and charging 
arrangements which completely ignore these differences are unlikely to lead to efficient 
decisions.  
 
8. They should command sufficient stakeholder support to be implementable 
 
Changes to transmission charges and access arrangements are likely to create winners and 
losers.  Stakeholders that believe they will be losers have an incentive to try to block a 
change.  Transmission arrangements are not a zero/sum game, which means, in principle, that 
it should be possible to make a change and find a way of compensating the losers from the 
benefits that would otherwise go to the winners, at least during a transition period.  Finding 
such arrangements in practice may be very difficult, however. 
 
  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We will assume that transmission charging arrangements will ensure adequate recovery of the 
costs of developing, maintaining and operating transmission assets. This assumption arises 
out of the following principles: 
 
1. They should encourage efficient investment and operating decisions by the 
transmission companies, generation companies and consumers such that the overall 
cost of electricity is, as far as practicable, minimised. 
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5. They should not present undue barriers to the realisation of adequate security of supply 
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8. They should command sufficient stakeholder support to be implementable 
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We plan to assess proposed transmission charging arrangements in a two/phase process.  
First, there should be a detailed assessment against a range of technical and practical criteria.  
Second, there should be an overall assessment against three key questions:  
 
1. what effect would the proposed arrangements have on the overall cost of electricity? 
2. what effect would the proposed arrangements have on the likelihood of meeting the 
UK’s targets for renewable energy?   
3. what effect would the proposed arrangements have on security of supply? 
 
The context for this is that we regard the ultimate objective of a set of electricity trading and 
transmission arrangements as being to: 
 
 minimise the total cost of electricity in both the short and long/term 
 
 subject to  
 
• meeting the 2020 renewable energy targets; 
• achieving at least a certain minimum level of reliability of supply. 
 
Although there are clearly interactions between various aspects of electricity trading and 
transmission arrangements, our focus will be on transmission charging. 
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In this section, we discuss the objective function that we have postulated above and the 
constraints we have associated with its achievement. 
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We take the cost of electricity to mean the total paid by consumers for their electrical energy. 
This must clearly be sufficient for the costs of ‘production’ and ‘transport’, i.e. transmission 
and distribution, of that electrical energy to be recovered. We assume the costs of production 
to include those of the physical facilities for conversion of energy and the costs of fuel. We 
also assume that measures to encourage investment in and efficient operation of production 
of electrical energy from low carbon sources should be considered as being part of the cost of 
production. We therefore assume the costs of production to include the costs of carbon, such 
as for allowances as under the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme or the future carbon tax 
proposed in the recent DECC consultation on Electricity Market Reform (DECC, 2010d) and 
confirmed in the 2011 Budget, and the value of contributions to reducing carbon emissions 
such as Renewables Obligation Certificates (ROCs) or Feed/In Tariffs (FITs). While this 
focuses on the  of reducing emissions and promoting renewable energy, these policies 
also have 		 for consumers (now and in the future) – with the right mix of policies, the 
benefits will exceed the costs. 
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In this model, the role of transmission and distribution can be considered to be one of 
facilitating the transfer of the electrical energy produced to consumers. However, as will 
become evident through this report, there are interactions between decisions relating to 
‘production’, ‘transport’ and the overall cost of electricity. In general, decisions made by 
consumers also affect this. For example, developers of electricity generation facilities whose 
 *+	 in a liberalised electricity supply industry is the making of profit from 
production and sale of electrical energy, have at least some freedom in deciding what kind of 
plant to build and where to site it. In principle, so too do consumers though, in an 
industrialised economy in which a reliable supply of electricity at a ‘reasonable’ price is 
generally assumed, the locations of domestic and commercial electrical loads are generally 
shaped by much wider social and economic factors than the local cost of electricity; at least 
until now, electricity consumption has been shown to be highly inelastic to its price. A 
decision by a generation developer to locate their new facility away from the main load 
centres (as opposed to near to them) will entail, if spare network capacity is not available, 
either a need for investment in additional transmission capacity or some kind of constraint on 
the utilisation of generation in order that network limits can be respected; while the extent 
depends on the electricity market arrangements, the latter normally also entails some 
additional cost relative to the case of the new generation facility being located near to the 
main load centres. 
 
As will be discussed more fully later, one way of trying to build a bridge between highly 
regulated, tightly constrained world of electrical networks and the freer (though not entirely 
free) world of generation of electricity with the purpose of minimising the total cost of 
electricity is to provide signals to owners of generation regarding the different costs of 
network infrastructure consequential to different generation siting decisions. This is 
commonly done through locationally differentiated charging for access to and use of the 
network, locationally differentiated prices of electrical energy or some combination of the 
two. The same mechanism is normally also used to recover at least part of the transmission 
company’s costs. The subject of the present review is the choices that are available in respect 
of these signals and the recovery of the cost of, in particular, transmission.  
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It seems to us that there is global consensus regarding the objective of minimising the total 
cost to consumers of electricity supply. This includes cost of production of electrical energy 
and its delivery via networks. In the longer/term, costs are minimised by the undertaking of 
appropriate levels of investment in new generation and network capacity. This seems to us to 
be correct and is a principle that we have adopted in the assessment of different trading and 
transmission arrangements. However, there is generally also a concern with reliability, or 
‘security’ of supply. If the economic penalty of failure to meet some part of demand for 
electricity can be quantified, the cost of unreliability of supply might be added to the cost of 
electricity supply and the total minimised. On the other hand, if it cannot or there is no 
consensus on the value of continuity of supply, some minimum level of reliability might be 
specified and the minimisation of cost made subject to a reliability constraint. Given the 
dependency a modern society has on reliable supply of electricity and that an industrial 
economy also has on it, and the historic recognition in GB of the important of reliability of 
supply, we regard the achievement of some level of reliability as also being fundamental to 
the design of trading and transmission arrangements.  
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Although authors in the past have postulated one or more ‘values of lost load’ or ‘customer 
damage functions’, most – though not all – recent debate about ‘security of supply’ impacted 
by generation focuses on a particular reliability threshold11; although not explicitly stated in 
present transmission network security standards, they too are have a reliability threshold/
based minimum level of transmission capacity. Based on these precedents and due to the lack 
of consensus on how unreliability should be costed, reliability of supply will be treated in the 
present assessment as a constraint, though it is recognised that its inclusion as a cost has an 
arguably more attractive theoretical basis. 
 
In contrast with the development of electricity supply industries over the last 20 years, the 
supply of electricity is now also subject to a constraint that a certain proportion of it – 
achieved by whatever means – should come from renewable sources. This might be treated as 
an additional constraint applied to the minimisation of the cost of electricity or, if a penalty 
for failing to meet the target is quantified, it could be added as further term in the cost 
minimisation. 
 
We are unaware of any published penalty price for Britain failing to meet its 2020 renewable 
energy targets. The achievement of the targets – albeit with industry responses to the setting 
of the targets currently incentivised through the renewables obligation and, for small scale 
generation, feed/in tariffs – is therefore treated as a constraint.  
 
While different emphases might be put on short/term cost minimisation versus long/term 
effects, we regard the achievement of minimum costs in the long/term as being largely 
dependent on attracting appropriate levels of investment in generation and network capacity. 
The same dependency is true of achievement of renewable energy targets and adequate 
security of supply. If investors cannot recover the costs of past investments, future 
investments will be jeopardised.   
 
While we regard security of supply and meeting the UK’s renewable targets as constraints, 
there is a degree of freedom in the system.  In this review, we do not specify the mechanism 
used to support renewable energy, and we note that the government is currently consulting on 
major changes to the mechanisms to be used in the UK.  To some extent, it is possible to 
change the level of support provided to renewable (or other low carbon generation) to offset 
any changes in the arrangements for transmission charging; if the latter appear to discourage 
renewable generators to such an extent that achievement of the renewables targets is 
threatened, one option would be to provide a higher level of renewable support, with 
consequential costs for electricity consumers (or taxpayers).  In other words, the impact of 
changes to transmission charging arrangements on the renewables constraint is not that they 
will make it possible, or impossible, to meet that constraint, but that they will change the 
financial and economic costs of doing so and the exact means by which it is achieved.  We 
discuss this issue further in section 7  
 
! 		
 
                                                 
11 DECC’s recent consultation on Electricity Market Reform cited work by Redpoint and Oxera in which a value 
of lost load of £30/kWh was used (DECC, 2010d). It was claimed that this led to a generation plant margin – 
or ‘capacity margin’ – of 10% (including appropriate ‘de/rated’ contributions from variable and intermittent 
generation such as wind). 
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For our detailed assessment, we will use technical criteria – those which would apply, 
regardless of the country for which the proposals were made – and practical criteria, by which 
we mean questions that depend on the particular starting point relevant to Great Britain.  We 
currently propose the following criteria: 
 
Technical: 
1. Economic efficiency 
2. Robustness 
 
Practical: 
1. Workability by industry participants 
2. Complexity of regulatory and legislative instruments 
3. Prospects for gaining stakeholder support 
 
We note that, in respect of some criteria, notably the practical ones, it will be difficult for the 
academic team to make a comprehensive assessment. However, we believe it to be important 
that such criteria are articulated and some issues raised in order to aid discussion among 
stakeholders. 
 
In following subsections, we present some brief discussion around each criterion. 
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The key element here is the extent to which the proposed arrangements create incentives to 
decisions by transmission companies and users that deliver an efficient overall electricity 
system.  This implies that differences in the prices paid by users of the transmission network 
should reflect differences in the costs that they impose on the transmission system.  If price 
differences are too low, there will be a tendency to chose generating sites which are further 
from loads than would be optimal if all costs (both for generators and for the transmission 
system) were considered.  If the price differences are too great, however, generators will tend 
to cluster too close to the loads.   
 
Efficiency can normally be expected to result if  
 
• incentives to different parties accurately reflect the effect of different actions on 
overall cost, in this case of electricity, and  
• signals are clear and industry participants have the chance to respond to them in a 
timely fashion, changing their intended action where necessary.  
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A system of transmission charges that is very sensitive to small changes in conditions will not 
be robust.  If the presence or absence of a single generator leads to an economically 
significant change in the prices which other transmission users in the vicinity face, this will 
lead to a degree of risk which they may find unacceptable.  It is possible that long/term 
hedging arrangements could be put in place to offset such risks, although at the cost of 
complexity, which we also regard as undesirable. 
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Another aspect of robustness is the extent to which the arrangements might be exploited by a 
company or companies with market power.  If a transmission user has the ability, by its own 
independent action, to significantly change the prices it faces by changing its decisions, this 
may lead to inefficient outcomes and excessive costs for other users or the transmission 
company.  Market rules cannot eliminate the possibility of exercise of market power, which 
comes from the fact that in some situations, there are few alternatives to buying from the 
company which has it. However, long/term contracts can sometimes make the short/term 
exploitation of market power unprofitable.  
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It is important that the signals sent by the transmission charging and access arrangements are 
clear and can be straightforwardly interpreted, in particular so that all market participants can 
successfully work with the arrangements.  Excessively complex market arrangements can act 
as a barrier to entry, particularly to the smaller (potential) players.  Given that one possible 
future for low/carbon energy involves a large number of small generators, this kind of barrier 
should be avoided, as far as possible.
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A different, but related question is how difficult it would be to bring about the necessary 
changes to the industry’s Codes and regulatory context to implement any new set of 
arrangements.  Similar issues of transition and implementation may arise in respect of 
extensive changes to computer systems or renegotiation of large numbers of contracts that 
would be required.   
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Transmission charging is not a zero/sum game.  The total benefit to society of an industry 
with efficient transmission charges and access arrangements will be greater than that of an 
industry with inferior arrangements.  Nonetheless, any changes to the arrangements risk 
affecting individual market participants’ profits, and it is quite possible that some participants 
could stand to lose significant amounts.  A change which faces too much resistance from 
individual stakeholders or groups of them may become impractical.  It is sometimes possible 
to sweeten the pill of an otherwise unacceptable set of changes by using a transition period to 
ensure that rises in charges are gradual, or by creating “grandfather rights” which provide 
some degree of temporary compensation to those who would benefit from continuation of an 
existing policy, while ensuring that all new developments face the more efficient 
arrangements. 
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The context of a generator’s decision on where to build a new facility, the transmission 
planner’s task in planning the system and the signals that might be sent to encourage overall 
economic efficiency in electricity generation and transmission can be illustrated by means of 
a very simple example: would it be better for the new power station or wind farm to be built 
at location A, which is quite remote from the main demand centre, or location B that is next 
door to it? (We assume that similar connection costs are incurred in both cases, but that only 
location A might require some additional capacity on the main interconnected transmission 
network). 
 
The transmission planner’s job is to decide how much additional transmission capacity would 
have to be built were the generator to connect at location A. If there is already enough 
generation on the system and enough transmission capacity to satisfy security of supply 
considerations, this will largely be a question of economics: what is the cost of different 
amounts of additional transmission capacity and, for each level, what is the impact on trading 
of electrical energy and on network constraints that must be managed – and, in BETTA, paid 
for – by the system operator? The amount of transmission capacity that the planner would 
seek to build would be that which would minimise the total cost of new transmission capacity 
and constraints, the bulk of trading of electrical energy being assumed to take place outside of 
the Balancing Mechanism (as it is under BETTA) and the impact of restricting physical 
operation of (mainly) generating plant being revealed through constraint costs.  
 
The above total cost of additional transmission and additional constraints consequential to the 
connection of generation of A is what should be reflected to the generator. However, 
connection of the generator at location B instead of A would also affect the trading of 
electricity and the total constraint costs seen by the system operator. The change in constraint 
costs consequential to the connection at B should also be reflected to the generator. In this 
way, the generator, knowing all the other costs and risks of their project and the respective 
sites, could then include in their evaluation the cost of accessing and using the transmission 
system.  
 
The challenge lies in identifying the change to constraint costs arising from a connection at 
A, the change to constraint costs were it to connect at B and the ‘correct’ amount of 
transmission for location A (and the cost of that additional transmission). It should go without 
saying that this is difficult. The economic assessment of the reinforcement were the generator 
to connect at A should consider a number of years of operation. (Discounting tends to mean 
that for assets only the first 5/10 years really make a difference.) Without firm commitment 
from all network users, there will be considerable uncertainty regarding which other 
generators will have and exercise rights to use the system. While demand for electricity might 
be reasonably well forecast, the operation of generation to meet that demand at different 
times of the year is harder to predict. For example, in the last few years in Britain, due to 
variations in the ‘spark’ and ‘dark’ spreads, combined cycle gas turbines have been preferred 
to large coal stations for some months, and at other times large coal has been. These changes 
give rise to very large differences in the power flows that the system operator must manage 
and hence to the volume of constraint actions that might be required (and to what the system 
operator has to pay for them) (Bell, 2010). 
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In theory, a large, sophisticated software tool might be used to simulate lots of different 
system conditions, estimate future constraint costs and inform the decision on how much 
transmission to build. However, as well as the practical difficulties of setting up, running and 
assimilating the outputs from such large simulations, this approach would depend on a very 
large number of assumptions, any one of which can be challenged, often giving a degree of 
precision in analysis that, because the uncertainty of data, is illusory. Moreover, there is often 
suspicion on the part of outsiders of what is going on inside large, complicated software 
tools. 
 
It could be argued that what transmission charging methodologies boil down to is an 
approximation of the network planning and operation process so as to produce a 
representation of the costs that a connection at location A or location B or any other location 
would impose. The approximation may, in effect, short/circuit the planner’s consideration of 
year/round constraint costs and try to represent directly the additional network capacity, 
perhaps itself based on one or just a few operational snapshots. That process may try to take 
direct account of existing capacity ‘headroom’, or simplify the process by assuming that all 
increments in power average out over time into average network upgrade costs. In any case, a 
charging methodology implemented by a transmission company takes on the task of 
estimating the costs associated with connection and operation of generation and demand at 
different places, and communicates them to the network users. That might be done in terms 
of one charge reflecting the cost of both transmission assets and network operation, or in two 
separate charges. Alternatively, as could be said to be the case with the locational marginal 
pricing (LMP) approach that will be described in section 6, it could be said to be left to each 
market participant to make their own forecast of the benefits (for generators, in terms of 
higher earnings from sale of energy) of one location compared with the costs (in terms of 
lower earnings) of another, a forecast that should take into account the behaviour not only of 
competitors but also of the system operator and transmission owner (who might reinforce 
some part of the network). 
 
If the above forecasting is left to each individual network user to do, as in an LMP approach, 
how they do it is up to them. If it is the responsibility of the transmission owner or system 
operator, arguably every transmission user has a legitimate interest in how they do it.  
 
It seems to us that a very detailed simulation of the network planning and operation process 
for increments of generation (or demand) at every location would be nigh on impossible (and 
the evidence of which we are aware is that no centrally managed transmission charging 
methodology has attempted it). The designer of a methodology is left with a number of 
choices of how to arrive at an acceptable approximation. Often, this concerns a trade/off 
between computational complexity, dependency on large volumes of (often uncertain) data, 
robustness and accuracy of reproduction of costs. In the event that no one approach seems to 
fit the bill, minimisation of perverse outcomes might become a priority in terms of the 
approximation and other considerations such as those described in section 3 will have an 
influential role. 
 
Some of what seem to us to be the main dimensions in practical charging methodologies are 
described below. 
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Review of established transmission charging methods (some of which are described in 
section 6 below) suggests that key choices in their design can be reduced to a number of key 
dimensions, listed in Table 1 below. They are each discussed briefly below. 
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Locational ↔ Non/locational 
Levied on Generation ↔ Levied on Demand 
Power based (measured by MW) ↔ Energy based (measured by MWh) 
Based on long/run costs ↔ Based on short/run costs 
Recovery of cost of transmission assets and 
their maintenance  
↔ Recovery of cost of  
operating the system 
Fixed charges ↔ Variable charges 
Based on typical reinforcements and  
their costs 
↔ Based on notional or average 
reinforcement costs 
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The meaning of the locational dimension in Table 1 is clear: either a charge (per unit) 
depends on exactly where that unit is connected within the network, or it does not. Some 
countries levy charges for use of the main interconnected system only on the demand side.12 
Others levy some part on generation and the rest on demand; it is also possible to impose all 
the charges on generators (even though the costs eventually find their way through to 
consumers of electricity, i.e. the demand side). A further variation on the theme involves 
either the generation (or the demand) part summing to zero even though individual generators 
(or demand side users) all pay some amount. 
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‘Power based’ methods generally refer to maximum power generated or consumed in the 
course of a year. Energy based methods take into account, at least to some extent, the 
variation in generation and consumption through a year. In practice, such methods might take 
account only of a limited number of operational snapshots13 or might use total energy 
produced or consumed over the course of year. Still other approaches, such as trading based 
on locational marginal pricing (LMP) complemented by purchase of ‘financial transmission 
rights’ (FTRs), implicitly base net transmission access charges on energy and time and 
locationally dependent prices of energy. (The main features of LMP plus FTR are described 
in section 6.5 below.) 
 
                                                 
12 This includes several countries that have not fully adjusted their systems to EU/mandated liberalisation. It 
may also be noted that at least some of these apply quite ‘deep’ connection charging to generation. 
13 A report by Pöyry, independently of us, presents a similar breakdown of the dimensions of a charging 
methodology (Poyry, 2010). In addition to MW and MWh based methodologies, they make a distinction 
between ‘static’ and ‘dynamic’ methods by which they mean: based on single or multiple power system 
conditions. 
				  
	 !"##
Bell, Green, Kockar, Ault and McDonald   22
/''! 1$#
 
The short/run marginal cost of transmission is given by the cost of losses and the opportunity 
cost of transmission constraints.  How much does it cost to move power from one location to 
another at the present time, or what is the opportunity cost of the constraint that makes it 
impossible to do so – in other words, what is the difference in the marginal cost of electricity 
at various points on the network?  The long/run marginal cost of transmission is the cost of 
building and maintaining transmission capacity in order to accommodate an increase in 
power flows, together with the cost of the resulting energy losses. 
 
If it were possible to “fine tune” the size of the transmission system, the system owner would 
add capacity until the cost of a small additional increment was just greater than the cost of the 
congestion it would relieve and transmission losses it would reduce.  The short/run marginal 
cost (congestion plus losses) would thus be equal to the long/run marginal cost (of capacity).  
In reality, transmission investments are lumpy.  This means that there will be times when the 
short/run marginal cost of transmission exceeds the long/run marginal cost (i.e., congestion is 
quite frequent) but it is not yet worth making the investment required to ease it.  Once the 
investment has been made, however, there will typically be spare capacity, and so the short/
run marginal cost will be less than the long/run cost.  If investment decisions are made to 
minimise the overall costs, we would expect periods when long/run marginal costs exceed 
short/run marginal costs to be roughly balanced by those when short/run marginal costs are 
higher.  Short/run marginal costs will be more volatile than long/run marginal costs, but they 
will not necessarily be higher on average. 
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A single charging methodology might be concerned with recovering the cost of transmission 
network assets and their maintenance, i.e. the costs associated with the ‘transmission owner’ 
(TO) role, or with the cost of operating the system (such as network losses, the scheduling 
and utilisation of response and reserve, reactive power, balancing actions to resolve network 
constraints and so on), or a combination of both. Alternatively, there might be two 
methodologies used in parallel, one concerned with the transmission owner’s costs, the other 
with the system operator’s. 
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The next dimension of a charging methodology that we highlight concerns whether the 
charges levied on a particular network user are set some time in advance of time of use and 
are fixed for some given period, or whether they are variable and depend on the network 
conditions that prevail through the charging period. The former might be the outcome of 
some auction process by which future access rights are determined. The present transmission 
charging methodology in Britain is an example of the latter. In it, a particular network user’s 
charges are affected not only by their own behaviour in or at the start of the period but also 
by that of others.  
 
For decisions to apply for new access rights, how much capacity is available on the network 
is clearly affected by the actions of others and, if the price of access is cost/reflective, by the 
cost of any additional network capacity needed to facilitate those rights. (If an auction 
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approach is used to allocate access rights, the price of access would reflect both the various 
users’ perceptions of its value and its scarcity). However, once rights have been granted 
(possibly accompanied by a need for reinforcement), it might be argued that the price of 
acquisition of such rights should be ‘locked in’; anyone else seeking new rights after that 
would have their application assessed against the new background and would be influenced 
by the cost of further network capacity, if it is needed. 
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Methods that are concerned not only with recovery of network costs but also with sending of 
locational signals and which make use of long/run costs in identifying the impact of extra 
generation or demand at different places might, in general, use one of two approaches: to try 
to identify whether the actual network would need to be reinforced to accommodate a 
particular change and what would be the nature and cost of that reinforcement; or to assume 
that the impact on transmission cost of extra generation or demand at a particular place can be 
represented by some notional or average reinforcement. The present ‘investment cost related 
pricing’ (ICRP) methodology used in Britain falls into the latter category (and is described in 
section 6.2 below). Some of the methods proposed for distribution network pricing in Britain 
fall into the former category (and are described in section 6.3). One of the issues around the 
latter arises from the ‘lumpiness’ of reinforcements that might typically be carried out on an 
actual system – they tend to provide capacity in discrete chunks and normally provide more 
than is immediately required. If network users are made responsible directly for the works 
they cause (and have their charges fixed on that basis – see above), the spare capacity might 
be used as a free windfall by someone else. 
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The significance of the design dimensions outlined above can be readily seen in relation to 
some currently implemented charging methodologies. For example, in Britain, the costs 
associated with the role of ‘transmission owner’ are recovered via the ‘Transmission Network 
Use of System’ (TNUoS) charge while that of the system operator is recovered via the 
‘Balancing Services Use of System’ (BSUoS) charge. The present TNUoS charging 
methodology in Britain levies locationally differentiated charges based on maximum power 
generated or consumed14 over a year, and the charges are based on the long/run costs of 
electricity transmission infrastructure and ‘notional’ reinforcements. BSUoS charging to 
recover the costs of operating the system – payment for response, reserve, re/dispatch of 
generation in order to respect real/time network constraints, reactive power and so on – is 
based on energy and is, at present, non/locational. 
 
Even in respect of the element concerned with transmission assets and their maintenance, the 
reality of a particular charging model may necessitate a hybrid whereby different proportions 
of the total cost of transmission are recovered via different ends of the various dimensions in 
Table 1. For example, in 2009/10, total income to the three GB transmission licensees via 
TNUoS charges came in the proportions shown in Table 2. On the other hand, some such 
hybrid may be a deliberate design choice. 
 
                                                 
14 In practice, for the demand side, the power figure is averaged over the three highest demand periods in a year, 
each separated by at least 10 days. 
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We believe that the choice of design of a charging methodology, and the splits of the total 
charge between the different dimensions in Table 1, should comply with the principles 
articulated in section 3 above such that the objective and constraints outlined in section 4 are 
satisfied.  
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 Locational Non/locational 
Generation 7.6% 18.7% 
Demand 8.2% 65.5% 
Notes: 
1. Total TNUoS cost/recovery in 2009/10 was £1.58 billion 
2. Percentages based on total charges for 2009/10 (Hynes, 2011) 
3. All TNUoS charges in 2009/10 were based on power and the long/run costs of transmission 
4. Although the total TNUoS recovery via the locational is the smaller part, the differences between 
particular locations may be significant. 
5. BSUoS cost/recovery was split roughly 50/50 between generation and demand and was based entirely 
on energy. However, almost all of the money spent by the system operator and recovered via BSUoS 
goes to generators. 
				  
	 !"##
Bell, Green, Kockar, Ault and McDonald   25
3 -$*
$
 
In this section, we present a brief review of some of the main transmission charging models 
that have been implemented or proposed in different parts of the world. Our intention here is 
not to present an exhaustive review; for one thing, there are many variations on a theme that 
can be seen in different places with different mixes on the design axes outlined in section 5. 
Moreover, a review of international practice has been commissioned separately by Ofgem as 
part of Project TransmiT. In addition, a plethora of charging methods has been suggested in 
the academic literature (e.g. Galiana, 1998; Galiana, 2003; Glachant, 2005; Lima, 1996; O'Neill, 
2002; Rubio/Oderiz, 2000). We do not intend to describe them; rather, our intention here is to 
describe the main models that have been discussed within the electricity supply industry in 
relation to transmission or distribution charging in Britain and for which there is at least some 
practical experience somewhere in the world. We also present an initial discussion of the 
characteristics of each model with respect to the assessment criteria outlined in section 4, i.e. 
how they seems to perform in respect of economic efficiency and robustness, and how 
practical they are in respect of  
 
• their workability by industry participants; 
• the complexity of regulatory and legislative instruments required for their 
implementation; and  
• the prospects for gaining stakeholder support in them. 
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Postage stamp pricing implies that all system users face the same set of transmission charges, 
with no geographical variation.  This is the approach adopted by Sir Rowland Hill when the 
Post Office was reformed in 1840 – a user could send a letter anywhere in the country for the 
standard fee of one penny.  The charges can still depend on the user’s characteristics, of 
course, such as their maximum demand, generation capacity or output.  However, access to 
the transmission system is seen as some kind of universal service, and the fee for this access 
should not depend on the user’s location. 
 
In the following sub/section, we discuss “pure” postage stamp pricing, where all of the 
transmission revenues come from charges that are not geographically differentiated.  In sub/
section 6.1.2, we consider a second application of the principle, which is as a residual in a 
geographically differentiated transmission tariff.  Many tariffs calculated on the basis of 
incremental or marginal costs will only bring in part of the revenue required by the 
transmission owner: effectively the average cost of transmission is much higher than its 
marginal cost.  The cost/based geographical tariff must therefore be adjusted so that it 
recovers the total amount of revenue required, and this adjustment is most appropriately made 
on a postage stamp basis, charging users the same amount, wherever they are located.
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A pure postage stamp is the simplest kind of transmission tariff – all users face the same 
(schedule of) charges, wherever they are located.  The tariff could be based upon generation 
capacity and maximum demand (for consumers) or upon total energy output and 
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consumption.  Many EU countries currently have postage stamp transmission charges, 
frequently applying only to consumers.  The Bulk Supply Tariff used before privatisation in 
England and Wales was based on a postage stamp approach, in that the main energy and 
demand charges were not regionally differentiated.  We will not differentiate between 
capacity/ and energy/based charges in our assessment: 
 
	
  Postage stamp charges send no signal of how the costs imposed on the 
transmission system by a user depend on that user’s location.  This means that the 
user has no incentive to avoid investing at locations that would impose high costs on 
the system, or to choose locations that would reduce the costs of the transmission 
system.  Similarly, there is no geographical signal that relates to operating decisions.  
Sending this signal will not always affect the decision taken – the renewable resource 
in an area may be so good that it should be exploited, whatever the costs of 
transmitting it to consumers, but we would argue that the signal should still be sent.  
Otherwise, some distant resources will be exploited when it would have been cheaper, 
overall, to have exploited a slightly inferior resource that was much closer to the load.  
A pure postage stamp tariff therefore performs very badly on the criterion of 
economic efficiency. 
 
	  Postage stamp charges are robust in the sense that they should not be affected by 
small changes in the industry.  If a change leads to an increase or decrease in the 
revenue required to pay for transmission, this will be spread across all users, leading 
to a relatively small change in the charges.  The charges may not be robust in a 
broader sense, however.  If a system is seriously inefficient, there is always the 
possibility that it will be replaced by something better.  If this happened, some 
transmission users would see large changes in their transmission charges. 
 

  We expect that industry participants would find it easy to adapt to postage 
stamp charges, due to their simplicity.  If a tariff was based on maximum demand and 
generating capacity, existing administrative systems could be used, simply placing 
each location in the same zone, or inputting an identical tariff for each zone.  If the 
transmission tariff was based on output and consumption, systems used for the 
Balancing Service Use of System charges would record the information required.  
 
	
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	  Similarly, it would not be difficult 
to regulate a geographically undifferentiated transmission tariff.  EU policy requires 
transmission tariffs to be ‘non/discriminatory’, and it is possible to argue that a tariff 
that charges all users the same amounts does not discriminate against any of them.  
(To anticipate a later argument, it is our view that a tariff that accurately reflects 
differences in costs between users is also non/discriminatory.  Indeed, if there are 
differences in costs, most economists would argue that it would actually be 
discriminatory to charge the same amount.)  
 
		  This change would be welcomed by some stakeholders and opposed 
by others.  We expect that it would be welcomed by companies which own (or are 
developing) generation in areas that are quite remote from the main demand centres.  
We would expect it to be opposed by politicians who are interested in the price paid 
for electricity in those areas.  Generators in the south of England, who currently 
benefit from low or negative transmission charges, would be most likely oppose the 
change.  Except insofar as the removal of cost/reflectivity from transmission pricing 
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might lead to an increased overall cost of electrical energy that offsets the benefit, 
consumers in southern England may be expected to gain slightly from a move to 
postage stamp transmission pricing. 
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Most cost/based methods of transmission charging initially fail to recover the required 
amount of revenue.  That is, when an initial set of tariffs is calculated, which reflects the 
incremental (short/ or long/run) costs that users impose on the transmission system, the 
revenue which would be collected by these tariffs falls well short of the total cost of the 
transmission system.  This has been noted for the system currently used in Great Britain, and 
for the locational marginal pricing used in parts of the United States.  Effectively, the average 
cost of transmission is well above its marginal cost (Pérez Arriaga, 1995). 
 
We would argue that a postage stamp charge is the best way to recover the residual.  The 
charges should be raised by the same (absolute) amount at each point in the country, 
maintaining the geographic differentials established in the cost/based transmission tariff.  
This ensures that the locational signals from that tariff are maintained at the correct level.  
Any alternative that simply scaled up the initial tariff to a level that recovered the total 
revenue required would impose geographical differentials that far exceeded the cost 
differences imposed by transmission users.  This would send perverse signals, and would be 
discriminatory. 
 
Should the postage stamp be imposed on generators or on suppliers, and should it be based on 
capacity and peak demand, or on output and consumption?  Eventually, all transmission 
charges are paid by customers – generators have to cover their costs, and do so from the 
prices which are ultimately paid by electricity consumers.  If consumers end up paying the 
bill, would it not be simpler just to charge their suppliers?  This also has an advantage in an 
interconnected system in which neighbouring countries levy most or all of their transmission 
charges on consumers, in that British generators would then face a more level playing field.  
The main reason for imposing the residual charge on both generators and suppliers is one of 
meeting past expectations enshrined in contracts.  Ever since privatisation, National Grid has 
calculated a transmission tariff so that generators provide 27% of its ‘transmission owner’ 
revenue, and suppliers 73%.  Our understanding is that this split was arbitrary, but since long/
run contracts for the sale of electricity have been written in the expectation that generators 
would provide this proportion of transmission revenues, National Grid and Ofgem have been 
reluctant to change it.  To reduce generators’ transmission charges would give them a 
windfall gain, unless their power sales contracts were renegotiated to pass through the 
benefits of the lower transmission charges to suppliers – who would find themselves facing 
higher charges.  In the ordinary course of business, such renegotiations would be unlikely.  It 
is possible that they might be contemplated as part of a sufficiently wide/ranging reform of 
transmission charging. 
 
The choice between a capacity/peak demand residual charge and one levied on 
output/consumption should be viewed mainly in terms of its effect on consumers’ decisions.  
With any charge designed to raise revenue, rather than to send a signal of costs, the aim 
should normally be to minimise the impact of the charge, in terms of the risk that it will 
change people’s choices.  In terms of taxation, one reason for taxing petrol has been that its 
consumption is not very responsive to its price, and so large amounts of revenue can be raised 
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without too much distortion.  Economists have a well/developed theory of so/called Ramsey 
pricing which would raise prices the most for those customers or products that would 
minimise the change in sales.  Much of this theory is irrelevant for setting transmission 
charges, however, because National Grid has to charge electricity suppliers, not final 
customers.  It would be impractical to have a transmission tariff that attempted to 
discriminate between electricity suppliers on the basis of the customers that they were 
serving.  The current tariff does have separate charges for half/hourly and non half/hourly 
metered customers, but a transmission tariff that had separate charges for domestic and non/
domestic customers, for example, would likely be unworkable. 
 
The pattern of transmission charges will be reflected in customers’ prices, except where 
charges levied on generators fail to feed through to wholesale prices – which would not be a 
feature of a competitive market in the long run.  This means that if the residual transmission 
charge is levied on consumption (and output), we would expect energy prices to rise across 
the year by the amount of the charge.  If the charge is levied on peak demand, customers will 
face higher peak demand charges.  If a charge is levied on generating capacity, this will raise 
the amount that generators have to recover from the wholesale market.  Given the current 
British market design, this implies higher peak wholesale prices, since the peak is the only 
time that some generators are able to earn any money.  Once again, these peak prices will be 
passed through to consumer prices.   
 
Customers with half/hourly meters can receive signals of the price of power at different 
times.  Residual transmission charges that are based on the peak demand will give them a 
sharp incentive to reduce demand at these times.  If wholesale prices are an accurate signal of 
the cost of power, and are passed through to these consumers, then the combined signal from 
cost/reflective transmission charges, wholesale prices and the residual transmission charge 
may be too strong, encouraging the customers to take unnecessarily disruptive steps to reduce 
their consumption.  This is because the transmission charges are focused on a few periods, 
and are at a level that can capture the attention of energy managers.  If the same amount of 
residual revenue was recovered over the year as a whole (via charges on energy 
consumption), the cost in each half/hour would be far lower, and there would be no artificial 
incentive to switch consumption between periods.   
 
For customers without half/hourly meters (or with such a meter, but with a supply tariff that 
does not take advantage of its features) even a charge based on their estimated peak demand 
will actually be smeared across their consumption.  For these customers, the main question is 
how the choice of residual charge affects their overall bill.  Customers with a relatively peaky 
demand would be better off with residual charges that are based on kWh of consumption, 
whereas those with above average load factors would gain from a transmission residual 
charge based on kW of peak demand.  This consideration also applies to customers with half/
hourly meters, of course.  However, it should be pointed out that the amounts at stake for 
customers are typically less important than for generators, since transmission is a small part 
of the average customer’s bill. 
 
Since a residual postage stamp charge is something used as part of a transmission tariff, 
rather than a system in its own right, we do not formally analyse it against our criteria here.  
However, we note that a postage stamp design is the most economically efficient way of 
recovering the revenue remaining after cost/reflective prices have been imposed, and that it 
can be robust, workable and does not require complex regulation.  If the residual postage 
stamp used in Great Britain were to change, stakeholders would likely support or oppose the 
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change based on their own perceived interests: much would depend on whether long/term 
contracts could be renegotiated to reflect any change in the proportion of transmission 
revenue coming from generators. 
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The method on which the setting of transmission network use of system (TNUoS) charging in 
Britain is based at present is known as ‘investment cost related pricing’ (ICRP) (NGC, 1992). 
It is intended to allow the setting of different tariffs for different locations across the 
transmission network in Britain in a manner that reflects the cost of transmission 
infrastructure associated with connecting there.  
 
The method proceeds via a determination of how far how much power flows around the 
network – the product of MW on each branch and the length of each branch, i.e. the number 
of MWkm – and how that changes as additional power injections are added at each location 
in turn (National Grid, 2010a). Fundamental to the method is the assumption that the total 
cost of additional transmission infrastructure associated with additional power generated at 
each node (or demand consumed) is closely related to the change in total system MWkm. 
Although some of the details in its implementation are quite involved (such as the way 
incremental MWkm costs are calculated or the setting of the residual to ensure a particular 
split of the total income from generation and demand), as will hopefully become clear from 
the description below, the basic method is relatively simple. 
 
In the course of a year of operation of a power system, there is no single pattern of power 
flows. This is due to the variation in demand through the year between its minimum and 
maximum levels, and the fact that, with a positive plant margin, the available generation 
almost always exceeds the total demand and yet a power flow solution is only valid if total 
generation output matches total demand (plus network losses). For each demand condition, 
there are therefore many possible dispatches of generation that would allow the totals to 
balance. 
 
Behind the current methodology is an implicit assumption that transmission capacity 
expansion is driven by conditions around peak demand. (Some of the background to this is 
described in section 2.2 above). Furthermore, while a large number of combinations of 
generation outputs are possible under that condition15, the present TNUoS methodology uses 
only one, based on a uniform scaling of generation outputs (relative to each generator’s 
network access rights, i.e. ‘transmission entry capacity’ (TEC)). Thus, for the purpose of 
application of the methodology for a particular year’s charges, to find an amount of power 
flowing on branch of the network, and the distance that it travels, the inputs are the full set of 
generator TECs at each location, the demands at each location under a single, weather/
corrected (‘average cold spell’) annual peak demand condition and the planned network 
characteristics including the impedances and lengths of each branch.  
 
The power flow solution yields the MW figure for power flowing on each branch of the 
network which, for each branch, can be multiplied by the length of the branch to obtain a 
                                                 
15 To be more precise, a system peak demand condition is modelled under an ‘average cold spell’, which has the 
effect of smoothing out the year/by/year variations in weather that affect the exact level of peak demand. 
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MWkm figure. Generation is increased by 1 MW (and balanced by an increase in demand at 
a single ‘balancing node’) at each node on the network (i.e. each location at which generation 
or demand might connect) in turn and the change in total system MWkm is found.  
 
On its own, this set of increments might be used as the basis for a split of total infrastructure 
costs. However, an acknowledgement is made that additional transmission capacity might be 
provided by different means. For example, the cost per MW of capacity is less on a 400kV 
overhead line (OHL) than on a 275kV overhead line. Furthermore, the cost of per MW of 
capacity is much less for OHLs than for underground cables (and the cost per unit capacity is 
less for 400kV cables than for those at 275kV). Thus, the MWkm on each branch is 
multiplied by a cost per MW per km for that particular branch depending on its 
construction16. Finally, the cost of the MWkm on a network branch is multiplied by a 
‘security factor’. This is intended to represent the fact that the actual increase in network 
capacity required for an increased power injection depends not on the power flow in the 
intact network, but on that on the network following a ‘secured outage’17. 
 
The result of a change in power generated at a node (and demand at the ‘balancing node’) is a 
set of cost changes, which can be summed to find a total change in cost associated with the 
extra MW injected at that node. When this is done for each node in turn, there is a set of cost 
increments. It is this that is actually used in determining the relative prices at each location. 
However, there is a further step in which nodes are clustered together into zones, the 
intention being to group nodes that have similar cost increments and to use a single, average 
cost increment for every node within the zone. 
 
It can be seen that the whole methodology starts from power capacity figures. The zonal cost 
increments obtained are multiplied by the MW TEC figure for generation18 and by ‘triad’ 
demands19 for consumption to find the respective total charges. However, that is not the end 
                                                 
16 This is the product of the ‘expansion constant’ and the ‘expansion factor’. The former is the ‘typical’ cost, per 
MW per km, of a 400kV overhead line. The ‘expansion factor’ is the cost of the particular technology – 400kV 
OHL, 275kV OHL, 400kV underground cable and so on – relative to the ‘expansion constant’. In practice, the 
costs of network branches constructed with the different technologies vary from branch to branch depending 
on, for example, the tower type and the conductor type. For the purposes of the charging methodology, costs 
for each tower and conductor type are based on historic costs (documented internally within National Grid) 
and tender valuations. A weighted average is taken based on recent usage of different overhead line and cable 
types and installation methods. For underground cables, one variation arises from whether the cable is in an 
urban or rural area. The ‘typical’ costs for TNUoS purposes assume a 50/50 split between these types. 
However, in a final adjustment to the applied costs, account is taken of each transmission licensee’s plans for 
uprating of circuits, e.g. from 132kV to 275kV or 400kV. With the latter being cheaper than the former, a 
discount is applied to MWkm on 132kV network branches, the value of the discount being dependent on 
licensee area. 
17 A ‘secured outage’ is an unplanned loss from service of some system element that the Security and Quality of 
Supply Standard (SQSS) stipulates must be ‘secured against’, i.e. it should not cause any breach of system 
operation limits. Such security rules are commonplace in the electricity supply industry worldwide, especially 
on transmission systems, and have provided the main guarantee of some level of reliable supply of electricity. 
The ‘security factor’ varies from place to place and depends on demand and generation dispatch. However, a 
single factor – 1.8 – is currently used in the TNUoS methodology for every location though may be modified 
to 1.0 for generation connections via single circuits. 
18 More precisely, a simple multiplication by TEC is used for generation in zones that have positive cost/
reflective tariffs. Because additional generation (or demand) at some locations can give rise to 			 in 
total MWkm, additional generation (or demand) at some locations has a negative transmission cost. For these 
locations, a function of out/turn generation is normally used to set the final tariff. 
19 This is the average of the peak demands on the three highest demand days of a year, those days each being 
separated by at least 10 days. 
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of the process as the total of those charges is insufficient to recover the total cost of 
developing and maintaining the transmission network infrastructure. The difference is known 
as the ‘residual’ and recovered by adding a non/locational additional element to the charge at 
each location, proportional to the TEC or triad demand as appropriate. The total figure to be 
added to the generation or demand side is determined by the need for the total income to be 
recovered 27% from generation and 73% from demand. (This split is quite arbitrary and was 
set at privatisation). 
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A number of observations can be made about the above approach. 
 
1. It is ‘capacity’, i.e. MW, based. 
2. The costs it uses are long/run costs. 
3. While there is a difference in per MW tariffs in different zones, i.e. it is a locational 
charge, there is also a non/locational element to ensure adequate recovery of costs by the 
transmission owners. 
4. The charges are based on notional small increments of power of each node. 
5. While the charge is capacity based and, in indexing of charges, it makes use of measures 
of changes of power flows resulting from changes to generation (or demand), it makes no 
reference to actual network limits. That is, it does not recognise the existence of spare 
capacity. 
 
As is noted in Russell (2010), the fifth point might make it appear as if there is no spare 
capacity anywhere on the network and each additional MW connecting causes a need for 
reinforcement of the network. Moreover, the effect of the methodology is to assume that the 
capacity of a line will be increased at the same voltage whereas, in reality, it might be uprated 
or a new line built20. 
 
By neglecting line ratings, smearing notional capacity changes across the network and using 
notional small, i.e. incremental, changes to generation or demand at each node, the 
methodology does not take account of exactly when actual reinforcements would be 
triggered.21 However, in comparison with the more ‘refined’ long/run methods described in 
section 6.3, this makes ICRP less volatile; in these other methods, once a trigger point is hit, 
if a particular generator (or group of generators) is held liable for the cost (or some part of it) 
of a particular reinforcement, their charges will see a significant step change. ICRP has the 
effect of smoothing out all such effects. As suggested in Russell (2010), this means that ICRP 
might be described as ‘ultra long/run’. 
 
                                                 
20 In practice and as noted earlier in this section, some account is taken of planned uprating from 132kV to 
higher voltages in setting the ‘expansion factor’ for 132kV and 275kV lines. 
21 Actually, an additional MW of generation (or, in theory, demand), may cause ‘negative reinforcement’ as a 
consequence of the total MWkm reducing. The locational element of the tariff would therefore be negative, 
and this has, at times, been the case for some zones. Engineers might also note that changes to the generation 
or demand background might drive a need for reactive compensation, and this is not modeled at all in the ‘DC 
power flow’ that is used in the charging methodology. On the other hand, the total asset value of reactive 
compensation on the GB network is very small in comparison with that of overhead lines, underground cables, 
transformers, substations and switchgear, and only overhead lines and underground cables are directly 
accounted for in the ICRP approach.  
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It might also be noted that any change in connected generation capacity or demand at any 
node will change the set of nodal MWkm increments, even if only by a small amount. Thus, a 
particular generator, even if it has been connected for some years and would seem to no 
longer drive, by itself, reinforcements, pays charges as if it was increasing output; it will find 
its charges affected by the existence of other generators. It might be argued that an 
established generator should not pay incremental costs if it is not seeking an increase in 
access rights; however, its continued use of the system adds to the overall requirement for 
capacity. A particular generator might choose to give up its rights and would then (in an 
exporting area) reduce the need for transmission; moreover, in an export limited area, under 
present trading arrangements, a generator with access rights has the opportunity to take 
advantage of the constraint by having ‘bids’ to reduce output accepted by the system 
operator22.  
 
The influence of one generator’s actions on another’s charges is somewhat smoothed by the 
levying of average tariffs across a zone. The main problem that arises from the zonal 
approach is when a zonal boundary moves – boundaries are based on clusters of nodes that 
have similar locational tariffs, i.e. similar MWkm cost increments; for a variety of possible 
reasons, one particular node may, one year, have a tariff that is nearer to those at nodes in a 
different zone than in the existing zone and so the zonal boundary would be changed. The 
basing of boundaries on clustering of similar tariffs also means that some network spurs at 
the periphery of the system may have their own zone and very different charges from the next 
node or zone. This can be a particular issue for island connections. 
 
A counter/intuitive effect of the methodology was noted in Russell (2010). As described 
above, one of the inputs to the ICRP model is the network for the particular year for which 
charges are to be set. This will include the net result of any planned reinforcements. One such 
reinforcement might be the reconstruction of a particular route from, say, 132kV to 400kV, 
an investment triggered (on the actual network) by the connection of new generation and the 
need to comply with planning standards. Because the cost per MWkm of a 400kV overhead 
line is less than that of a 132kV overhead line, the difference in cost per MW of connected 
generation between one end of the line and the other would be less than it was before the 
reinforcement, in spite of the generator at the sending end sending its power along a route 
that has just had quite a lot of money spent on it, perhaps because of that generator. Russell 
(2010) suggests that this might send a wrong signal: rather than build a new generation 
facility of size 1 that would not trigger a major reinforcement, build one of size 21 that would 
since the locational tariff (per MW of TEC) would be less even though, by virtue of a 
network reinforcement having just been triggered, the total cost per MW of additional 
generation capacity for the actual development of generation of size 21 and the associated 
extra transmission may be more than for a generation development of size 1)23 However, it 
might also be noted that the total revenue to be recovered by the transmission owner would 
have gone up as a result of the new assets being added to the asset base. Although the 
locational element of the TNUoS charge might have come down as a result of use of a 
                                                 
22 In practice, this opportunity will be more easily exploited by fossil fuelled generation than by wind farms or 
the present generation of nuclear power stations. In addition, it provides an opportunity for generators on the 
other side of the constraint to have offers of increased output accepted. (In monetary terms, the latter are 
normally more expensive). 
23 The total TNUoS charge paid by the second project would, of course, be much more than that of the first so 
whether the signal would have any effect is open to question. However, if the most economic outcome would 
be for a bigger generation development to be undertaken along with the network reinforcement, perhaps the 
signal given would have been correct. 
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smaller expansion constant, the non/locational element would have increased, although this 
will be spread among all transmission users. (A change to the network’s characteristics as a 
result of reinforcements can be summarised as having, in general, three effects: to change the 
pattern of MW flows and hence MWkm; to change the cost applying to a particular branch of 
the network; and to change the total revenue to be recovered.24) 
 
There is another possible way of viewing the above anomaly, noted by SSE (SSE, 2010). The 
very large difference in ‘expansion factors’ that represent the relative costs of reinforcements 
of branches of the network at 132kV and 400kV would seem to suggest that connection of a 
new generator at 400kV is always the right answer, however small the generator is.25 In 
reality, for a particular generator location, the transmission planner will design the connection 
that is most cost/effective for the industry as a whole, and this may be at 132kV.26 
 
Particular further points of detail that might be highlighted in respect of the method and its 
applicability to the present day network situation include the following. 
 
• Network reinforcement in many parts of the GB network is currently being driven not by 
capacity (MW) but by constraints, the latter measured in terms of energy curtailed and 
replaced (MWh) and the prices paid for increments or decrements of energy. 
• The costs used in the costing of MWkm on each branch are based on at least partly on 
historic costs and could be argued to reflect inadequately the actual reinforcement costs 
(which, in recent years, have tended to be higher), and so provide insufficiently strong 
locational signals. (Use of lower branch costs will tend to reduce the MWkm cost 
differences between nodes).  
• There is a proposal to build an ‘embedded’ HVDC link in parallel with the main AC 
system and directly connecting the south west of Scotland to somewhere near Deeside 
(ENSG, 2009). The cost of this is likely to be in the region of £0.8 billion to £1 billion. 
There is currently no representation of HVDC in the ICRP power flow model and no cost 
defined for it in the TNUoS methodology. 
 
One final question we would raise is whether the present methodology is consistent in its 
treatment of offshore and onshore networks (are ‘local circuit’ assets including substations, 
transformers and switchgear treated consistently?), and of offshore networks (which connect 
artificial islands on which generation is located back to the main system) and connections 
between the main system and islands. In the latter case, our understanding of the present 
methodology is that, assuming an ‘expansion factor’ for the connection has been defined, a 
connection from an island to the onshore network would be treated as part of the main 
interconnected transmission system (MITS) due to the presence of demand on the island. It 
                                                 
24 In practice, this last effect would already have been taken account of in the setting of total revenues in a price 
control based on forecast expenditure, or would be taken account of following the next price control. 
25 It might argued that this effect is somewhat offset by the qualifying of the 132kV ‘expansion factor’ to take 
account of planned upratings to 400kV. 
26 The question arises here of what the transmission planner anticipates might happen after: if further generation 
is expected, it may be better to build at 400kV to provide, in the short/term, spare capacity that can be used in 
the longer/term more cost/effectively than to undertake a 132kV transmission development and then some 
additional development afterwards. While such ‘strategic’ or ‘anticipatory’ transmission development would 
seem sensible (see, for example, Bell, 2002), it has, to date, often proved difficult to justify whenever there is 
uncertainty about the later generation connections. 
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would therefore have a ‘security factor’ of 1.8 applied, even if there was only a single cable 
in contrast to use of a ‘security factor’ of 1.0 for offshore connections.27 
 
3''! 
 
		
 We feel that a cost/reflective signal is important to the satisfaction of 
our first principle regarding the overall cost of electricity, and we feel that the signal 
arising from ICRP is broadly in the right direction in that, in general, locations that 
‘need more transmission’ are charged at higher rates than those that ‘need less’. 
However, we note that, under some circumstances, the signals provided might be 
incorrect (discussed in section 6.2.2 above) and that some would argue that the 
locational tariff differences, rather than being too strong, are actually too weak 
relative to the costs of future reinforcements and so provide weakened signals.  
 
A final point on economic efficiency concerns possible differences in the treatment of 
offshore networks, onshore networks and connections between islands and the main 
onshore network. We believe that it is important that there is consistency between 
them in terms of signals towards economic efficiency. 
 
	 Notwithstanding some complaints levied by some generation companies, we 
would regard it as being quite robust, i.e. it is not ‘over/sensitive’ to small changes in 
inputs; at least, that is the case relative to the models described below. The smoothing 
out of the ‘lumpiness’ of real/world network reinforcements helps in this regard, as 
does the averaging over zones. Some generation companies have complained that 
charges levied at the end of a year do not match those forecast before the start of it, 
but the differences are generally small and reflect changes in the level of TEC bought 
by generation companies. Where significant step changes in charges do occur between 
one year and the next, it tends to because zonal boundaries have changed. We 
understand that, hitherto, this has occurred only rarely. However, one significant 
uncertainty going forward that will particularly affect network users in the north is 
how the planned ‘embedded’ HVDC links would be treated in the methodology. 
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	 The fact of ICRP 
being the methodology that is currently applied reveals it to be workable. Moreover, 
for it to continue to be applied would not require any regulatory or legislative 
changes.  
 
		 Although this is the approach currently in use, it is clear from the run/
up to Project TransmiT that it does not attract uniform support among stakeholders.  
 
                                                 
27 The ‘security factor’ is meant to represent the fact that unplanned outages of circuits due to, for example, 
faults, are normally ‘secured’, i.e. they should not cause overloads of other circuits or voltage or system 
stability problems. It often means that the pre/fault power flow on a circuit should be some way below its 
rating to provide some headroom for the re/distribution of power following the outage of another circuit. 
However, for single circuit connections of generation or demand, there is no re/distribution of power flow 
between the generation or demand and the rest of the system, only, in the immediate aftermath of a fault 
outage, a simple disconnection. 
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In this model there are actually a number of variations on a theme, all based around charging 
in accordance with long/run costs of the network but intended to reflect actual network limits 
(and spare capacity) better than the simple approach described above. The variations on the 
theme concern the extent to which the ‘lumpiness’ of network investment (the fact that 
discrete physical works are actually carried out), the timing of investments, the level of 
additional capacity that the charging methodology assumes them to achieve, the period over 
which those new investment costs are to be recovered and the parties on whom those costs 
are levied. By way of example, the following sections will focus on the ‘Long Run 
Incremental Cost’ (LRIC) method that has been adopted for distribution use of system pricing 
in Britain. 
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In microeconomics, setting prices according to marginal costs is considered to send the most 
efficient signals regarding the resource utilization. However, these costs are based on short/
term costs, and in electricity markets reflect the cost of energy without always adequately 
reflecting necessary infrastructure investments. The latter are better reflected under a Long 
Run Incremental Cost method that considers new investments and allocates them to users that 
cause these reinforcements.  
 
The Long/Run Incremental Cost (LRIC) method has been discussed for water charges in 
Britain, and in the electricity sector it has been considered for cost/reflective use/of/system 
charges for the extra high/voltage (EHV) distribution networks. (See, for example, ENA, 
2010). 
 
The LRIC method calculates how new customers, or an increase in a demand or generation of 
existing customers, affects network capacity and thus causes network reinforcement. Unlike 
for a simple long/run method such as that discussed in section 6.2, the calculations take into 
consideration the lumpiness of network investments as well as the time at which increased 
network utilisation would cause the investment to have to be made. The resulting charges are 
calculated based on the annualized cost of the network reinforcement decisions, and the 
process is shown in Figure 2 (Levi, 2009). 
 
As indicated in Figure 2, a forecast of customer behaviour is initially used to evaluate future 
network expansion needs.  These plans are then applied when calculating a cost associated 
with the required expansion, as well as when this reinforcement is needed. As discussed in 
(Levi, 2009), charging models based on LRIC produce nodal charges for each network node.   
 
In the original LRIC approach (Li, 2007), each branch  in considered in isolation from the 
rest of the network and its reinforcement is calculated without limitations on  how far in the 
future it would need to be reinforced. The LRIC approach requires two sets of, typically, 
three load flow calculations representing winter peak demand, summer peak and summer 
minimum. In the first set, the original network is considered. The most critical of these three 
conditions is then used to determine the time that it will take for each component to reach its 
capacity,   assuming a particular forecasted load growth, 
 
 max (1 )
 
  = + ⋅  (1) 
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where max
 is the maximum line capacity, 
 is the calculated line flow for the current 
condition,   is the estimated load growth rate, while   is the time it would take to reach its 
limit, i.e. the number of years before reinforcement would be required. The rearrangement of 
(1) to express time  in terms of known line capacity, max
 , current line flow, 
 , and rate of 
growth of total network load,  , yields, 
 
 
maxlog log
log(1 )

 
 

−
=
+
 (2) 
 
Thus, reinforcement of the considered line, 
 ,  would be necessary after   years. If the value 
of  is larger than the asset’s remaining life (which in the UK is typically set to 40 years), then 
its replacement would not be brought forward. Note that the same growth rate,  in (2) is 
used for the total power injection at each node. In general, it can have either a positive or a 
negative value, indicating load growth or load reduction.     
 
$	!)2'3
$
456$	72	!""/8
 
Given  these  timings  and  the future  reinforcement  costs of this line, 
	 , a  net  present  
value  of  the  future  reinforcement  cost, 
6 ,  for  the network is calculated using a 
discount rate,  , equal to the cost of capital (assessed by Ofgem), 
 
 
(1 )



 
	
6

=
+
 (3) 
 
If there is a particular known or forecast change in the load or generation at a specific node in 
the network, it would affect the above calculated time to reinforcement,  .  
 
The second set of load flows is used to identify the change in line flow of 
  caused by a 
change of injection , at node , . The relationship between a new time to reinforcement, 

 !"#
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
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	 , the change in line flow of 
 , the maximum line capacity
max

 , the whole network load 
growth  and the calculated line flow for the original condition, 
 , is  
 max (1 ) ( )	
 
 
   = + ⋅ +   (4) 
 
Therefore, the new time to reinforcement, 	  consequential to the change of injection 

, at node , , and therefore due to the increase in line flow 
 , is,  
 
 max
log( )
log
log(1 )

 

	 

 
 

+ 
= −
+
 (5) 
 
 
This change of the time to reinforcement, 	 , will also influence  the  net  present  value  of  
the  future  reinforcement  cost, which now becomes 	
6 , 
 
 
(1 ) 	
	 


 
	
6

=
+
 (6) 
 
Furthermore, a change in injection at node , , , , will cause a change in the net present 
value, i.e., 
 
 
1 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )	 	
	 
 


 
 
  
	 	
6 6 6 	
   
 
 = − = − = − 
+ + + + 
 (7) 
 
For the considered line 
 , the annualized incremental cost, 
'3 , is the difference in the 
present value of the future investment as a result of a change of injection, , , at node N 
multiplied by an annuity factor, 
 
 
'3 6 $ =  ⋅  (8) 
 
The above annuity factor reflects the rate of return on investment and an allowance for 
operation, repairs and maintenance. . 
 
Since the change in power injection, , , at node ,, affects a number of lines (or other 
devices) in the network, the total charges attributed to this node will equal to the sum of 
incremental costs for all of the lines affected by the change,  
 
 




, 
,
'3
2'3

=

∑
 (9) 
 
In the above network planning process, a number of considerations could be included when 
deciding which line, and when, needs to be reinforced. These criteria, such as security levels, 
will affect network charges, but will not be addressed further here. 
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A number of observations can be made about the above approach. 
 
1. It is ‘capacity’, i.e. MW, based. 
2. It is based on Long/Run costs. 
3. It is a locational charge, but the revenue reconciliation could be done either by adding a 
surplus charge, or using a multiplier28.  
 
The ICRP method described in section 6.2 could be modified to take into account network 
capacity, and calculate time before a reinforcement would be required. This improved ICRP, 
i.e. IICRP (Levi, 2009), is similar to the original ICRP  model, except that includes maximum 
line capacities which are used to calculate time  to reinforcement which is  a  function  of  the  
loads  and generation as in the case of the LRIC model. In this case there are two functions in 
the cost equation, so the locational marginal charges have two terms. 
 
By virtue of being directly concerned with the remaining capacity of the network and timing 
of the investment than ICRP and being locational, the approach may be thought of as 
approximating ‘deep’ connection charging. A concern of the latter has commonly been the 
imposition of the full cost of an enhancement of transmission capacity on a single user. 
Specific investments tend generally to be ‘lumpy’ and may well leave some spare capacity, 
with the possibility that another user would then have much easier and cheaper access than 
the first one.29 This would seem inequitable, but that effect might be reduced by a sharing of 
transmission charges between the two users once the second one connects, in the ratio of their 
relative capacities. 
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 LRIC indicates when changes to nodal injections would cause power 
flows to exceed the limits of the existing or planned network and reflects the cost of 
network upgrades to accommodate the changes at each location. However, in its basic 
form and in common with ICRP, the approach neglects alternatives to reinforcement 
such as constraint actions in operational timescales. Nonetheless, it has good 
characteristics to promote economic efficiency.   
 
	 The focus on when reinforcements would actually be triggered by breach of 
branch capacity limits makes the method very sensitive to small changes when that 
limit is approached. However, it would be possible for this effect to be reduced by the 
averaging of nodal charges across pre/specified zones. Furthermore, the power flows, 
and hence the time at which a reinforcement is needed on any one branch, are heavily 
dependent on the assumptions made not only for demand growth but also for which 
generators have access to the system in future and how their power will be dispatched. 
On a distribution network with a radial structure and, to date, relatively little 
embedded generation,30 this is much less of a problem than on a transmission network 
                                                 
28 See the discussion of ‘residuals’ in section 6.1.2 
29 The same effect of the making available of spare network capacity may result not only from discrete 
reinforcements but also from changes to load or generation at other locations on the network. 
30 Small scale embedded generation is currently experiencing significant growth following the introduction of 
feed/in tariffs. 
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in which there are many degrees of freedom, all of which are uncertain. (This problem 
of what to assume about a future dispatch of generation is shared by ICRP, but is 
arguably worse here as it goes further into the future). 


	
	
			 As mentioned, the 
LRIC method has been developed for the distribution network in Britain, and has not 
been applied to transmission. While similar principles of recovering network 
reinforcement costs could be considered for a transmission level, there are a number 
of specific details that would need to be taken into consideration., e.g. the process by 
which some forecast of the future generation and demand ‘background’ would need to 
be developed and agreed, and the manner in which the planned HVDC ‘bootstraps’ 
would be treated. However, it is not expected to need significant regulatory or 
legislative changes; it would require a change to the approved TNUoS methodology 
and otherwise would fit with existing transmission licence conditions. 

		One criticism made of ICRP by a number of stakeholders is that they 
regard it as excessively complex. Although LRIC is somewhat familiar to GB 
industry stakeholders through its application to distribution charging, it is 
significantly more complex than ICRP, especially when applied to transmission. On 
the other hand, for a particular forecast of generation and demand ‘background’, it 
ought to provide a more accurate reflection of the cost of additional generation or 
demand at different locations and might therefore be welcomed by at least some 
stakeholders. 
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The Investment Cost Related Pricing system has the advantage of relative simplicity, and 
sends signals to transmission users on the relative cost of different locations.  It can therefore 
affect their investment decisions, helping to minimise the overall cost of generation and 
transmission together.  What it does not do, however, is to affect operational decisions by 
generators (except for those with negative charges, who have an additional incentive to 
generate at the system peak to ensure their eligibility for those charges).  This is unfortunate, 
since there are operational costs to transmission, as well as investment costs.  Indeed, as 
argued in section 5.2.3 above, in an optimal system, the short/run marginal cost (linked to 
operational costs) will equal the long/run marginal cost (linked to investment decisions), at 
least on average. 
 
The ICRP methodology might be amended to send signals of the operating cost of 
transmission.   We call this Investment Cost Related Energy Pricing – ICREP.  A number of 
options might be thought of for precisely how it could be done. Although we have not 
considered it within the scope of our present study to undertake a detailed, quantified ICREP 
design and demonstration exercise, we set out some initial suggestions in Appendix 4. 
 
We believe that charges based on some form of ICREP approach would be simple for 
generators and consumers to interpret and as easy to predict as the current ICRP charges.  No 
significant changes to the industry’s systems would be required to charge generators and 
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suppliers on this basis, since MWh generated and supplied are already used by National Grid 
in calculating BSUoS charges. 
 
Generators will take the charges into account in their operating decisions. This means, for 
example, that generators remote from the main demand centres will have rather higher 
variable costs (fuel plus the transmission charge) than similar generators located nearer to 
them. This is correct even in an unconstrained network, because more of the output from 
those generators is consumed as losses on the system, and less as useful energy.  A charge 
which incentivises the remote generator to produce slightly less, and the local generator to 
produce slightly more, can thus help to minimise the total cost of generation and transmission 
combined.  A reduction in remote output may also help to reduce the extent and cost of 
transmission constraints.  However, a very high charge might be needed to make generators 
self/disconnect (or at least reduce output) while a constraint is binding.  In an LMP system, 
these charges are set when required to resolve congestion, and only at those times – when 
there is no congestion, the transmission charges are much lower.  In ICREP, however, we 
envisage transmission charges which would be stable throughout the year.  Since most 
transmission constraints only bind for some of the time, pre/set transmission charges which 
were appropriate at those times would be far too high for the rest of the year.  The level of 
MWh charges for transmission which minimise the overall cost of generation and 
transmission is something to be determined empirically – the charges would probably exceed 
marginal costs in some hours, and be lower than marginal costs in others.  We suggest that a 
(published) modelling exercise might be undertaken once per price control period to 
determine the pattern of MWh charges that minimises these costs, with some mechanism 
adopted to facilitate both transparency and the transition between one period and the next.31.   
 
The MWh transmission charges would be passed on to consumers in their unit rates for 
electricity, and maximum demand charges would fall.  As already argued in section 6.1.2 
above, this may be no bad thing.  Electricity users with low load factors would gain, those 
with high load factors would lose. 
 
There would be an equivalent shift in the amount paid by generators, although we note that in 
the long term, this should be reflected in the pattern of wholesale prices. Generators with high 
load factors would pay more for transmission, while those with low load factors would pay 
less. We note that where two generators are located in an export/constrained zone, this 
arrangement would naturally allow them to share transmission capacity and its cost since 
each generator would only be paying the MWh charges when it is actually exporting power.  
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   This method of transmission charging would send cost signals 
calculated on the same principles as the ICRP system.  It is thus likely to be as 
efficient as ICRP in terms of users investment decisions.  However, the MWh charges 
also send a signal for operational decisions.  Our concerns regarding ICRP mainly 
centre around its failure to reflect operational decisions by generators, and ICREP is 
                                                 
31 One example might be as follows. A constraint might be imposed that total generation MWh charges are in a 
fixed ratio to the zonal ICRP kW charges for generators, and all demand MWh charges are in a (potentially 
different) fixed ratio to the zonal demand charges.  Different peak and off/peak ratios could be used if the 
pattern of costs varied enough to justify this.  Year/to/year tariff setting would then be on the (more 
transparent) basis of maintaining these ratios 
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intended to overcome this. However, if the operational signals under ICREP were too 
strong, this would also lead to inefficiency, and for this reason, it is unlikely to be 
appropriate to recover the entire transmission cost in MWh charges.  
 
	  This system would have the same advantages and disadvantages as ICRP.  
Charges within zones are relatively stable, but changes in zonal boundaries can have 
significant effects on individual generators.  If some charges are related to the 
generator’s output, this will act as a kind of insurance for low load/factor plant. 
 

  This system is slightly more complex than ICRP pricing, since there would be 
zonal charges in £/kW and in £/MWh.  It would also be possible to have peak and off/
peak energy charges.  Nonetheless, each generator or demand side user would face a 
relatively simple tariff and would not need significant changes to their internal 
systems.  
 
	
	
			  We believe that this system would 
not require significant changes to industry codes and procedures.   
 
		 Our expectation is that this system would approximate the status quo in 
terms of geographical winners and losers.  However, low load factor generators would 
be better off while charges to generators with high load factors would increase, (In 
time, the pattern of wholesale prices or long/term contracts may be expected to adjust 
accordingly.)  Since we expect the system would be more efficient, there should be 
net reductions in costs, although these may not be in a form that allows for easy 
redistribution towards those who would otherwise lose from the changes. 
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In most organised electricity markets in the US, nodal energy prices are set by a system 
operator to equal the marginal cost of electricity at each point on the transmission system in 
each settlement period. There are two main variations of marginal pricing in electricity 
markets: 
 
• system marginal pricing; 
• locational marginal pricing. 
 
Under system marginal pricing the generator offers are stacked in a merit order, and the 
clearing price is defined by the intersection of this curve with the cumulative load curve, as 
illustrated in Figure 3. The market clearing price, or System Marginal Price (SMP), normally 
calculated on an hourly, half/hourly or even 5 minute basis, is then applied to all generators 
uniformly, regardless of their offer or their location. 
 
As the SMP does not explicitly take into consideration transmission constraints, various rules 
have been developed to address this. For instance, the Pool in England and Wales first 
calculated the merit order dispatch without transmission constraints and set SMP on this basis 
of this schedule.  Actual dispatch followed a second, constrained, schedule that took account 
of network congestion, and side payments were made to generators who had to change their 
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dispatch. In the Scandinavian countries, the NordPool market can split into several zones 
when there is congestion on the borders between them, and a (potentially) separate marginal 
price is calculated for each zone.   
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[$/MWh]	
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The approach used in the US is referred to as Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) and is a 
more complex variation of marginal pricing. As in SMP, the market administrator collects 
generator offers and estimates load levels (or collects load bids), and calculates the optimal 
generation dispatch by minimizing cost of generation (or maximizing social welfare). The 
difference here is that the market clearing is subject to various system constraints such as line 
load and voltage limits.  Several of the markets also take marginal transmission losses into 
account, setting higher prices in importing areas because part of the power sent to them is lost 
in the network.   
 
The LMP form of dispatch can be based on a full AC Optimal Power Flow, when calculated 
LMP prices simultaneously reflect energy prices, network losses and network congestion. 
However, some practical approaches to LMP calculations use simplified methods. For 
example, in the PJM market LMP calculations identify three components: energy price, 
transmission congestion cost and cost of losses. This enables a somewhat simplified three/
step LMP calculation process in which each of the components is calculated separately. 
 
While the dispatch algorithm takes account of all generation and demand, the markets run by 
the system operator are  compulsory. Generators can make their own bilateral 
arrangements with loads or suppliers.  They must notify the system operator of their 
intentions, and can offer prices at which they would increase output (or reduce it), which are 
also used in the dispatch algorithm.   
 
Generators are paid the locational marginal price at their node, i.e. the estimated marginal 
cost at that location from the dispatch model, for all the energy they sell through the 
centralised market.  In an area subject to an import constraint, this price will be high, because 
high/cost local generators have to run if the constraint is to be respected.  In an area behind 
an export constraint, the nodal prices will need to be low to discourage production and ease 
the constraint. 
 
There is an obvious incentive for a generator in an export constrained area to trade bilaterally 
if this means that it could achieve a system/wide price, rather than the nodal price depressed 
by the transmission constraint.  To remove this incentive, all physical bilateral transactions 
have to pay a transmission charge equal to the difference between the nodal prices where the 
power is taken out and where it is put in, which would obviously need to be specified in the 
contract.  One or both of these might be the (notional) “National Balancing Point” (NBP) 
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where electricity trading is currently deemed to take place.  These charges on bilateral trades 
mean that a generator putting in power at a low/priced node will have to pay a higher 
transmission charge (since it is subtracting its local price, which is low, when it calculates 
that charge) than one sited at a high/priced node.  A generator at a high/priced node would 
receive a transmission payment if it traded bilaterally.  If the power is injected and withdrawn 
at the same node, no locational charge is payable. There is thus no incentive to either enter or 
avoid the centralised market, from the point of view of transmission charges. 
 
Box 1 below shows how the nodal prices, and associated transmission charges, would be 
calculated in a simplified example. 
 
Box 1 – An LMP example 
 
Consider an electricity market with three nodes, 1, 2 and 3, and several generators at each. The 
example will illustrate application of LMP for the following situations: 
• case i  – operation with no transmission congestion 
• case ii – operation with congestion 
 
	
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This case is shown in Figure B1. The demands, available power and prices at which power is offered 
are shown in Table B1 along with it would be dispatched if there were no transmission constraints. In 
this case, the most expensive generator that needs to run would be Fossil 2 (shown in the darkest 
green shaded area of Table B1), and the market price would be £70/MWh.  All the generation with a 
lower offer price is running, and the most expensive generation (which happens to be at node 3) is not 
required. The revenues received by generators and payments made by demand through the centralised 
market are also shown in Table B1.  
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Node 
Demand 
(GW) Generator
Power 
available 
(MW) 
Price 
(£/MWh) 
Unconstrained dispatch 
(GW) 
LMP 
(£/MWh)
Generator  
Revenues  
(£k/h) 
Load 
Pays 
(£k/h) 
1 6 
Wind 1 3 1 3 
70 
210 
420 Nuclear 1 2 2 2 140 
Fossil 1 6 60 6 420 
2 23 
Nuclear 2 5 2 5 350 
1610 
Fossil 2 33 70 32 2240 
3 33 
Nuclear 3 4 2 4 280 
2310 Fossil 3 10 50 10 700 
Fossil 4 10 100 0 0 
Total 62 
  
73  62 
 
4340 4340 
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Now consider the same demands, available powers and offer prices as in case i but also that there are 
in fact binding limits on transmission: only 3 GW of power can flow from node 1 to node 2, and only 
13 GW from node 2 to node 3, as shown in Figure B2. Dispatch of power under these conditions is as 
shown in Table B2. The table shows the marginal generator at each node in darker shading. It also 
revenues for the generators and payments by demand through the centralised market. 
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Node 
Demand 
(GW) Generator
Power 
available 
(MW) 
Price 
(£/MWh) 
Constrained dispatch 
(GW) 
LMP 
(£/MWh)
Generator  
Revenues 
(£k/h) 
Load 
Pays 
(£k/h) 
1 6 
Wind 1 3 1 3 
60 
180 
360 Nuclear 1 2 2 2 120 
Fossil 1 6 60 4 240 
2 23 
Nuclear 2 5 2 5 
70 
350 
1610 
Fossil 2 33 70 28 1960 
3 33 
Nuclear 3 4 2 4 
100 
400 
3300 Fossil 3 10 50 10 1000 
Fossil 4 10 100 6 600 
Total 62 
  
73  62  4850 5270 
 
 
The demands at each node and the maximum line capacities between them mean that the system is 
split into three price areas. 
• At node 1 where we can generate no more than 9 GW at node 1 (6 GW of local demand, plus 3 
GW of export capacity). The price at this node is now £60/MWh and is determined by generator 
Fossil 1 as it is the marginal generator for this area (i.e. generating the next MW of power will be 
at the price of this generator). Compared with the uncongested case and in order to avoiding 
overloading the line between node 1 and node 2, this generator has had to reduce its output and 
the net export is lower. 
• At node 2, the output from the most expensive generator (Fossil 2) has been reduced compared 
with case i in order that the line connecting node 2 to node 3 is not overloaded. (Power will not be 
exported to node 1 as it has cheaper generation). This is the marginal generator at this node; since 
it had also been the marginal generator in the unconstrained case, the price at node 2 has remained 
£70/MWh. 
• Node 3 has also been affected, but in this case we must generate at least 20 GW there as it has 33 
GW of local demand but only 13 GW of import capacity. This additional generation comes from 
the most expensive generator, Fossil 4, driving the marginal price of energy at Node 3 to 
£100/MWh. 
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From the above example it can be concluded that the transmission congestion on these two lines has 
had a negative impact on generators in areas 1 and 2, because of the reduced price and/or reduced 
power produced. It has also significantly increased the price seen by demand at node 3, which went 
from £70/MWh to £100/MWh. However, because of this increase, congested operation has been 
beneficial for all generators at node 3.   
		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As can be seen from Table B1, in the uncongested case (case i), generators would receive a total of 
£4.34 million for an hour’s operation.  It can also be seen that the total revenues of generators are 
equal to the total payments of all loads. 
When there is congestion (case ii), generators and demand will face different prices at different nodes. 
For example, at node 1, all of the 9 GW of scheduled generation receives £60/MWh; at node 2, the 33 
GW of scheduled generation receives £70/MWh; and at node 3, the 20 GW of scheduled generation 
receives £100/MWh. As can be seen from Table B2, consumers would pay a total of £5.27 million, 
which is above the value of £4.85 million received by generators.  The bill for consumers is larger 
because relatively more demand is located in the node behind an import constraint, where the price is 
higher.  The difference between the amount paid by consumers and the amount received by generators 
is £420,000. This difference is called the Merchandising Surplus and could be kept by the 
transmission owner as a contribution towards its costs.  (Other transmission charges would be reduced 
to offset this.) 
			
The use of LMPs does not mean that all power has to be traded through the spot market.  At the other 
extreme, consider a case where all trading takes place bilaterally. In this case, generators submit 
adjustment bids to the system operator that it uses, where necessary, to re/dispatch generation to 
balance the system and respect transmission limits and to set the LMPs (Galiana 2002 and Kockar 
2002).  Where there is congestion and there are differences in locational prices at some nodes, the 
parties to bilateral trades need to make additional payments to the system operator for its provision of 
network capacity and ancillary services. These are typically based on the nodal price difference 
between the node where seller is located and the node where the buyer is. (If there was no congestion 
between these two nodes, the additional payment to the system operator would be zero).  
Figure B3 illustrates the cash flows of the revenues and expenditures in a market in which there is 
both a centralised market and bilateral trading. 
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To illustrate the effect of bilateral trading, assume that in case ii of the previous example, generators 
at node 1 have bilateral contracts with demand at node 2. They will be required to pay a transmission 
charge of 2 !92 #:£70/MWh – £60/MWh = £10/MWh to move their power from node 1 to 
node 2 where 2 #is the LMP at node 1 and 2 ! is the LMP at node 2. Suppliers at node 1 who 
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have bilateral contracts with generators at node 2 also “pay” a transmission charge – the cost of 
moving power from node 2 to node 1 – which is $ £10/MWh (2 # 9 2 ! :£60/MWh – 
£70/MWh = /£10/MWh). Thus, they receive a payment from the system operator because their 
bilateral trade is causing counter flows. 
Generators at node 3 are in a similar position: the cost of moving power from node 3 to node 2 is 
minus £30/MWh (the price at node 2, £70/MWh, minus the price at node 3, £100/MWh). If a bilateral 
contract involves generation and delivery at the same node, no payment is required; if a generator at 
node 1 sold to a supplier at node 3, a payment of £40/MWh would be imposed.  Any set of bilateral 
trades that turns out to be feasible, i.e. no transmission constraint is breached, will have the net effect 
of moving 3 GW from node 1 to node 2 (at a cost of £10/MWh) and moving 13 GW from node 2 to 
node 3 (at a cost of £30/MWh).  The total cost to the bilateral traders is thus £420,000 an hour, which 
is exactly the same as the congestion rent (Merchandising Surplus) that the system operator would 
receive if all trading took place in the centralised market.   
In reality, the original set of bilateral trades may not be feasible, and then system operator will have to 
trade in the balancing mechanism, buying additional power in import/constrained areas and selling 
power on the export side of constraints until flows fall to acceptable levels.  It is actually these trades 
that would set the LMPs and hence the transmission charges for the remaining bilateral trades.  The 
Merchandising Surplus from trades in the centralised market and the transmission charges from (all 
the originally scheduled) bilateral trades would still come to £420,000. 
 
 
One key feature of the nodal markets in the US is that they are fully compatible with a high 
level of physical bilateral trading.  In 2009, 13% of the real/time load in PJM was met by 
bilateral contracts and 70% by self/supply (generators owned by the company selling the 
power to customers) although some of this may have been traded through the spot market.  
Generators with a bilateral contract can submit adjustment bids that allow the system operator 
to change their output level through spot market sales or purchases – just as British 
generators can do in the Balancing Mechanism.  Generators that do not wish to change their 
output for any reason submit adjustment bids at such extreme prices that they will almost 
never be called – although these generators will therefore miss out on some profitable 
opportunities.32  
 
Most of the organised US markets have a day/ahead market, where most power is scheduled, 
and a real/time market, where payments are based on the differences between the results of 
the day/ahead market (and bilateral transactions) and what actually happens in real time.  The 
real/time market is thus based almost entirely on adjustment bids, just like the Balancing 
Mechanism in Great Britain.  Prices in the real/time market are more volatile than those in 
the day/ahead market, however, since only a relatively small amount of flexible plant can 
respond to unanticipated changes in demand or in the output of other generators.  
Nonetheless, in principle, National Grid could use the bids and offers it receives in the 
Balancing Mechanism to calculate the marginal cost of power at each point on the GB 
electricity system.  These nodal marginal costs would be used to calculate transmission 
                                                 
32 For example, a generator with a marginal cost of £40/MWh might have sold its power in advance at some 
price above this level.  If the wind in its area suddenly rises, the locational price might fall to £30/MWh as 
there is a surplus of generation and some generators need to be persuaded to sell less power.  Our generator has 
the opportunity to reduce its output, saving £40/MWh in fuel, and to spend only £30/MWh in buying back the 
power it has pre/sold (or, equivalently, paying someone else to generate on its behalf).  If the generator had not 
submitted an adjustment bid, or had submitted a bid of (say) minus £500, it would not have been called, and 
would have forgone a profit of £10/MWh for the amount it reduces output.  However, the generator would be 
sensible to submit a very negative bid (requiring a sizeable payment) for any output reduction that forced it to 
stop generating completely and incur the cost of starting up again later. 
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prices.  It might be appropriate to use locational marginal pricing, rather than the current pay/
as/bids system, to remunerate actions in the Balancing Mechanism.  The main imbalance 
prices, however, could still be calculated in the same way as present, if desired. Other key 
features of the UK market, such as the physical nature of bilateral contracts, could be retained 
(Galiana 2002 and Kockar 2002), as well as the relatively late time of the gate closure when 
trading ends, which is more suitable for renewable generators that have generally uncertain 
output. 
 
National Grid would then set transmission prices for every node, relative to the National 
Balancing Point, based on the difference between these nodal marginal costs.  These prices 
would be paid by all bilateral trades and imbalances. Since the prices offered and bid in the 
Balancing Mechanism are used to calculate the transmission charges, the transactions 
accepted in the BM would not have to pay an additional transmission charge – the charges are 
implicit in their individual prices. This system would retain national prices for energy and the 
voluntary nature of the Balancing Mechanism, key features of the current arrangements.  
 
Electricity spot prices are inevitably volatile over time, but locational marginal prices can 
also be geographically volatile – when a transmission constraint binds, the prices on either 
side can diverge sharply. Just as volatility over time can be hedged by selling forward (using 
a physical forward contract or a contract for differences, depending on the nature of the spot 
market), Financial Transmission Rights allow market participants to hedge geographical 
variations in prices (Box 2).  For a fixed amount of power, the holder of an FTR between two 
locations is entitled to receive the difference between their prices.  If the FTR covers trades 
that put power into the system at A and take it out at B, then the payment (per MW of the 
FTR, per hour) will be the price at B minus the price at A.  In many cases, one of the two 
points in the FTR is not a physical location but a “trading hub”, which is also used for trading 
energy.  In PJM, the hub prices are weighted averages of the LMPs in an agreed area.  In 
Great Britain, FTRs might be written against the same notional “National Balancing Point” 
(NBP) where electricity trading takes place.  
 
A generator can acquire an FTR between its own location and the NBP, so that if congestion 
means its own price is low, it will receive a top/up from the FTR.  A trader who is selling 
power into a city across an import constraint which sometimes binds will occasionally have 
to pay a large transmission charge to do so.  Once again, an FTR which covered this trade 
would compensate the trader for that charge, since the payment under the FTR rises with the 
price at which power is taken out of the system.  A generator which sells to a supplier in the 
same area will not generally need an FTR, since the (locational) transmission charge paid by 
the supplier will be the negative of that paid by the generator, and the two will thus cancel 
out.  If a generator sending power to the NBP simply sells the amount of power covered by 
the FTR, then the locational part of its revenues is hedged exactly – and a contract to sell 
energy at the central point could hedge this price, too.  However, the FTR payments are 
independent of the generator’s actions (for a given set of market prices).  This means that if 
the price at the generator’s site is too low, it may be more profitable for the generator to 
reduce output, cheaply buying its power back from the system operator.  The generator thus 
faces the correct incentives to respond to system conditions at its own location.  If it chooses 
not to do so, the forward contract and the FTR have locked in its revenues, but if it does 
respond, it can only increase its profits. 
 
The transmission company also gains from selling FTRs.  Part of its income will come from 
the volatile differences in LMPs, but the FTRs will hedge these price differences.  As long as 
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the FTRs that the company sells are feasible – they represent a pattern of power flows that the 
network could actually accommodate – then any payments that the company makes under the 
FTRs should be offset by payments that it receives from transmission charges.   
 
Some FTRs will involve net payments, on average.  If an FTR covers a power flow from a 
generator in an export/constrained zone, where prices are typically low, its owner will receive 
compensation via the FTR payments.  Typically, such FTRs would be auctioned, and the 
prices paid for them would reflect the expected payments.  However, if a new transmission 
charging system meant that some generators would be financially disadvantaged, FTRs could 
be given to them without payment as a form of compensation.  The generators would expect 
to have to pay transmission charges to move their power from an export/constrained area to 
the main market, but would receive payments exactly equal to the charges they would face 
for some preset level of output.  This would compensate them, but they would still face the 
correct (i.e. low) net price for generating at those times, since their FTR payments are fixed 
but the actual transmission charges they face are based on output.  
 
Box 2: Financial Transmission Rights – an example 
We continue with the example from the previous box.  The level of output from the wind generator at 
node 1 depends on the strength of the wind, of course, and if there is no wind, then the fossil and 
nuclear generators at that node would be able to send their full output (net of the local demand) to 
node 2 without breaching the transmission constraint.   This means that the nodal prices at both node 1 
and node 2 would equal £70/MWh.  If the wind generators are able to run and there is congestion, the 
price at node 1 would fall to £60/MWh.  While nodal prices that reflect system conditions in this way 
are good (by design) at sending signals of the desirable pattern of operation, they are also volatile.    
Case ii in Box 1 showed that with 3 GW of wind output at node 1 and a constrained line between 
nodes 1 and 2, the price at node 1 was £60/MWh, £10/MWh below that at node 2 (£70/MWh).  
Generators at node 1 selling through a centralised market would thus receive £10/MWh less than if 
they were at node 2, while generators making bilateral trades would have to pay £10/MWh 
(£70/MWh / £60/MWh) for the transmission service. However, the differences between LMPs can be 
volatile, exposing the generator to risk. To hedge against this risk, in most LMP/based markets it is 
possible to obtain Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs). These are the instruments which entitle their 
holders to collect a payment (for each of a specified number of MWh) that is equal to the difference in 
LMPs between two specified nodes. They work both in the case of energy being traded centrally and 
in the case of it being traded via bilateral contracts. 
If the generators are trading bilaterally, they can acquire an FTR that pays out the difference in prices 
between the two nodes in their bilateral contract, and hence hedges their transmission charge (equal to 
this price difference).  If a generator is trading in the centralised market, it can hedge general 
fluctuations in the price of power at some “hub” location (such as a ‘national balancing point’, NBP), 
acquire an FTR between the price at its own location and this hub.  The combination of the general 
hedge and the FTR hedges the actual, location/specific, price received by the generator. 
Generators at node 1 selling their power into the centralised market could acquire FTRs from node 1 
to node 2: each MW of FTR entitles its holder to a payment equal to the price at node 2, less the price 
at node 1.  With 3 GW of wind output at node 1 and a congested network as in case ii, this payment to 
the FTR holder would be £10/MWh (£70/MWh / £60/MWh) multiplied by the quantity in MW and 
the duration of the trading period in which those prices apply. That is, if a wind farm at node 1 
acquires an FTR for 3GW between nodes 1 and 2 in case ii, it would be entitled to a revenue of 
£10/MWh × 3,000 MW = £30,000/h.  
The generator is now exposed to fluctuations in the price at node 2, rather than at its own node 1.  
However, if enough market participants are exposed to the same price, then a market can develop to 
hedge it.  In PJM, hedges are available for the “hub” price (an average across a wide area); in Great 
Britain, energy hedges are available for trading against the NBP price.  It would therefore be sensible 
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to write FTRs in terms of this price.  (It would be necessary to define the geographical location of the 
NBP in order to do so, but contracts can be written in such a way that the choice of location is 
financially irrelevant – it changes the balance between generation and transmission prices, but not 
their sum, at any node.)   
For a case in which the wind farm wants to sell its energy via a bilateral contract, recall that it would 
also have to pay a fee for use of the system to facilitate that trade, the fee being equal to the difference 
in LMPs at the selling and buying nodes involved in the bilateral contract, multiplied by the level of 
the energy transfer for the trade. In this case, if the wind farm generates and sells 3 GW of energy at 
node 2 with a bilateral contract, it will have to pay (£70/MWh / £60/MWh) × 3,000 MW = £30,000/h.  
This is the same as the revenue this generator would collect from its 3GW FTR. Therefore, in the case 
of it selling its energy via a bilateral contract, if the generator actually generates the amount of energy 
for which it has FTRs, its payment for the transmission service would be equal to its FTR revenue, 
and it would be completely hedged against the difference between the LMPs. If there was no wind 
output in zone 1 and the price was equal to that in zone 2, there would be no payment under the FTR 
in that hour.  In other words, holding the FTR means that the generator at node 1 is exactly 
compensated for the transmission charges it needs to pay when trading bilaterally. 
Note that the payment under the FTR is determined (for given electricity prices) regardless of what 
the generator did.  This means that the marginal revenue received by generators at node 1 for selling 
an extra MWh of power will equal the market price there (or the system/wide market price, less the 
transmission charge to move power from node 1 to node 2 in the case of a bilateral trade) and that 
price can be used to send signals to those generators.  Since the generator should be expected to 
produce all the power for which the marginal revenue exceeds its marginal cost, sending accurate 
price signals should give optimal results. 
Note that if the system operator issues a set of FTRs that are feasible, in the sense that the power flow 
they imply could be accommodated by the network, then the revenue to the system operator from 
transmission charges will be sufficient to cover the FTR payments.  The net allocation of 3 GW of 
FTRs, however, could well consist of 9 GW of FTRs from node 1 to node 2 for generators at node 1, 
together with 6 GW of FTRs from node 2 to node 1 for suppliers.  The latter imply the opposite 
payment to the generators’ FTR (i.e., the price at node 1 minus the price at node 2) and thus require 
the holder to  the system operator whenever the price at node 1 is below that at node 2, as in our 
example.  With a price difference of £10/MWh, generators holding 9 GW of FTRs from node 1 to 
node 2 would be paid £90,000  an hour, funded by £60,000 per hour of FTR payments from suppliers 
holding FTRs from node 2 to node 1, and £30,000 per hour of congestion rents.  The FTRs can thus 
ensure that practically all parties – those generators able to sell power, suppliers and the system 
operator – are hedged against differences between the LMPs.  Generators who do not hold FTRs will 
not be hedged, however, and in a situation with congestion (and hence more generators behind a 
constraint than can be accommodated) there may well be a mismatch between actual generation and 
FTR holdings.  
In many US markets, FTRs are auctioned to the highest bidder, at prices which reflect the payments 
the holder expects to receive.  The revenue from the auction effectively replaces the revenue that the 
transmission company would earn from congestion rents.  However, lines that are nearly always 
congested will see their FTR prices reach the price of the congestion rent. It is possible, however, to 
allocate FTRs without requiring a payment in exchange.  In this case, the transmission company 
would need a source of funds to make the payments due under the FTR (such as a general increase in 
its charges) but allocating FTRs in this way allows generators and suppliers to be compensated for a 
change in the transmission charging system that would otherwise worsen their situation.  
 
One key question concerns how the prices for FTRs are set.  In the US, FTRs are mainly 
auctioned to market participants.  In Britain, entry rights for gas transmission have been 
auctioned.  The potential problem with an FTR auction, however, is that in the early years (at 
least) market participants would have very little information as to the true value of an FTR.  
In due course, histories of locational electricity price differences would become available, 
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and bidders could use this information to assess an appropriate price to offer for an FTR.  At 
first, however, there is a significant danger that market participants, and particularly smaller 
participants, could end up paying too much for an FTR, or alternatively fail to secure one and 
face excessive price volatility from unhedged LMPs. This will be a particular problem for 
lines that are nearly always congested, which will see FTR prices converge towards the 
congestion rent33. In this situation, the danger that FTR auctions will see generators paying an 
excessive risk premium is particularly acute, as it will be difficult to predict when the 
congestion will not occur.   
An alternative model, which may be particularly attractive as part of a transition process, is 
that users should receive FTRs in exchange for paying fixed annual transmission charges to 
the GB System Operator. These charges could be set according to the current ICRP approach, 
or following a reformed version as described above. The system could be calibrated in such a 
way that most users would see no change in the total that they paid for transmission.  If they 
acted in the same way as at present, generators in an export/constrained area would suffer an 
implicit LMP/based transmission charge during the year arising from the difference between 
the (higher) price at NBP and the (lower) price at their location, for those hours in which they 
were generating. However, in return for paying TNUoS, perhaps calculated by ICRP as at 
present, they would receive the difference between the NBP price and their locational price 
for the hours covered by their FTR. For a baseload generator that continued to run in every 
hour of the year, the payments received under the FTR would exactly offset the penalty of the 
lower location price they received for their energy.  However, the FTR payments are fixed, 
and so the generator’s operational decisions should be based solely upon the local energy 
prices.  This sends an accurate signal of the true value of the generator’s output and should 
lead to efficient decisions. 
In the above arrangement, the allocation of transmission entry capacity (TEC) and the 
liability to pay annual TNUoS charges can be seen as being analogous to the allocation of 
FTRs and the liability to pay for them. One difference is that system users have the choice of 
whether or not to buy FTRs and how many of them to buy whereas TNUoS is compulsory. 
Arguably, the analogy was stronger under a previous charging regime in Britain in which 
connection charging was deeper than it is now. Then, there was some incentive for a new 
electricity user to choose a simpler, cheaper connection design than that required under the 
Security and Quality of Supply Standard, provided no other user was adversely affected by 
the choice. However, the connectee would not have firm access rights and would therefore 
not be entitled to compensation for loss of access when the network has an export constraint. 
Various reforms to arrangements for access to the GB electricity transmission system have 
been proposed that come very close to different ways of managing the allocation and pricing 
of FTRs. Some of these proposals are briefly discussed in section 7.5.2. It could then be 
argued that the key difference between a charging approach based on LMP+FTR and what 
might be in place in Britain after reform of access would concern the trading arrangements. 
These are briefly discussed in section 7.5.1. 
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   LMPs and the associated transmission prices are the most efficient 
system of charging for transmission, reflecting the actual state of the electricity 
system and its associated short/run marginal costs.  If the transmission companies 
                                                 
33 In PJM, FTR prices for some lines that were often congested increased significantly in the last auctioning 
period. 
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undertake the appropriate investments, these short/run marginal costs should also be a 
good approximation of the long/run marginal costs of transmission, at least when the 
former are averaged over time.  As discussed earlier, this long/run marginal cost will 
be less than the average cost, and so some top/up will be required – as with all the 
methods described here. 
 
	  Individual LMPs and the associated transmission charges can sometimes change 
significantly in response to seemingly small changes in system conditions.  However, 
each price only lasts for a single hour.  The individual prices can also be hedged with 
FTRs.  However, if a change in system conditions means that prices at a node will be 
consistently higher or lower by significant amounts (which can happen34) and FTRs 
are auctioned, then the price of the FTR will change to reflect the expected impact on 
the node’s prices, and market participants will not be able to hedge this risk beyond 
the lifetime of the FTRs they currently hold.  There is also the danger of generators 
paying an excessive risk premium for their FTRs. 
 

  This system is potentially the most complex for industry participants, as they 
(potentially) have many prices to keep track of.  Computer systems would have to 
record the location of each generator and its associated prices or transmission charges, 
and contracts would have to be rewritten to reflect the new rules.  However, similar 
markets have been operating successfully in the US for over a decade, and so the 
systems required to implement them are well/known35.   
 
	
  	
  		 	 This system would require 
significant changes to industry codes and procedures, but because US models could 
be adapted, the industry need not start with a blank piece of paper.   
 
		  We suspect that many stakeholders would resent the additional cost of 
implementing a system of this kind.  It may involve stronger signals of the cost of 
transmission than are currently sent, and would thus tend to disadvantage northern 
generators and southern consumers.  The value of the hedge provided by purchase of 
FTRs may be difficult to predict and would therefore tend to favour those market 
participants with greater resources to carry out detailed modelling and those with 
greater experience of the operation of the GB electricity market. However, if FTRs 
were allocated to compensate transmission users in return for tariff payments that are 
close to current levels, this might well dilute their opposition. 
 
                                                 
34 One example of a significant change would be that brought about by a reinforcement to increase the 
transmission network’s power transfer capability. Normally, such a reinforcement would be signalled well in 
advance though, for example, the Seven Year Statement. However, major transmission reinforcements are 
subject to uncertainty both in the granting of planning permission and, according to current practice, regulatory 
approval for the transmission owner to be able to recover the cost. In a set of arrangements in which net 
congestion rent and the revenues from sale of FTRs are meant both to indicate the need for transmission 
reinforcement and to fund it, significant complexities can be foreseen. 
35 As a counterpoint to this observation, it might be noted that transition to locational marginal pricing (with 
financial transmission rights) was considered around 2005/6 for the National Electricity Market in Australia. 
However, the proposed reform was not taken forward largely in light, as we understand it, of concerns about 
the total IT cost and revenue adequacy in respect of sale of FTRs and compensation given to holders.   
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In this section, we present a comparison of the main models outlined in section 6 in the 
context of against the assessment criteria presented in section 4. 
  
We regard the ultimate objective of a set of electricity trading and transmission arrangements 
as being to: 
 
 minimise the total cost of electricity in both the short and long/term 
 
 subject to  
 
• meeting the 2020 renewable energy targets; 
• achieving at least a certain minimum level of reliability of supply. 
 
Thus, we also express our views on the ability of each main charging models to contribute to 
the minimisation of the cost of electricity and the extent to which it might jeopardise the 
meeting of the 2020 renewable energy targets or the achievement of a certain level of security 
of supply. However, we note that a wide range of factors influence both the objective and the 
meeting of the constraints while only transmission charging arrangements are within the 
scope of our review. In addition, the approaches described in section 6 above are only a few 
of the possible approaches – others that we have not discussed might be judged to fit the 
overall objectives and constraints better though, for many of them, there is likely to be little 
practical experience. Furthermore, there are a number of details of implementation of the 
main approaches described in section 6 that can materially affect the outcome relative to the 
objective and constraints set out above. We do not seek to resolve those details here. 
 
Before starting the discussion of how each model seems to perform with respect to the main 
objective and constraints, we recall our first high level principle and note that, hitherto, the 
extent to which consumers of electrical energy can or do respond to different signals about 
location is limited. The most significant recipients of signals are therefore generators. In the 
short/term, they can affect the way that existing generation is utilised. In the long/term, they 
can affect investment in new generation capacity, both its type and its location. In light of the 
two constraints expressed above – on renewable energy targets and security of supply, it 
would be useful to recall other influences on generation investment. These have been 
described by Oxera on behalf of Scottish Power as including (Oxera, 2010): 
 
• the ability to gain Section 36 planning approval; 
• local public acceptance of the proposed development; 
• proximity to the electric power network and cost of connection to it; 
• for fossil fuelled plant, access to fuel such as via the gas transmission network; 
• for thermal plant, availability of cooling water; 
• land availability and cost; 
• for future CCS plant, proximity to CO2 transport and storage facilities; 
• impact on local flora and fauna; and 
• availability of labour. 
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To the above might be added, for wind farms, the local average wind speed and visual impact 
of an energy conversion facility. For generation of all types, we might also note that some of 
the most significant potential investors are international companies that are likely to judge the 
attractiveness of investment in generation in Britain in comparison with that in other 
countries. In all cases, however, the investors will aim to resolve the different influences and 
the available financial support for low carbon generation in a way that maximises their return. 

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To minimise the total cost of electricity, including that of ‘production’ and ‘transport’, it 
seems reasonable to us that signals should be expressed that attempt to coordinate choices of 
location for generation with those for development of transmission and, as argued in section 3 
above, those making decisions should be exposed to their consequences. In a transmission 
charging context and in order to encourage a minimisation of the overall cost of electricity, 
this depends  on appropriate and accurate ‘cost/reflective’ signals being given to network 
users  on those users having an opportunity to respond to them. The influences are 
illustrated in Figure 1 in section 2.3. (As has already been mentioned in relation to the 
demand side and will be discussed in section 7.3 below in relation to the generation side, 
network users do not always have this opportunity). 
 
Of the four main methods outlined in section 6, postage stamp pricing performs least well in 
this respect as it sends no signals that would lead to minimisation of the cost of transmission 
as part of the overall cost to consumers of electricity. Worse, it may send signals that would 
drive up the overall cost of electricity as a consequence of new generation capacity 
connecting in parts of the transmission system that are export limited36. In the short/term, this 
will lead to increased costs; it seems to us that these are most likely to benefit fossil fuelled 
generation, which seems a perverse outcome if the intention of a postage stamp approach is to 
encourage development of renewables. (We observe that these cost implications are also true 
of the UK government’s ‘connect and manage’ policy). In the longer term, it should be 
possible to limit the level of constraint costs by investment in appropriate additional 
transmission capacity, but this also has a cost. 
 
The other methods all provide signals that ought to contribute to the minimisation of the cost 
of electricity. Many academic authors have argued that locational pricing of electricity would 
bring about the greatest economic efficiency (Hogan, 1992; Brunekreeft, 2005). In respect of 
short/run signals and with adequate liquidity in the market this is likely to be true. The 
opportunity for incumbent or future generators to exploit export constraints would be reduced 
and any attempt by ‘must run’ generators in import limited areas to exploit their situation 
should lead directly to network reinforcements37. Differences in prices between locations 
ought to signal appropriate resolutions of production costs and transmission costs, network 
                                                 
36 In theory and as consequence of an increase of transmission charges in importing areas, another outcome 
might be to help bring forward the closure of generation in those areas and either put security of supply in 
those areas at risk or else increase constraint costs as a consequence of increasing dependence on a few ‘must/
run’ generators for long periods. 
37 We are not sufficiently aware of the industry situation in parts of the US where LMP has been implemented to 
say if high locational prices driven by import constraints have led to investment in additional transmission 
capacity to give consumers in those high price areas access to cheaper electricity generated elsewhere. 
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losses (in the short/term) being an important part of the latter. However, the effect in the 
longer/term would depend on the degree to which differences in short/run prices would 
influence decisions on location of new generation and investment in additional transmission 
capacity to give expensive locations access to power at cheaper locations.  
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One of the main anxieties about locational pricing of energy is the variability of prices and 
the difficulty of forecasting them and hence of driving ‘correct’ responses to them. It has 
been argued that uncertainties around locational prices can be offset by market participants 
buying FTRs which have the effect of compensating for short/run differences in prices (or 
transmission charges) between locations. However, whatever the computational tools that 
might be available to market participants and the party responsible for making FTRs 
available (usually the System Operator), there is still some uncertainty about how many FTRs 
should be made available (usually for auction) as the actual transfer capability varies through 
the year and, for market participants, how many they should buy and at what price. 
Judgement is required to answer these questions (or to define a mechanistic approach to 
answering them) and it is usually the case that uncertainty brings with it higher costs. 
 
The need for quite sophisticated analysis and decision making would seem normally to 
favour larger market players over smaller ones, although it might be argued that ‘aggregators’ 
might help groups of smaller players to manage their risks. Moreover, large companies with 
market power may be able to manipulate prices in a system based on LMPs, just as they have 
exploited transmission constraints under non/geographical pricing in Great Britain (Offer, 
1992).  Under an LMP system, generators behind an export constraint may be careful to offer 
so little power to the market that the constraint does not bind, and their price does not fall to 
the level which the constraint might suggest.  Under uniform pricing, generators may attempt 
to schedule large amounts of power to flow across a constraint, and then refuse to buy it back 
except at a very low price.  Green (2007) found that a system of geographically differentiated 
prices was less vulnerable to market power than a uniform price, but we do not regard that 
paper to be the last word on the subject.  
 
The comparison between LMP and uniform pricing exposes differences between the way in 
which a set of locational marginal prices reveals the ‘cost’ of a transmission constraint and 
the way in which it is revealed under Britain’s current trading arrangements. It could be asked 
which gives the truer reflection of the ‘real’ cost of constraints, something which is very 
important to the overall electricity cost not only because consumers, in the end, pay the cost 
of constraints, but also because the apparent cost of constraints will be used in determining 
the level of investment seemingly needed for additional transmission capacity and because 
income from a variety of balancing services might be finally make the difference to a 
generator’s overall commercial viability. 
 
As will be discussed briefly in section 7.5.1, the two sets of trading arrangements differ in a 
number of important respects, and all must be considered when evaluating the overall effect. 
However, the timescales over which prices are set are also important. In the GB balancing 
mechanism, the set of ‘final physical notifications’ is revealed only an hour before the start of 
the trading period to which they relate. Unless the system operator has been able to make 
some forecasts and to strike ‘pre/gate’ or availability contracts, they and the generators that 
are the main contributors to balancing actions therefore have little time in which to act. It 
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could therefore be argued as being inevitable both that actions to increase generation have 
much higher prices than actions to decrease output as they are much more costly to effect 
(especially at short notice)38, and that ‘offer’ prices exhibit significant volatility39.  
 
The attempt to schedule large amounts of power across an export constraint and offer only 
very low – or negative – prices to buy it back is known as ‘the dec game’ and it might be 
supposed that it can be played, for example, on the northern side of the ‘Cheviot’ constraint 
in Britain. However, it might also be worth noting that most of the cost of constraints is for 
the replacement energy (through accepted ‘offers’, which typically range between £25/MWh 
and £180/MWh) to balance an output reduction action (effected through accepted ‘bids’, 
typically ranging between £5/MWh and £50/MWh) (National Grid, 2009)40. 
 
It has been noted above that overall economic efficiency depends both on signals of cost 
implications being given to inform actions and the opportunity for actors to respond to them. 
It is obviously important that the signals should be accurate in their reflection of costs. In this 
respect, it was noted in section 6.2 that, largely because of changes in the drivers for the main 
enhancements to capacity of the main interconnected transmission system, the simple long/
run approach used in the present TNUoS methodology is not entirely accurate. In principle, 
more refined long/run approaches should be more accurate though, depending on the details 
of their implementation, the derivation of cost signals can be highly complex and highly 
dependent on a forecast of the generation and demand ‘background’. An approach based on 
LMP, while theoretically accurate in reflecting on trading of electrical energy the impact of 
lack of transmission capacity, is also complex and is influenced by many factors; how 
network users respond to signals, in terms of acquisition of FTRs and selection of locations 
for new power generation facilities, depends, it seems to us to a greater extent than the other 
methods, on the quality of their own analysis, judgment and their attitude to risk. Moreover, 
as has been noted above, LMPs seem not to be immune to the problems associated with lack 
of competition in particular areas of a power system. 
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It may be recalled (a) that one purpose of transmission charging is to provide signals to 
transmission users regarding location (the other being the recovery of reasonable costs) and 
(b) that much demand for electricity is relatively unresponsive to price signals, particularly in 
respect of location. On the other hand, generation does seem to be sensitive to locational 
signals. That would seem to indicate that transmission charges should be levied only on 
generation – in order to influence generators’ investment and operational decisions – and not 
on demand. However, there are some classes of demand that one would expect would be 
                                                 
38 Nuclear and wind would generally be expected to be dispatched at their maximum available outputs and 
would therefore have no headroom for increments of power. However, reductions in power for these may be 
very expensive. For nuclear stations, it may be very difficult and time/consuming to subsequently increase 
output again, and this would likely be factored into ‘bid’ prices. For wind, reduction in output would entail loss 
of income from, under present industry arrangements, renewable obligation certificates. This, too, would be 
factored into ‘bid’ prices. 
39 One of the arguments presented in Ofgem (2010) for introduction of a capacity mechanism is that these prices 
are not high enough. 
40 In National Grid (2009), it is noted that a bid price for reduction of wind output of /£450/MWh is being 
assumed for constraint cost forecasting, i.e. the system operator should pay the wind farm operator £450 for 
each MWh of reduced output. This figure might be compared with lost income from inability to register output 
for Renewable Obligation Certificates, which are typically worth around £50/MWh. 
				  
	 !"##
Bell, Green, Kockar, Ault and McDonald   56
sensitive to locational signals (industrial demand, in particular) and there is the prospect of 
greater demand side response in future; there is no overwhelming reason that we can think of 
why future demand side response should not have a locational element and be exposed to the 
cost implications of decisions. In other words, both generation and demand should face a 
locational element in their transmission charges. However, as we have already observed in 
section 6.1, locational elements of charging or pricing generally do not succeed in recovering 
the total cost of the network. This is equally true of the locational element of present day 
TNUoS and of the ‘congestion rent’ accruing to the system operator from a system of 
locational marginal prices. Some additional charge should be levied and, as suggested in 
section 6.1, this might be done on a ‘postage stamp’ basis and be levied exclusively on 
demand since all charges will eventually find their way through to a bill for consumption 
anyway. 
 
One final cost implication concerns the impact on trading electricity between countries.  If 
one country only charges consumers for transmission, then wholesale prices that reflect 
generators’ costs will be lower than in a second country which splits transmission charges 
between consumers and generators.  With higher costs, the generators have to recover these 
through higher wholesale prices.  This would place them at a competitive disadvantage when 
it came to trading power with the first country.  This could distort trade flows, so that the 
country which charged its generators for transmission would tend to import more power, and 
export less, than if both countries recovered the entire cost directly from consumers.  The 
circumstances of individual country pairs would determine whether such a distortion was in 
fact economically significant.  In some cases, charges for using the interconnector between 
the countries might offset the different treatment of transmission costs, although we note that 
such charges would have to be consistent with EU policy. Alternatively, in order to minimise 
distortion of power flows due to different components of the cost of electrical energy and its 
transport being levied on generators in different countries, transmission charging in each 
country – including Britain – might be designed so that the total charge levied on generators 
was zero. However, this need not be the same thing as saying the charge for each and every 
generator will be zero; rather, because locational signals remain important, some charges 
would be negative and some positive so that the average – and the total recovered from 
generators – is zero. 
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The key consideration in respect of the renewables targets and the impact of transmission 
charging arrangements is whether those arrangements would make investment in renewable 
generation capacity so difficult or unattractive that insufficient volumes would be delivered 
by 2020. Up to 2020, we expect the majority of the new capacity to be in the form of wind 
farms. Achievement of the 2020 targets would be adversely impacted if the locational 
transmission charging differentials were so large that  
 
a) investment in wind generation in what, in other respects, would be the most attractive 
locations is made commercially unviable by the cost of access to and use of the 
transmission system; and 
b) investment in wind generation in other locations is made commercially unviable by 
the low load factors of those locations and the consequential impact on revenue from 
sale of energy, presentation of Renewable Obligation Certificates or, depending on 
the outcome of Electricity Market Reform, income from feed/in tariffs, or  
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c) development of wind generation in other locations is delayed or prevented by, in 
particular, difficulties in gaining planning permission. 
 
Without detailed, quantified analysis (which is outside our present scope), it is very difficult 
for us to judge precisely the consequences of the main different transmission charging 
approaches in respect of the above. Nevertheless, it might be judged that, of the four main 
approaches outlined in section 6 and given that the best wind resources tend to be remote 
from the main demand centres in Britain, a postage stamp approach would seem to be the 
most benign in respect of the risk of breaking the renewables target constraint. However, that 
is not the same thing as saying that the others $
 cause it to be broken.  
 
Without access to commercially sensitive data and with our own analysis of the viability of 
generation projects being outwith the scope of the present project, it is hard for us to judge 
the material effect of the locational tariff differences on generation investment. Connections 
of wind farms, and applications to connect, in the more expensive parts of the network are 
still taking place (National Grid, 2010c). At least one wind farm project has been said to have 
been abandoned by its developer as a direct consequence of high TNUoS charges, and 
another by the combination of TNUoS charges and ‘final sums liabilities’ (SSE, 2010), 
although we also understand that the former was bought by another developer. Moreover, that 
particular project was on Orkney and would have required a new undersea cable connection 
to the Scottish mainland. If the TNUoS tariff on Orkney was significantly higher than that in 
TNUoS tariff zone 1 (“North Scotland”) and correctly reflected the cost of the cable, the load 
factors on Orkney were similar to those at feasible sites in zone 1 and all other things were 
equal, then we would argue that a correct signal was sent. Otherwise, whether the 
connections and applications to connect are fewer than would otherwise have been the case is 
impossible for us to say.  
 
As mentioned, detailed analysis would be required to be able to comment with confidence on 
the relative effects of the three main cost/reflective methodologies on the meeting of 
renewables targets. However, it seems to us that an approach that is more complex will be 
more of a deterrent to investors than one that is simpler, and one that provides greater 
certainty of charges will be better than one with less certainty. This would seem to indicate a 
preference for simple long/run pricing such as in the present TNUoS methodology. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that different instruments are already used to offset apparent 
cost disadvantages of one technology with respect to another if doing so is consistent with 
wider energy policy. In principle, such extra support might be extended to particular locations 
to ensure that projects that wider energy policy considerations seem to indicate are required 
remain economic. This is discussed further in section 7.6 below. 
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‘Strong’ cost/reflective pricing is what the principle of economic efficiency and minimisation 
of the total cost of electricity would seem to require. It has been noted above that that might 
cause problems for the meeting of renewables targets if the only sites that can developed are 
in locations at which transmission charges (and other costs) are so high that developments are 
no longer commercially viable. However, if required, those negative effects might be 
counteracted with stronger support measures for renewables (or, indeed, other low carbon 
plant).  
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It might be expected that strong cost/reflective transmission pricing would also deter 
investment in fossil fuelled generation in locations remote from the main demand centres. For 
the foreseeable future, such plant is likely to remain extremely important to ‘security of 
supply’; thus, cost/reflective, locational pricing might be argued to put security of supply at 
risk. 
 
One scenario that might be envisaged would involve existing coal plant in the north of Britain 
being only marginally viable commercially so that the locational disadvantage it faces by 
virtue of cost/reflective transmission charging is enough to persuade its owners either to 
retire it immediately or decline to invest in life extension. With a squeeze on plant margins 
already anticipated (DECC, 2010d), this would seem to make a bad situation worse as far as 
security of supply is concerned. However, another scenario might be envisaged: postage 
stamp transmission pricing would reduce the locational advantage for fossil fuelled plant in 
the south enough for them to cease to be commercially viable so that their owners either retire 
them or decline to invest in life extension. 
 
Either of the above scenarios would seem to be bad for security of supply. However, it should 
also be noted that the UK government is proposing to establish a mechanism for contracting 
with generation to provide sufficient capacity to meet some target plant margin (DECC, 
2010d). This may be expected to counteract an adverse transmission charging effects. 
Moreover, it is suggested in DECC (2010d) that such a capacity mechanism may have a 
locational element to recognise the different value different amounts of generation capacity 
have in different parts of the network due to finite limits on power transfer capabilities. Thus, 
whatever is gained (or lost) by peaking plant in respect of a non/locational (or locational) 
transmission charging arrangement may be taken away (or gained) by a locational capacity 
contracting arrangement. 
 
In practice, the contribution to security of supply of peaking generation in the areas remote 
from demand depends on there being sufficient network capacity for it to be used. Its security 
of supply benefits (compared with comparable plant nearer the main demand centres) would 
seem to depend on transmission, and it would seem correct that the cost of transmission is 
taken into account when evaluating the cost/effectiveness of different options. However, one 
should also consider the future system conditions under which such plant would be needed. 
 
In a future system in which there is much more wind generation than there is now, the 
conditions under which reserve generation capacity, generally expected to be fossil fuelled,41 
would be required would be those when the wind power available is low. Under these 
circumstances, wind generation in the remoter parts of the network would not need to use the 
network’s capacity; fossil fuelled reserve generation would then be able to use it instead. In 
other words, a particular level of network capacity can be shared between wind and fossil 
fuelled plant; the amount of network capacity that would need to be built would be less than 
if the simultaneous operation of both classes of generation needed to be accommodated. This 
lower need for transmission should then be reflected in the transmission charging 
arrangements as lower locational tariffs than would otherwise have been the case. However, 
                                                 
41 It has been suggested in some quarters that the demand side can, in future, play a significant part in providing 
response and reserve. We agree with this view. However, the demand side’s contributions depend on the 
timescales over which it is required and are unlikely to obviate the need for generation – or interconnector – 
capacity to cover, for example, high pressure conditions arising in winter that linger for some days in which 
little or no wind power is available. 
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as will be discussed in section 7.5, present transmission access and trading arrangements in 
GB do not seem to lend themselves to this outcome42. 
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As will have become apparent from the foregoing discussion, different options for 
transmission charging arrangements and their seeming impacts interact with other electricity 
arrangements, in particular those for trading and transmission access. Although these are 
outside the scope of our review, we believe it is important that the interactions are noted.  
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A major feature of trading arrangements is the way in which the system is balanced in ‘real 
time’. In Britain at the moment, the system operator’s costs in operating the system and 
procuring balancing services are recovered via the Balancing Services Use of System 
(BSUoS) charge, which is levied on a MWh basis in a ‘postage stamp’ manner. While we 
believe that, for the purposes of overall economic efficiency, cost/reflectivity should be part 
of the recovery of the system operator’s costs, it seems that this has been ruled out by DECC 
in its decision to ‘socialise’ the costs of ‘connect and manage’ (DECC, 2010c)43. 
 
A major influence from existing trading arrangements is exerted on the apparent need for 
investment in additional transmission capacity, something that a cost/reflective charging 
methodology is designed to signal. As described in section 2.2, one of the drivers is to reduce 
constraint costs. While reference to this has always been possible as a justification for 
reinforcement, the connection of, in particular, wind generation in areas remote from the 
main demand centres is arguably making it more important. However, while historic 
constraint costs provide a good starting point for a cost/benefit analysis, there is much 
uncertainty around future constraint costs. They depend not only on the volume of constraint 
actions – measured in MWh, undertaken at different times of the year – and their individual 
costs but also on the initial dispatch of generation and the presence (or otherwise) of outages 
on the network (Bell, 2010). It might also be argued that the nature of the trading 
arrangements in Britain tend to exaggerate constraint costs – the system operator is obliged to 
                                                 
42 It has been argued by some that the system design criteria in the Security and Quality of Supply Standard 
(SQSS) do not permit such a ‘sharing’ of network capacity. However, it has never been the case that sufficient 
transmission capacity is built to permit levels of export associated with all generation in an area running at 
100% output, not even at time of peak demand when exports under such generation conditions would be lower 
than at off/peak times. In other words, the network has never been designed to be constraint/free. On the other 
hand, the level of simultaneous output of generators in an area that a transmission planner should design the 
network to accommodate does not, as written in the present SQSS, seem to treat wind in a clear and robust 
manner. It is this issue that was the initial prompt for the ongoing review of security standards. Nevertheless, it 
should also be recognized that the proportion of a generator’s possible output that the network should be able 
to accommodate is dependent not only on the technical characteristics of that generator but also on market 
interactions and the level of access rights that the generator has bought. The issue is therefore closely tied to 
trading and access arrangements. 
43 “DECC’s view is that the analysis [of different ‘connect and manage’ – C&M – options] also highlighted the 
complexity of implementation and monitoring arrangements associated with the non/socialised C&M models. 
The sensitivity analysis … also suggests that the non/socialised C&M models would lead to unpredictable and 
highly volatile charges in specific parts of the network under certain scenarios. These factors (complexity, 
unpredictability and volatility) would in DECC’s view increase the perceived risk to investors and has the 
potential to deter investment in generation.” (DECC, 2010a) 
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accept bids and offers to change a dispatch determined by the generators themselves rather 
than for the initial dispatch to be determined on a system/wide basis. Although the scope 
would be reduced by the use of post/fault actions44 or the striking of forward contracts by the 
system operator with relevant generators, the presence of few individual generating 
companies in a particular constrained area would seem to leave both initial dispatches and 
(for exporting areas) bids or (for importing areas) offers open to manipulation. 
 
In comparison with the arrangements described above, the partial centralisation of dispatch45 
that is an important feature of trading arrangements based on locational marginal pricing 
would seem to have some attractions. However, notwithstanding the apparent benefits of 
LMP complemented by ‘financial transmission rights’ (FTR), it would seem that, on the face 
of it, its adoption in Britain would necessitate a major change to trading arrangements, 
something on which the UK government, insofar as it is addressed in the recent consultation 
on Electricity Market Reform, is less than keen (DECC, 2010d). 
 
It is not our intention to conduct a review of different options for trading arrangements but we 
note the following choices that would normally need to be made. Locationally differentiated 
pricing may be achieved on a node/by/node basis as in full LMP or on a zonal basis as has 
existed, for example, in some regions of the US, in the ‘NordPool’ in Scandinavia and is 
understood to be being considered by the European Commission for implementation of a 
single European electricity market46. In the latter case, decisions need to be made about the 
delineation of the zones and, ideally, about how they might be changed to reflect different 
background conditions as they develop. Alternatively, as was the case in the former England 
and Wales ‘Pool’, there may be a single, system wide price. Another choice in trading 
arrangements concerns the dispatch of generation, whether it should be ‘centralised’ as in the 
former England and Wales ‘Pool’ or the current single electricity market on the island of 
Ireland, or decentralised as in the current GB arrangement47. Finally, it should be decided 
whether generators should all be paid according to a ‘marginal price’ or should be ‘paid as 
bid’.48 Any reform of trading arrangements should consider these and other design 
dimensions in a robust manner in light of some clearly defined electricity trading objectives 
set in the context of wider energy policy.  
 
It has been suggested by some that something approximating LMP could be synthesised by 
the addition of a locational transmission signal to a single energy price. Such a single energy 
                                                 
44 Normally, power transfer limits are consequences of the need to ‘secure’ the system, i.e. prevent breach of 
operational limits were a ‘secured event’ such as an unplanned outage to occur. The most common such events 
are faults, and, depending on the nature of the critical operational limit, corrective actions after the fault may 
suffice instead of pre/fault preventive actions.  
45 The option of bilateral trading remains. 
46 In Baldick (2011), arguments are presented in favour of a nodal approach and against a zonal one. 
47 It was argued in reform of the electricity market on the island of Ireland that centralised dispatch should be 
preferred as the more efficient means of managing the variability of wind energy. A similar argument was 
mentioned in Newbery (2011). 
48 Arguably, the two main effects of the ‘New Electricity Trading Arrangements’ (NETA) introduced in England 
and Wales in 2000 were to move from centralised to decentralised dispatch and for generators to be paid as 
bid.  The latter was (controversially) argued as mitigating the exercise of market power in setting the marginal 
price that was paid to all dispatched generators regardless of their offer. (In a pay/as/bid system, it might be 
expected that all offers would rise relative to those under marginal pricing, but some might rise by less than 
others). 
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price might be represented by the ‘System Buy Price’ (SBP) in BETTA49, though, in reality, 
there may be no need for such a single price to be articulated – it might suffice for the 
locational element of a price to be expressed50. To have a good match with LMP, the 
locational transmission signal ought to be one that is time dependent and is updated at the 
same rate as the wholesale energy price, i.e. the value of the signal depends on system 
conditions (and constraints) in a particular settlement period. This might appear to look a lot 
like a locational BSUoS charge, but this was seemingly ruled out by DECC’s decision to 
‘socialise’ the additional constraint costs associated with ‘connect and manage’ (DECC, 
2010b). Nevertheless, a further option would seem to remain: for the locational transmission 
signal to be a long/run one, based on some kind of capture of transmission constraints and 
costs over the course of, say, a year. This starts to look a lot like a locational TNUoS charge 
with an energy element. While there are clearly different options for how that locational 
TNUoS charge is worked out and much is likely to depend on the detail, the model is 
functionally the same as currently exists. 
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Transmission access rights in Britain, for generators, concern the right to export up to a 
certain amount of power onto the transmission system. It is outside the scope of the current 
review to address the many concerns that have been raised within the industry in Britain 
about access rights. However, we do highlight a few because of the way they interact with 
transmission investment and hence, because of the way that transmission charges should 
reflect the costs of the transmission network, transmission charging. 
 
An analogy between allocation and pricing of FTRs and allocation of TEC and levying of 
TNUoS charges has been suggested in section 6.5.1. Arrangements in the US around 
locational marginal pricing and financial transmission rights include some features that would 
not depend on reform of trading arrangements. However, they would involve reform of 
access arrangements and include measures intended to allocate scarce transmission capacity 
and gain clearer, ‘market/driven’ signals on the need for additional transmission capacity. 
Such measures include auctions for access rights and have been considered as part of the still 
ongoing review of transmission access (Ofgem, 2009a). They have a clear link with the 
charges that transmission users would need to pay and, in the choice between ‘firm’ and 
‘non/firm’ access rights, entitlement to compensation for loss of access (analogous to gaining 
a system energy price) or not (analogous to gaining only a local energy price). 
 
One of the criticisms typically made of the present TNUoS methodology is that charges 
actually levied often turn out differently from those that had been forecast. One of the main 
                                                 
49 SBP in a particular settlement period in the GB Balancing Mechanism is a function of offers accepted solely 
for ‘energy’, i.e. it does not include offers tagged as being necessary for the resolution of network power 
transfer constraints or consequential to them. 
50 One difficulty with the wholesale trading arrangements in Britain at present is that the majority of energy is 
traded – and priced – bilaterally and prices in the balancing mechanism concern changes to physical dispatches 
of (mainly) generation where the initial dispatches are driven by the bilateral trades. Moreover, within the 
balancing mechanism, two ‘cash out’ prices are articulated – ‘system buy price’ and ‘system sell price’. It 
would therefore seem to be difficult to say what a single wholesale energy price in any one trading period 
would be. In the UK government’s recent consultation on Electricity Market Reform, it was suggested that a 
‘contract for difference’ based feed/in tariff for low carbon generation would use a single electrical energy 
‘wholesale price’ as the ‘strike price’ (DECC, 2010d). It did not say how this wholesale price would be 
calculated. 
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reasons for this is the access rights sought by generators and subsequently awarded often 
differ from those that National Grid had anticipated when carrying out the TNUoS forecast. 
While generators seeking new rights must apply for them to the system operator and must 
await and sign an offer before they can be exercised, the same uncertainty about the future 
access rights that generators will use affects transmission system planning. Notable among 
the uncertainties are: rights offered for some future time are not necessarily exercised; rights 
can be given up at short notice.  
 
The aforementioned review of transmission access had, as one of its objectives, the desire to 
give greater certainty on the future need for transmission. One proposal involved the 
following (Bell, 2009): 
 
1. the submission to the system operator of applications for the rights to enter up to a 
certain amount of power onto the system at some future time; 
2. a forecast by the system operator of what that would mean for transmission 
reinforcement and for TNUoS charges, and the publication of those charges; 
3. the opportunity for applicants to revise their applications in light of the forecast; 
4. processing of a revised set of applications and making of offers; 
5. the signing of offers by generators which as well as granting rights would also entail a 
certain commitment by network users to pay future TNUoS charges. 
 
The chance for generators to revise their applications and the last step of ‘user commitment’ 
were intended to improve certainty and provide a firmer base for more ‘strategic’ 
development of the network51. However, another feature was intended to address one of the 
difficulties in transmission system planning: judgement on the total transmission capacity that 
it would be economic to provide to accommodate the aggregate output of a group of 
generators in an area. Implicit in that judgement are the degree to which those generators 
might be regarded as ‘sharing’ capacity, and  how much it would cost to constrain one or 
more generators off in the event that the ‘final physical notifications’ they submit to the 
balancing mechanism exceed the network’s export capability. It had been proposed that this 
might be achieved by not only requiring applicants for rights to specify how much power 
they might enter onto the system but also (a) how much they expect to actually operate in the 
course of a year, i.e. what is their anticipated ‘load factor’ or ‘capacity factor’, and (b) how 
much it would cost to reduce their output should network limits otherwise be breached. 
Especially in respect of interactions between wind farms and ’marginal’ fossil fuelled plant, 
this is potentially very important for determining how much transmission should be built and 
what the TNUoS charges should be. As noted in section 2.1, in a future system with more 
wind generation than there is at present, wind and ‘marginal’ fossil fuelled plant in the same 
area would not generally be expected to operate at the same time – the ‘marginal’ plant would 
normally only operate when wind speeds are low or demand is high (and when demand in an 
exporting area is high, the net export will be reduced). In other words, the two facilities might 
‘share’ the same transmission capacity. 
 
As an alternative to indicating the cost to the system operator of buying back access rights 
given to generators, rights of access to the system for periods much shorter than a year might 
be sought by ‘marginal’ generators and made available to them when network capacity would 
                                                 
51 The development, mooted in both ‘Project Discovery’ (Ofgem, 2010) and DECC’s December 2010 
consultation on Electricity Market reform (DECC, 2010d), of some kind of capacity mechanism in which 
generators receive quite long/term contracts for being available could, depending on its final form, be argued 
to go some way to reducing uncertainty about the future generation ‘background’. 
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not be exceeded. By making themselves available at times when alternatives are few, these 
generators would provide a service to the system operator without imposing additional 
constraint or network infrastructure costs. In effect, they would share the network capacity 
with other, higher merit plant. In return, the charges these ‘marginal’ generators would pay 
for use of the system in those periods might be expected to be minimal52.  
 
Neither the above proposal to require generators to quote capacity factors and buy back prices 
nor the other major reforms mooted in Ofgem (2009a) have been implemented except for 
‘connect and manage’. It is not our intention to explore the reasons why or to debate the 
various options, but simply to note our view that current arrangements for granting of rights – 
which, as previously observed, give rights holders full freedom to set their own initial 
dispatch and quote a price for reducing output – would tend to increase the transmission 
capacity that should be built compared with that which would needed were capacity to be 
‘shared’ in an efficient manner, and hence would increase the transmission charges levied on 
generators in exporting areas. 
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In a number of places in sections 7.3 and 7.4, possible interactions of transmission charging 
arrangements with wider energy policies have been noted. In addition, our principles in 
conducting this review included consistency with the policies of government in the UK and 
EU Directives, insofar as they are apparent and we can interpret them correctly. Some of 
these interactions are therefore discussed in this section. 
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We have noted above that economic efficiency depends both on signals that reflect the 
consequences of actions and the opportunity for actors to respond to them. A key signal of 
transmission cost concerns location, and it may be asked whether renewables developers have 
the chance to respond to it, and this depends on the availability of choice. It seems to us that 
they do have a choice – at least, at the moment they do53 – of different high wind locations, 
e.g. in the Western Isles, in the south of Scotland or off the south/east coast of England. It is 
clearly in consumers’ best interests if the cheapest of those locations is developed; given the 
cost of offshore wind farms and of a new connection from the Western Isles to the main 
transmission system, in the example it would seem to be the south of Scotland. It would seem 
to be correct that transmission charging arrangements would signal that.  
 
While legally binding targets motivated by reduction of carbon emissions associated with 
energy use are currently focused on renewable energy, the recent DECC consultation on 
Electricity Market Reform addresses low carbon energy (DECC, 2010d). In addition to 
renewables, this includes both nuclear power and fossil fuelled generation with carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) facilities. Although nuclear power and CCS do not have complete 
freedom of location, they, too, do still have some degree of choice and would be expected to 
                                                 
52 Attempts have been made to develop short/term access products in GB. However, our understanding is that 
they have faced significant difficulties in determining, in some simple and useful way, quite how much extra 
generation can be accommodated. 
53 In the longer term as the ‘best’ sites get developed, this might not remain true for the next set of 
developments. 
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resolve the different influences, e.g. cost of electricity transmission versus access to fuel 
versus access to carbon transport and storage facilities. It thus seems correct that cost/
reflective transmission signals should be sent that encourage an economically optimal 
solution. 
 
It has been reported that delays to gaining or failure to gain planning permission is a major 
influence on wind farm development (RenewableUK, 2010). Moreover, developers are well 
aware of regional differences in success rates for planning applications. In the longer term as 
the sites that are most attractive from both a wind resource and local impact point of view are 
developed, this is likely to be increasingly important. In this context, we feel it is worth 
reflecting on the position of offshore wind.  
 
It is widely accepted that the construction, connection and operation of offshore wind farms 
are significantly more expensive than those onshore, though it may also be anticipated that, as 
technology develops and reliability improves, the gap will narrow. Nevertheless, both the UK 
and Scottish Governments have seen fit to encourage its development by making extra ROCs 
available. Such extra support for offshore wind – through ROCs,  some future Feed/In Tariffs 
or some other mechanism – might be justified relative to onshore wind in view of two things: 
the vastness of the offshore resource; and (in principle, at least) fewer planning issues.  
 
A more favourable planning regime that reduces risks associated with projects that, 
otherwise, seem adequately to balance increased revenue consequential to increased load 
factor with increased cost of transmission access would clearly help. Nevertheless, it seems to 
us that it would not be inconsistent with current arrangements for offshore for extra support 
to be given for areas onshore where the wind resource is attractive, the development of 
capacity there is needed for the meeting of renewables targets but where costs of accessing 
and using the transmission system turn out to be prohibitively high. Alternatively, one might 
ask whether treatment of offshore network costs is entirely consistent with principles of cost/
reflectivity.  
 
It might be argued that postage stamp charging would achieve the objective of increasing the 
commercial viability of renewables developments in key locations. However, this is likely to 
be exploited by generation other than renewables and is only one tool among the many that 
can be envisaged.  
 
In general, we do not support the engineering of electricity transmission arrangements 
(whether in respect of charging, trading or anything else) to target – or penalise – particular 
technologies. This would fall foul of existing transmission licence conditions that forbid 
discrimination (though changes to those conditions might be sought). On the other hand, the 
forbidding of discrimination might be judged to be in contradiction of the 	 
discrimination (in favour of renewables) seemingly called for by EU Directive 2009/28/EC 
(see Appendix 2 below). Nevertheless, we believe it should be recognised that support for 
different renewable energy and other low carbon electricity generation technologies, whether 
motivated by, for example, climate change mitigation targets, industrial policy, regional 
economic development or some combination of those objectives, is a complex matter that 
should be determined by elected policy makers; for those responsible for transmission 
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charging to try to second guess those policy decisions, manage their interactions or react to 
major changes54 would not, in our opinion, be reasonable.  
 
We believe that, as far as possible, different signals to development of generation should be 
kept clean from each other and as transparent as possible. Transmission charging signals 
should reflect simply the cost of transmission. The generation developers themselves, rather 
than the designers of transmission charging arrangements, are best qualified to weigh up 
different influences on investments such as those outlined in section 7.1 above and to make 
most effective use of any available support mechanisms. This is as true of investments in 
nuclear power stations and fossil fuelled plant with carbon capture and storage facilities as 
wind farms. We believe that such an approach would be best both for electricity consumers 
and, through minimising the chance of unintended consequences, the meeting of climate 
change mitigation targets. 
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Extracts from a number of relevant EU Directives are reproduced in Appendix 2 below. We 
present our view of their implications for transmission charging here. 
 
EU Directive 2009/28/EC requires that the sharing of costs, for example for connection and 
grid reinforcements, shall take into account “the benefits which initially and subsequently 
connected producers … derive from the connections.” 
 
Directive 2009/28/EC also calls for priority or guaranteed grid access for renewables and for 
priority to be given to them by system operators in dispatch decisions and curtailment of 
energy from renewables minimised insofar as doing so would not threaten security of supply. 
However, it also notes that rules for network reinforcements and grid codes should be non/
discriminatory and take account of costs and benefits. Directive 2009/72/EC says that the 
dispatching of generation and interconnectors “shall take into account the economic 
precedence of electricity from available generating installations or interconnector transfers 
and the technical constraints on the system”. It also directs that the rules and tariffs for 
balancing services shall be established in “a non/discriminatory and cost/reflective way”. 
 
Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003 on access to the network for cross/border 
exchanges says that “Charges applied by network/operators for access to networks shall be 
transparent, take into account the need for network security and reflect actual costs incurred.” 
However, it also says that “those charges shall not be distance/related” and that the 
proportion of charges borne by producers shall be less than borne by consumers. 
Furthermore, “the level of the tariffs applied to producers and/or consumers shall provide 
locational signals at European level, and take into account the amount of network losses and 
congestion caused, and investment costs for infrastructure.” (It also notes that Member States 
shall not be prevented from providing locational signals within their territory.  
 
We note that, in accordance with an EU Directive, since October 2010 interconnectors are no 
longer charged for use of transmission systems in Europe and are not regarded as being 
‘generation’ or ‘demand’ as such. Our understanding of the intention of this aspect of the 
                                                 
54 An example of a significant shift is that implied by the December 2010 DECC consultation on Electricity 
Market Reform that follows on from the change of government in Westminster and is the apparent move from 
support of ‘renewables’ to support of ‘low carbon’ generation (DECC, 2010d). 
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Directive is that there should be fair rules for cross/border exchanges, enhanced competition 
across all Member States and the protection of cross/border flows from exposure to multiple 
network access charges. However, there should also be some kind of ‘Inter TSO 
Compensation’ (ITC) mechanism that compensates TSOs for costs arising as a consequence 
of cross/border flows and is paid for by the TSO that causes the flows (Pielage, 2010). It is 
not clear to us how the ITC will work. 
 
While some of the Directives and Regulations might seem, on the surface, contradictory in 
places, we interpret them as placing no particular constraints on the design of transmission 
charging arrangements except that they should be ‘non/discriminatory’, interconnectors 
should be treated as neither generation nor demand and transmission costs should not be 
recovered only from producers. It is possible to argue that a tariff that charges all users the 
same amounts does not discriminate against any of them.  However, it is our view that a tariff 
that accurately reflects differences in costs between users is also non/discriminatory.  Indeed, 
if there are differences in costs, many economists would argue that it would actually be 
discriminatory to charge the same amount. 
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As noted in section 2.3, the GB transmission licensees and other members of the Electricity 
Networks Strategy Group expect the biggest set of investments in enhanced network capacity 
in decades to be required in the next 5/10 years in order to accommodate new renewable 
generation (ENSG, 2009). The biggest single component of it is the proposed ‘bootstrap’ 
between the south west of Scotland and Deeside. (A further, east coast ‘bootstrap’ may also 
be required). It seems to us that this represents an important test of the fitness for purpose of 
the different methodologies discussed in section 6. While it is outside the scope of our review 
to conduct a detailed, quantified analysis, in this section we therefore present a simple, very 
high level ‘thought experiment’ to explore the treatment of the ‘bootstrap’ in each of the main 
methodologies outlined in section 6. 
 
Our understanding of the main effects of the different charging methodologies with respect to 
the west coast ‘bootstrap’ is summarised in Table 3. We discuss some of the apparent 
implications below. 
 
Principles of economic efficiency suggest that, in an export constrained area, charges should 
be higher (or potential earnings should be lower) than on the other side of the constrained 
boundary in order to reflect the cost either of upgrading the boundary transfer capability or of 
constraining generation in network operation to accommodate additional generation in the 
area. The north of Britain is just such an area which ought, therefore, to have higher charges 
(or lower income for generators) than the south. All the methods except the postage stamp 
give this signal. Indeed, an energy/based postage stamp, i.e. indexed by (for generation) total 
energy produced, may give lower charges in the north than if the constraint were less severe 
even though surplus generation in the north (relative to the network’s capacity) leads to 
increased costs of system operation. 
 
As noted in section 6.1, none of the locational methodologies recovers all the costs of the 
network. Some additional charge, known in the present TNUoS methodology as the 
‘residual’, is necessary.  
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Postage stamp: 
MW capacity 
			
Depends on size of generator 
			
Depends on size of generator 
			
Depends on size of generator but 
increased 
			
Depends on size of generator but 
increased 
Postage stamp: 
MWh produced 
			
Depends on type of generator and 
its relative cost, but output – and 
charge – may be limited by 
network constraint 
			
Depends on type of generator and 
its relative cost 
			
Depends on type of generator 
and its relative cost, but output – 
and charge – less limited by 
network constraint 
			
Depends on type of generator 
and its relative cost 
ICRP 			
Relatively expensive 
			
Relatively cheap 
			
Locational charge increased 
			
Relatively cheap 
LRIC 			
Relatively expensive 
			
Relatively cheap 
			
Locational charge reduced, 
residual increased 
			
Relatively cheap,  
residual increased 
ICREP 			
Relatively expensive, more so for 
higher capacity factor plant than 
lower capacity factor plant. 
			
Relatively cheap 
			
Locational charge reduced, 
residual increased 
			
Relatively cheap,  
residual increased 
LMP 			
Energy price earned (theoretically) 
significantly lower than in south 
			
Income depends on marginal 
energy price 
			
Earnings increased due to energy 
price being nearer to that in 
south 
			
Income depends on marginal 
energy price 
 
The ‘bootstrap’ is designed to relieve the constraint on transfers of power out of the north and 
the justification for it is based on comparison of its cost with the benefit of reducing 
constraint costs, in this case against an anticipated future generation ‘background’ that 
includes new generation in the north. 
 
Following commissioning of the bootstrap, if the cost/benefit case was correct, even though 
the bootstrap must be paid for, the total cost of transmission in the medium term should be 
lower than would be the case without it due to the reduction in constraint costs. In spite of 
this overall reduction, principles of cost reflectivity suggest that generators in the north 
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should pay a higher share of the cost of the bootstrap since they – and their customers – gave 
rise to it. (In general, a practical investment in additional network capacity would provide 
some spare capacity so that, while the cost of the investment would need to be recovered, the 
deterrence signal to future use of the system would not be as strong in the short term as if 
there were no headroom and any additional generation in the north would require further 
network investment). 
 
In the LMP approach, the effect of the bootstrap in increasing power transfer capability from 
the north would be to reduce the extent to which the north seems like a separate market from 
that in the south, with the northern market having a significant surplus of generation capacity 
relative to demand. However, depending on how LMP were implemented and how prices are 
set in the northern market by the few generating companies active there, the price differences 
– or, in a different implementation, the cost of constraints55 – between the north and south 
might not be that big. While that would be a relatively good outcome for generators in the 
north in the short/term, it would weaken the case for investment in the bootstrap and, as a 
consequence, lead new generators hoping to connect in the north to expect wider price 
differentials between north and south (energy prices being lower in the north) and so weaken 
their cases for investment. On the other hand, if the bootstrap were still to be constructed, the 
LMP approach would lead to it being paid for out of any income from sale of ‘financial 
transmission rights’ and ‘residual’ network charges, the latter likely to be levied on some 
kind of ‘postage stamp’ basis. 
 
In the ICRP approach, if it were to be costed on a similar cost per MWkm basis as overhead 
lines and underground cables using the full cost of both the cable and the two converter 
stations, the bootstrap would cost probably in excess of £120/MWkm per year. (This 
compares with the assumed cost in the present ICRP methodology for a 400kV overhead line 
of around £11/MWkm per year). As described in section 6.2, when adding an additional MW 
of generation, the ICRP approach effectively assumes that increased flows would be 
accommodated by network capacity upgrades on each branch in proportion to the MWkm 
changes on them. Thus, while the ICRP approach would not assume that every additional 
MW of generation in the north would cost the same as a MW of extra capacity on the 
‘bootstrap’, the ICRP approach would give a significant increase in the charges paid by 
generators, possibly so much so that the new generators in the north on which the cost/benefit 
case for the bootstrap was predicated may have been rendered commercially unviable and 
will not connect, thus undermining the justification for the bootstrap. 
 
This ‘catch/22’ could be argued to illustrate the need both for charging signals to be both 
forward looking (taking into account interactions between charging and future generation 
investment decisions) and accurate and for some degree of user commitment on which  
transmission network investment cases can be based. 
 
                                                 
55 The two main implementation options seem to us to be: ‘pure’ LMP in which all generators submit data to a 
central authority, e.g. the system operator, which carries out a centralised dispatch out of which emerges the 
locational marginal prices that all generators receive and all suppliers pay; or a synthesised LMP in which, as 
in present trading arrangements, generators self/dispatch but quote prices to increase or decrease output, some 
of which are accepted by the system operator in order to balance the system overall and resolve network 
constraints, the constraint actions being used to set locational short/term network use charges. Both approaches 
would succeed in revealing differences between locations in what a generator would receive (or pay), albeit 
one would be dependent on full, ‘from the ground up’ dispatch and the other on re/dispatches. 
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It was noted in section 5 that there are a number of dimensions to the way in which 
transmission network users might pay for it and its use. In general, methodologies attempt to 
signal the effect of a market participant’s decision on the total cost of transmission, including 
both cost of constraints and the cost of network assets and their maintenance and operation. 
The ways in which these signals are produced differs.  
 
In this section, we summarise our current views on the relative merits of the five main 
charging models that we presented in section 6. In most of them, there is clearly some 
centrally administered means of levying charges. In a system involving locational pricing of 
energy such as LMP, generators will see a signal via their access to higher (in import limited 
areas) or lower (in export limited areas) energy prices, and they would generally need to 
make their own forecasts of prices in order to understand their potential impact. However, 
there may also be some centrally administered facility through which generators can buy 
financial transmission rights, i.e. FTRs. The precise arrangements for making FTRs available 
and pricing them are critical to how market participants are able to use them and must 
therefore be subject to careful consideration. For example, they might be used to add further 
weight to the locational signals given by locational pricing, e.g. by auctioning financial rights 
to the network capacity in export limited areas. In addition, we have suggested in section 6.5 
that an analogy can be drawn between allocation and pricing of FTRs and the allocation and 
pricing of TEC via TNUoS.  
 
Finally, before summarising our views on the different options considered in section 6, we 
recall that cost/reflective charging methodologies generally fail to recover all of a 
transmission owner’s reasonable costs. There is therefore a need for an additional charge, i.e. 
some kind of ‘residual’. As discussed in section 6.1.2, we believe that it is appropriate that 
this is levied on demand on a postage stamp basis, though it is up for discussion as to whether 
this should be power (kW) or energy (kWh) based. 
 
		
: the postage stamp approach, either in respect of long/run costs of the 
costs of operating the system, has no attractions in this regard. Of the others, LMP 
promises to provide the most faithful link between energy prices and the impact of 
lack of transmission on them which, in principle at least, should influence decisions 
by both generators (and, in future the demand side) and transmission owners and lead 
to economically efficient outcomes. However, we would welcome evidence of its 
effects in respect of incentives to investment in both generation and transmission56.  
 
	: by this we mean that the method should not be over/sensitive to small changes 
in input to the method. Both postage stamp pricing and simple long/run pricing such 
as ICRP may be expected to perform relatively well in this regard while more refined 
                                                 
56 Our understanding of the effect in PJM is as follows. Transmission flows are generally from west to east with 
local energy prices in the east much higher than those in the west as a result of transmission constraints. This 
has had the result of attracting new generation in the east to benefit from the higher prices there. This new 
generation has generally been CCGT but not so much of it has connected as to significantly reduce prices 
there. As it happens, the most attractive areas for development of wind generation are also in the east. We also 
understand that, in spite of high locational price differences, little or no new transmission has been built which 
would benefit consumers in high price areas by giving them access to cheaper energy elsewhere. In contrast, in 
Texas where a new LMP system was implemented in 2009, our understanding is that the most attractive wind 
areas are where locational prices are low. It remains to be seen, therefore, what the medium to long/term effect 
will be on investment in new wind farms and new transmission to allow their energy to be used. 
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long/run methods can give significant step changes in outcomes as network flows 
approach branch limits. Locational marginal pricing may be expected to demonstrate 
significant volatility through a period of time and between locations, but each half/
hourly price, considered separately, has relatively little impact on participants, 
compared to the decision to move a generator between ICRP zones, for example. 
 

: That a simple long/run method such as ICRP is workable is evident from the 
fact that it is what is currently applied in Britain whereas a postage stamp approach is 
used for the costs of system operation and in other countries also for the ‘transmission 
owner’ costs. The operation of more refined long/run methods is unproven for 
complex, meshed networks in Britain that have many different generation facilities. 
An LMP/based approach is practised in, for example, different parts of the US. 
However, its implementation in Britain is likely to be significantly more complex than 
the other approaches. In addition, it seems to us that interpretation of those signals by 
users depends on a significant degree of judgement and that efficient setting of energy 
prices is not guaranteed for areas affected by transmission constraints. 
 
	
	
			: An approach based on LMP would 
be the most complex to implement and would require a number of design choices to 
be made, in particular regarding the allocation and pricing of FTRs.57 However, we 
note that some means exist by which some of its features might be synthesised within 
the context of current GB trading arrangements while other features might depend on 
reform of access arrangements.  
 
A postage stamp approach for TNUoS charging would require revision of the 
transmission licence clause that stipulates cost/reflectivity of charges. The existing 
GB approach is the simplest in terms of regulatory change since it would need no 
change. 
 
		 : In spite of significant support among academics and some on the 
utility side of the industry for LMP, our impression is that it would not be widely 
welcomed by market participants, largely due to its complexities. Some in the 
industry have argued that, notwithstanding some concerns about details of 
implementation, the evidence for a change from the present TNUoS charging 
methodology is weak while others have argued in favour of postage stamp charging 
on the grounds that it provides the best support for renewables in areas remote from 
the main demand centres. 
 
It is important to consider the impact of a charging methodology on the meeting of 
renewables targets and security of supply. It has been noted in section 7.3 that cost/reflective 
pricing might put the meeting of renewables targets at risk if the only locations in which new 
renewable generation can practically be developed have such high transmission charges that 
                                                 
57 Notwithstanding the theoretical possibilities of a ‘simultaneous feasibility test’ (Hogan, 1992), judgment not 
entirely dissimilar from that in design of a charging methodology would be required on the part of someone – 
probably the system operator – on how many rights to make available. The available transmission capacity 
depends on how many rights have already been awarded and how the holders are assumed to use them and so 
may lead, as in PJM, to multiple rounds of allocation (PJM, 2011). The desire to accommodate different 
electricity users’ attitudes to risk and the fact that available transmission capacity varies through a year and is 
influenced by, among other things, planned outages of both generation and transmission, may lead to different 
access products of different durations made available at different times of the year. 
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they are no longer commercially viable. However, at present this seems to us not to be the 
case58 and renewables – and nuclear power and fossil fuelled plant with CCS – do have some 
choices that cost/reflective transmission charging should help to inform. Moreover, we note 
that other instruments for support of low carbon energy are available and that, with reform of 
these being currently consulted on, there is an opportunity for them to address any perceived 
threat to investment in renewables and the meeting of renewables targets arising from the 
costs of electricity transmission. Most importantly, we note our belief that, as far as possible, 
different signals to development of generation should be kept clean from each other and as 
transparent as possible. Transmission charging signals should reflect simply the cost of 
transmission. The generation developers themselves, rather than the designers of transmission 
charging arrangements, are best qualified to weigh up different influences on investments. 
 
In order to minimise any competitive disadvantage placed on generation located in Britain 
relative to that elsewhere in Europe, we suggest that the average charge to generators for use 
of the transmission system in Britain should be zero. 
 
In section 7.4 it has been noted that, by affecting the economics of a particular power station, 
a particular set of transmission charging arrangements might lead to closure of existing 
‘peaking’ or ‘marginal’ plant or failure to open new facilities that can operate when, in a 
future power system more heavily reliant on wind than that in Britain now, the power 
available from wind is low. However, peaking plant (and demand side measures) generally 
has greater flexibility of location than other types of plant so it would seem appropriate that 
cost reflective charges for use of the transmission system should be among the influences on 
decisions. In addition, we note that peaking plant in areas with the best wind resources ought 
generally to operate only when the available wind power is low and so it can ‘share’ 
transmission capacity with it and also share the benefit, with wind farms, of lower 
transmission charges arising from a reduced need for transmission capacity compared with 
the network having been built to accommodate the simultaneous maximum output of both. 
However, we note that neither the present access arrangements nor the charging methodology 
ensure this outcome. 
 
 
                                                 
58 Any clear evidence to the contrary would be welcome. 
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In this section we present the main conclusions resulting from our work to date, and make 
some recommendations for further work arising from our main conclusions.  
 
We have proposed a number of high level principles that have driven our review and 
informed the development of our assessment criteria. These principles for transmission 
charging arrangements are: 
 
1. They should encourage efficient investment and operating decisions by the transmission 
companies, generation companies and consumers such that the overall cost of electricity 
is, as far as practicable, minimised. 
2. They should be consistent with the realisation of climate change mitigation targets set by 
government in the UK. 
3. They must be compatible with EU directives and regulations. 
4. They should be consistent with the future integration of energy markets across Europe. 
5. They should not present undue barriers to the realisation of adequate security of supply. 
6. They should not be over/sensitive to small changes in the transmission system and its 
users. 
7. They should be as simple as possible to achieve their objectives, and no simpler. 
8. They should command sufficient stakeholder support to be implementable. 
 
To minimise the total cost of electricity, including that of ‘production’ and ‘transport’, it 
seems reasonable to us that signals should be expressed that attempt to coordinate choices of 
location for generation with those for development of transmission and that those making 
decisions should be exposed to their consequences. In a transmission charging context and in 
order to encourage a minimisation of the overall cost of electricity, this depends  on 
appropriate and accurate ‘cost/reflective’ signals being given to network users  on those 
users having an opportunity to respond to them.  
 
We note that various issues aside from transmission system charging might limit users’ 
ability to respond and, if transmission charges are high and other measures are not taken to 
compensate for them, might put the meeting of renewables targets and security of supply at 
risk. (Because the 2020 targets are legally binding, we regard them as imposing a strong 
constraint on policy, including transmission charging. We also note the wider importance of 
the UK transitioning to a low carbon economy). However, at present, there do still seem to be 
choices available for the development of wind farms, nuclear power stations and fossil 
fuelled plant with carbon capture and storage facilities. Moreover, we note that other 
instruments for support of low carbon energy are available and that, with reform of these 
being currently consulted on, there is an opportunity for them address any perceived threat to 
investment in renewables and the meeting of renewables targets arising from the costs of 
electricity transmission.  
 
We believe that it is important that accurate signals of the cost of transmission are sent to 
developers of new generation facilities to enable their resolution of the various influences on 
investment. Moreover, we believe that, as far as possible, different signals to development of 
generation should be kept clean from each other and as transparent as possible. Transmission 
charging signals should reflect simply the cost of transmission. The generation developers 
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themselves, rather than the designers of transmission charging arrangements, are best 
qualified to weigh up different influences on investments. 
 
In respect of security of supply, we note that, in future, it is likely to depend largely on 
contributions by ‘peaking’ fossil fuelled plant (and also from demand side measures). 
Choices do exist for the location of such plant; accurate signals of the cost of electricity 
transmission should be provided to help inform those decisions. However, we also note that 
peaking plant and wind farms located in the same area might generally be expected to ‘share’ 
network capacity as they would not normally operate at maximum output simultaneously. 
That would reduce the amount of transmission needed (compared to when it is designed to 
accommodate simultaneous high outputs from both) and hence reduce the cost of 
transmission to which both the wind farm and the peaking plant would be exposed. 
 
We have considered in some detail five main classes of transmission charging approach. 
These are postage stamp pricing, a ‘simple’ long/run cost based method, more refined long/
run cost based methods, a method based on long/run costs but with at least some part of 
payments based on energy rather than capacity and an approach based on locational marginal 
pricing (LMP) and financial transmission rights (FTRs).  
 
It has been outside the scope of the present study to conduct a quantified analysis of these 
options, though we would recommend that, in order to test the possible effect on cost of 
electricity and the investment environment for generation developers, some such analysis is 
carried out, at least of what seems, from a qualitative analysis, the preferred option(s). 
Instead, we have carried out a high level appraisal of their relative merits in respect of 
economic efficiency, robustness, workability, complexity of regulatory implementation and 
stakeholder support. We have also considered their possible impact on the meeting of the 
2020 renewables targets and security of supply.  
 
Based on our high level appraisal, summarised in section 7.8, our main conclusion is that 
while ‘refined’ long/run based methods and an approach based on LMP+FTRs have their 
attractions, neither of these or a ‘postage stamp approach’ is ideal. These options are 
variously, it seems to us, inconsistent with encouragement of economic efficiency, rather 
sensitive to small changes in the transmission system and its users, highly complex, in need 
of considerable further work to develop implementation details or lacking wide stakeholder 
support.  
 
While a simple approach to long/run pricing, when considering all of our evaluation criteria, 
seems to be the least imperfect, we regard it, in its present guise, as having some critical 
flaws that both compromise its cost/reflectivity and give rise to some outcomes that would 
appear to be, under some circumstances, anomalous. Moreover, while it has been outside of 
the scope of this study to develop and evaluate them, some discussions with various industry 
parties and some of our own very initial analysis suggest that options are available that would 
facilitate improvements in respect both of cost/reflectivity and minimisation of risk to the 
investment case for generation, in which regard we particularly note the need for sufficient 
investment in renewables to meet the 2020 targets. It seems to us that the development of 
improvements need not be an excessively lengthy process.  
 
We note that the GB system operator’s costs in balancing the system are currently recovered 
via ‘Balancing Services Use of System’ charging, and that this is a postage stamp, i.e. non/
locational, approach indexed by energy generated or consumed in the course of a year. We 
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believe that cost/reflectivity is important in ensuring overall efficiency in operation of the 
system but note that the decision by the Department of Energy and Climate Change that 
additional system operation costs associated with ‘connect and manage’ should be 
‘socialised’ seems to preclude that. 
 
We recall that the locational elements of cost/reflective charging methodologies – whether a 
specifically designed tariff such as TNUoS, the congestion rent from locational marginal 
pricing or the net income from sale of FTRs and compensation to FTR holders – generally 
fail to recover all of a transmission owner’s reasonable costs. There is therefore a need for an 
additional element, i.e. some kind of ‘residual’. We believe that it is appropriate that is levied 
on a postage stamp basis and, because the charge would normally be passed through to 
consumers anyway, should be levied only on demand. However, it is up for discussion as to 
whether the charge should be power or energy based. 
 
We note that different approaches in different countries to the levying of transmission 
charges on generators can lead to generators having to recover those costs through wholesale 
prices and to disadvantage relative to their competitors in other countries59. This could distort 
trading of electrical energy across national boundaries. To minimise that effect, we would 
recommend that the average charge levied on generators for use of the transmission system 
should be zero. 
 
1 *	
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Although we have concluded that, for charging for use of the transmission system, the best 
compromise option among the five that we have considered is a ‘simple’ long/run approach, 
we believe that the present ICRP methodology is inadequate and, if its general form is to be 
retained, should be revised to provide more accurate reflections of the drivers for network 
investment. In particular, we note that much investment in enhanced transmission network 
capacity in Britain in the next decade arises from the need to accommodate new wind farms 
located in power exporting areas remote from the main demand centres. Given that the cost of 
constraining wind power off will be very high, the level of reinforcement required may be 
said to be driven more by economics than by security of supply. Thus, the charging 
methodology is not driven simply by generation capacity, i.e. power, and network conditions 
around the time of peak demand for electricity, but rather should reflect, at least to some 
degree, conditions that arise in the course of a year of operation and the efficient decisions for 
network reinforcement that would be made. It would thus have at least some energy element. 
 
The question of exactly how much extra capacity on the main interconnected transmission 
system is required and how that need should be articulated in the design criteria of the 
‘Security and Quality of Supply Standard’ is the subject of a long/running review. While 
security of supply can be expected to still influence network investment in at least some parts 
of the network (so that power capacity remains important), energy produced has an influence 
as well as the initial dispatches of plant determined by market participants and the prices that 
                                                 
59 It has not been our intention to compare charging arrangements in different countries and we recall that 
Ofgem has commissioned a separate international comparison (CEPA, 2011). However, we also note that care 
should be taken when drawing conclusions about charging arrangements. For example, while a particular 
country might not levy charges for use of the main transmission infrastructure on generators, it might apply 
deep connection charging to generators whereas another country might levy infrastructure charges on 
generators but have shallow connection charging. 
				  
	 !"##
Bell, Green, Kockar, Ault and McDonald   75
the system operator would need to pay to change that dispatch in order to respect network 
limits. That is, the need for additional capacity might be said to be a very complex function of 
power. We recommend that attention is paid to how changed drivers for investment in 
network capacity can be better represented in a transmission charging methodology that 
remains as simple as possible but more cost/reflective with a reduced likelihood of perverse 
outcomes.  
 
While not precluding further work on more far reaching reforms such as a transition to 
locational marginal pricing and different arrangements for transmission access analogous to 
making the option of purchase of FTRs available, we would recommend work on 
development of a refinement of ICRP that, as well addressing what we believe to be its 
present shortcomings, includes an energy element. We have coined the term ICREP for that 
refinement of ICRP. That work should explore different options for incorporation of an 
energy element and provide quantified evidence of their effects for a number of different 
scenarios, both present day and for the possible future GB system. We believe that such a 
development can complement what we understand to be the timescales of DECC’s electricity 
market reform process and the wider industry’s desire for decisions to be made quite quickly. 
 
We note that ‘marginal’ or ‘peaking’ generation located in the same power export areas as 
wind farms have the potential to ‘share’ network capacity with them. This is because such 
marginal plant, certainly for off/peak conditions, would normally be expected to run only 
when the available wind power is low. This would give rise to a need for less transmission 
capacity than if the network had to be built to accommodate high simultaneous outputs from 
both classes of plant. This, in turn, would entail lower use of system charges for both than 
would have been the case. In other words, if such ‘sharing’ behaviour could be relied on to 
take place, low load factor generation might be expected to have lower use of system charges 
than high load factor plant in exporting areas. However, we note that rights granted to 
generators within current access arrangements do not give the necessary degree of 
confidence, nor does the current ICRP methodology take account of such effects of low load 
factor generation. Although access arrangements are outside the scope of review, we would 
recommend that both these issues are addressed. 
 
In addition to some element of charging for energy, we would recommend that some other 
aspects of the present transmission charging methodology are given attention. These include: 
 
• consistency of treatment between onshore generation, offshore generation and 
generation on islands; 
• the ‘security factor’ and whether a single value is appropriate for all locations; 
• the treatment of the proposed HVDC ‘bootstraps’. 
 
The last of these concerns the plan, currently under development, that an undersea HVDC 
connection is made between Ayrshire and Deeside in order to significantly increase the 
capability of the network to export power from the north of Britain and have the potential to 
contribute to system stability. (A second HVDC ‘bootstrap’ is under consideration for the 
east coast). Such a link would have a cost of between £0.75 billion and £1 billion. There is 
currently no accepted way for this to be represented in the ICRP model; depending on how it 
is done, it could be very expensive for generators in the north that are already under 
development (and thus have no realistic chance to respond to a cost/reflective price signal), 
perhaps doubling their TNUoS charges. Moreover, a ‘naïve’ treatment of it in the ICRP 
methodology might lead to a ‘catch/22’ outcome. The ‘bootstrap’ investment is being 
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justified on the basis of a cost/benefit analysis with constraint costs plus annuitised capital 
costs and losses with the ‘bootstrap’ being compared with constraint costs and losses without 
it, all predicated on the expected connection of a particular volume of renewable generation 
in the north. To reflect the full cost of the ‘bootstrap’ on network users in the north through 
ICRP could lead to a significant number of those projects not being taken forward, so 
undermining the case for the ‘bootstrap’ in the first place. 
 
It is our understanding that the option of an undersea HVDC connection in parallel with the 
main AC system has not only been driven by technical considerations but also by practical 
issues that limit the viability of the main alternatives. Thus, and given its apparent strategic 
importance to the realisation of the UK’s renewable energy targets in the short term, we 
believe that it might be legitimately asked whether the full cost of it should be borne by 
generators in the north. In that regard, we note a recent regulatory development in the US 
where, in December 2010, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) approved the 
concept of ‘multi/value projects’, i.e. “projects that are determined to enable the reliable and 
economic delivery of energy in support of documented energy policy mandates or laws that 
address, through the development of a robust transmission system, multiple reliability and/or 
economic issues affecting multiple transmission zones” (FERC, 2010). According to the 
American Wind Energy Association (AWEA, 2010), “The MVP concept is based on the 
recognition of the numerous, widely shared benefits provided by enhanced transmission 
infrastructure and, accordingly, spreads the costs for these lines across the [Midwest ISO 
(MISO)] footprint”. We ask whether some similar recognition – and the implication that the 
costs of ‘multi/value projects’ should be, in some way, socialised60 – might be helpful here. 
 
                                                 
60 An alternative to full socialisation would be to represent such projects in a charging model as if they were the 
cheaper reinforcement option that would otherwise have been built, e.g. 400kV overhead line. 
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Ofgem has recently launched Project TransmiT, which is an independent and open review of 
transmission charging and associated connection arrangements.  The aim of the review is to 
ensure that we have in place arrangements that facilitate the timely move to a low carbon 
energy sector whilst continuing to provide safe, secure, high quality network services at value 
for money to existing and future consumers.   
 
We are commissioning three short reports on optimal charging arrangements from 
independent academic experts in the area of network charging. In particular, we are looking 
for views on what an efficient charging regime might look like for GB electricity and gas 
networks given the new challenges we face today. These independent reports will be used to 
stimulate further debate within the shareholders and to inform our own policy development.  
 
The focus of each report will be on electricity transmission charging, although the principles 
will be considered in the wider context of both gas and electricity transmission. 
 
We expect the report to draw on relevant international best practice and latest academic 
thinking.  The report will consider all aspects of transmission arrangements that are relevant 
to the allocation of costs arising in transmission, including: investment in transmission assets, 
costs of transmission congestion and transmission losses, costs for purchasing ancillary 
services required for safe and secure operation of the transmission system. 
 
We are looking for views on: 
 
a) appropriate guiding principles for transmission charging that are consistent with 
meeting the objectives set out above; 
b) the broad building blocks of a suitable target charging model that would best achieve 
the objectives as a whole, taking into account any trade/off amongst these objectives, 
for example: 
• economic efficiency vs facilitation of carbon reduction; 
• long/run investment efficiency including both transmission and generation vs 
short/run operational efficiency; and 
• requirements for a self/contained system vs those relevant for closer integration of 
other European systems cross/border.  
c) the interdependencies between the proposed charging model and other aspects of the 
regulatory regime for electricity and, where relevant, gas networks, including cross/
European regulatory and policy developments.  Where possible, the report should also 
provide views on the extent to which these help or hinder under the existing GB 
arrangements. 
 
			
In line with our high level timetable for Project TransmiT, which includes a milestone of 
publishing Ofgem’s recommendations in Summer 2011, we require the following 
deliverables from the advisors: 
 
• An initial note by mid December 2010 on high level principles for transmission 
charging; 
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• A first draft report by early February 2011 to be presented to a workshop with key 
experts; 
• A draft final report by end March 2011 that has taken into account the comments from 
Ofgem and the workshop; and 
• A final report submitted by end April 2011 that can be published. 
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Article 16 
Access to and operation of the grids 
1. Member States shall take the appropriate steps to develop transmission and distribution 
grid infrastructure, intelligent networks, storage facilities and the electricity system, in order 
to allow the secure operation of the electricity system as it accommodates the further 
development of electricity production from renewable energy sources, including 
interconnection between Member States and between Member States and third countries. 
Member States shall also take appropriate steps to accelerate authorisation procedures for 
grid infrastructure and to coordinate approval of grid infrastructure with administrative and 
planning procedures. 
2. Subject to requirements relating to the maintenance of the reliability and safety of the grid, 
based on transparent and non/discriminatory criteria defined by the competent national 
authorities: 
(a) Member States shall ensure that transmission system operators and distribution system 
operators in their territory guarantee the transmission and distribution of electricity produced 
from renewable energy sources; 
(b) Member States shall also provide for either priority access or guaranteed access to the 
grid/system of electricity produced from renewable energy sources; 
(c) Member States shall ensure that when dispatching electricity generating installations, 
transmission system operators shall give priority to generating installations using renewable 
energy sources in so far as the secure operation of the national electricity system permits and 
based on transparent and non/discriminatory criteria. Member States shall ensure that 
appropriate grid and market/related operational measures are taken in order to minimise the 
curtailment of electricity produced from renewable energy sources. If significant measures 
are taken to curtail the renewable energy sources in order to guarantee the security of the 
national electricity system and security of energy supply, Members States shall ensure that 
the responsible system operators report to the competent regulatory authority on those 
measures and indicate which corrective measures they intend to take in order to prevent 
inappropriate curtailments. 
3. Member States shall require transmission system operators and distribution system 
operators to set up and make public their standard rules relating to the bearing and sharing of 
costs of technical adaptations, such as grid connections and grid reinforcements, improved 
operation of the grid and rules on the non/discriminatory implementation of the grid codes, 
which are necessary in order to integrate new producers feeding electricity produced from 
renewable energy sources into the interconnected grid. 
Those rules shall be based on objective, transparent and non/discriminatory criteria taking 
particular account of all the costs and benefits associated with the connection of those 
producers to the grid and of the particular circumstances of producers located in peripheral 
regions and in regions of low population density. Those rules may provide for different types 
of connection. 
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4. Where appropriate, Member States may require transmission system operators and 
distribution system operators to bear, in full or in part, the costs referred to in paragraph 3. 
Member States shall review and take the necessary measures to improve the frameworks and 
rules for the bearing and sharing of costs referred to in paragraph 3 by 30 June 2011 and 
every two years thereafter to ensure the integration of new producers as referred to in that 
paragraph. 
5. Member States shall require transmission system operators and distribution system 
operators to provide any new producer of energy from renewable sources wishing to be 
connected to the system with the comprehensive and necessary information required, 
including: 
(a) a comprehensive and detailed estimate of the costs associated with the connection; 
(b) a reasonable and precise timetable for receiving and processing the request for grid 
connection; 
(c) a reasonable indicative timetable for any proposed grid connection. 
Member States may allow producers of electricity from renewable energy sources wishing to 
be connected to the grid to issue a call for tender for the connection work. 
6. The sharing of costs referred in paragraph 3 shall be enforced by a mechanism based on 
objective, transparent and non/discriminatory criteria taking into account the benefits which 
initially and subsequently connected producers as well as transmission system operators and 
distribution system operators derive from the connections. 
7. Member States shall ensure that the charging of transmission and distribution tariffs does 
not discriminate against electricity from renewable energy sources, including in particular 
electricity from renewable energy sources produced in peripheral regions, such as island 
regions, and in regions of low population density. Member States shall ensure that the 
charging of transmission and distribution tariffs does not discriminate against gas from 
renewable energy sources. 
8. Member States shall ensure that tariffs charged by transmission system operators and 
distribution system operators for the transmission and distribution of electricity from plants 
using renewable energy sources reflect realisable cost benefits resulting from the plant’s 
connection to the network. Such cost benefits could arise from the direct use of the low/
voltage grid. 
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Article 15 
Dispatching and balancing 
1. Without prejudice to the supply of electricity on the basis of contractual obligations, 
including those which derive from the tendering specifications, the transmission system 
operator shall, where it has such a function, be responsible for dispatching the generating 
installations in its area and for determining the use of interconnectors with other systems. 
2. The dispatching of generating installations and the use of interconnectors shall be 
determined on the basis of criteria which shall be approved by national regulatory authorities 
where competent and which must be objective, published and applied in a non/discriminatory 
manner, ensuring the proper functioning of the internal market in electricity. The criteria 
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shall take into account the economic precedence of electricity from available generating 
installations or interconnector transfers and the technical constraints on the system. 
3. A Member State shall require system operators to act in accordance with Article 16 of 
Directive 2009/28/EC when dispatching generating installations using renewable energy 
sources. They also may require the system operator to give priority when dispatching 
generating installations producing combined heat and power. 
4. A Member State may, for reasons of security of supply, direct that priority be given to the 
dispatch of generating installations using indigenous primary energy fuel sources, to an 
extent not exceeding, in any calendar year, 15 % of the overall primary energy necessary to 
produce the electricity consumed in the Member State concerned. 
5. The regulatory authorities where Member States have so provided or Member States shall 
require transmission system operators to comply with minimum standards for the 
maintenance and development of the transmission system, including interconnection 
capacity. 
6. Transmission system operators shall procure the energy they use to cover energy losses 
and reserve capacity in their system according to transparent, non/discriminatory and market/
based procedures, whenever they have such a function. 
7. Rules adopted by transmission system operators for balancing the electricity system shall 
be objective, transparent and non/discriminatory, including rules for charging system users of 
their networks for energy imbalance. The terms and conditions, including the rules and 
tariffs, for the provision of such services by transmission system operators shall be 
established pursuant to a methodology compatible with Article 37(6) in a non/discriminatory 
and cost/reflective way and shall be published. 
 
 
Article 23 
Decision/making powers regarding the connection of new power plant to the transmission 
system 
1. The transmission system operator shall establish and publish transparent and efficient 
procedures for non/discriminatory connection of new power plants to the transmission 
system. Those procedures shall be subject to the approval of national regulatory authorities. 
2. The transmission system operator shall not be entitled to refuse the connection of a new 
power plant on the grounds of possible future limitations to available network capacities, 
such as congestion in distant parts of the transmission system. The transmission system 
operator shall supply necessary information. 
3. The transmission system operator shall not be entitled to refuse a new connection point, on 
the ground that it will lead to additional costs linked with necessary capacity increase of 
system elements in the close/up range to the connection point. 
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Charges for access to networks 
1. Charges applied by network/operators for access to networks shall be transparent, take into 
account the need for network security and reflect actual costs incurred insofar as they 
correspond to those of an efficient and structurally comparable network operator and applied 
in a non discriminatory manner. Those charges shall not be distance/related. 
2. Producers and consumers ("load") may be charged for access to networks. The proportion 
of the total amount of the network charges borne by producers shall, subject to the need to 
provide appropriate and efficient locational signals, be lower than the proportion borne by 
consumers. Where appropriate, the level of the tariffs applied to producers and/or consumers 
shall provide locational signals at European level, and take into account the amount of 
network losses and congestion caused, and investment costs for infrastructure. This shall not 
prevent Member States from providing locational signals within their territory or from 
applying mechanisms to ensure that network access charges borne by consumers ("load") are 
uniform throughout their territory. 
Article 6 
General principles of congestion management 
1. Network congestion problems shall be addressed with non/discriminatory market based 
solutions which give efficient economic signals to the market participants and transmission 
system operators involved. Network congestion problems shall preferentially be solved with 
non transaction based methods, i.e. methods that do not involve a selection between the 
contracts of individual market participants. 
2. Transaction curtailment procedures shall only be used in emergency situations where the 
transmission system operator must act in an expeditious manner and redispatching or 
countertrading is not possible. Any such procedure shall be applied in a non/discriminatory 
manner. 
Except in cases of "force/majeure", market participants who have been allocated capacity 
shall be compensated for any curtailment. 
3. The maximum capacity of the interconnections and/or the transmission networks affecting 
cross/border flows shall be made available to market participants, complying with safety 
standards of secure network operation. 
4. Market participants shall inform the transmission system operators concerned a reasonable 
time ahead of the relevant operational period whether they intend to use allocated capacity. 
Any allocated capacity that will not be used shall be reattributed to the market, in an open, 
transparent and non/discriminatory manner. 
5. Transmission system operators shall, as far as technically possible, net the capacity 
requirements of any power flows in opposite direction over the congested interconnection 
line in order to use this line to its maximum capacity. Having full regard to network security, 
transactions that relieve the congestion shall never be denied. 
6. Any revenues resulting from the allocation of interconnection shall be used for one or 
more of the following purposes: 
(a) guaranteeing the actual availability of the allocated capacity; 
(b) network investments maintaining or increasing interconnection capacities; 
(c) as an income to be taken into account by regulatory authorities when approving the 
methodology for calculating network tariffs, and/or in assessing whether tariffs should be 
modified. 
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Licence condition B12: 
 
The objectives of the transmission licensees are (inter alia):  
 
• “the development, maintenance and operation of an efficient, economical and coordinated 
system of electricity transmission; 
• facilitating effective competition in the generation and supply of electricity; 
• protection of the security and quality of supply and safe operation of the GB transmission 
system insofar as it relates to interactions between transmission licensees.” 
 
Licence Condition C5: Use of system charging methodology 
 
“ ‘the relevant objectives’ [of the Use of System Charging Methodology] shall mean the 
following objectives: 
a) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology facilitates effective 
competition in the generation and supply of electricity and (so far as is consistent 
therewith) facilitates competition in the sale, distribution and purchase of electricity; 
b) that compliance with the use of system charging methodology results in charges which 
reflect, as far as is reasonably practicable, the costs (excluding any payments between 
transmission licensees which are made under and in accordance with the STC) incurred 
by transmission licensees in their transmission businesses and which are compatible with 
standard condition C26 (Requirements of a connect and manage connection); and 
c) that, so far as is consistent with sub/paragraphs (a) and (b), the use of system charging 
methodology, as far as is reasonably practicable, properly takes account of the 
developments in transmission licensees' transmission businesses.” 
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In section 6.4, it was suggested that the present day drivers for investment in additional 
transmission capacity – and the consequences of lack of capacity for constraint costs – might 
be better reflected through the existing TNUoS methodology by the inclusion of an energy 
element. We suggest that such an approach might be called Investment Cost/Related Energy 
pricing, or ICREP.  
 
A number of options might be thought of for precisely how it could be done. Although we 
have not considered it within the scope of our present study to undertake a detailed, 
quantified ICREP design and demonstration exercise, we set out some initial suggestions in 
this appendix. These fall into four basic approaches. In each case, we assume that what we 
regard as the main flaws in the present ICRP process have been corrected. (See section 6.2 
for a discussion of these). 
 
1. Leave the locational element of TNUoS alone and introduce an energy element into the 
way the residual is calculated. 
2. Levy a proportion of the locational element of TNUoS via an energy/related charge. 
3. Set the initial condition of the load flow from which MWkm figures are derived in the 
locational element of TNUoS by reference to the relative annual energy production of 
each generator. In order words, apply not only a single, uniform scaling to ensure that 
total generation matches total generation in the load flow, but, first, apply a generator 
specific scaling proportional to its annual load factor and then a uniform scaling to ensure 
that total generation in the load flow matches demand. 
4. Calculate ‘shadow costs’ at each node, i.e. the change to the total cost of transmission 
consequential to an additional MW of generation or demand at a node for some indicative 
hours of operation, each weighted in a final charge in such a way as to approximate the 
overall impact on cost of transmission,  
 
Approach 1 is self/explanatory but would require some trial and error to ensure that the final 
charges levied on individual users are reasonably reflective of the transmission costs they 
impose. 
 
In respect of approach 2, National Grid might calculate zonal costs as at present (with 
amendments as we suggested in section 6.2).  However, some proportion of the resulting 
charges would then be converted from £/MW to £/MWh.  For demand charges, this would 
require an estimate of the ratio of the system peak demand (perhaps measured on National 
Grid’s “Triad” basis) to the total energy demand over the year.  For generation charges, this 
would require an estimate of the ratio of installed capacity to energy generation over the year.  
The charges in £/kW would be multiplied by these ratios to give charges in £/MWh.  Even 
though the ratios are only estimates, these charges could be set in stone before the start of 
each year, and any revenue surplus or shortfall could be rolled forward to the next year’s 
calculations, as already happens under the price control methodology. 
 
Approach 3 is similar to the approach mooted by National Grid for intermittent generation 
(National Grid, 2010b) but would apply to all generation regardless of type. (Some indicative 
studies on the effect of these were conducted by an MSc student at Strathclyde as part of her 
final individual project. The results have not been published and would need to be verified 
but suggest that for the planned 2015/16 transmission network before commissioning of the 
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first HVDC ‘bootstrap’ where generation capacity factors are taken into account, charges 
levied on low capacity factor plant in the north (such as wind farms) would be around the 
same level as would be the case for a postage stamp approach. However, under a postage 
stamp approach, demand in the north would pay more than under a cost/reflective approach). 
 
Approach 4 would represent an extension to ICRP that would take into account relative 
energy outputs from different generators but also proximity of power flows to network limits. 
It would have a number of features that promise greater accuracy in reflecting costs of 
transmission but at the expense of greater complexity in the modelling compared with 
approach 3. An acceptable compromise between accuracy and simplicity would need to be 
investigated. 
 
Unlike LRIC described in section 6.3, ICREP approach 4 would look only a year ahead and 
so would not be nearly as sensitive to variations in forecasts. Unlike ICRP, it would not 
assume that each branch of the network is, in effect, already at its limit. Rather, its actual 
limit would be used. The action consequential to a limit being reached would be determined 
by an optimisation to estimate its cost. The costed action would be either to undertake 
balancing actions (paid for via bid and offer acceptances), reinforcement of an overloaded 
branch or a combination, whichever was cheapest. (Bid and offer prices would be typical 
averages, as would costs per MWkm of reinforcements, the latter rather as in ICRP). In so 
doing, it would attempt to represent the decision that a planner would take. However, if 
significant complexity arising from the need for many conditions – different demand levels, 
different generation ‘merit orders’ and different fault outages – is to be avoided, some 
simplifications could be used. For example, the initial condition for generation would be a 
scaled condition similar to that suggested in approach 3. Just one representative demand level 
might be considered, or a small number of different ones, with total constraint costs estimated 
by use of suitable durations for each modelled condition. In the latter case in the setting of 
initial conditions, different generator capacity factors could be used that are appropriate to the 
season or time of day that the demand condition represents. Finally, a large set of outages 
(representing either faults or, for spring, summer or autumn conditions, planned outages) 
might be modelled in a ‘security/constrained optimal power flow’. Alternatively, to reduce 
the number of constraints in the optimisation and the time needed for the computation to be 
carried out, only the intact network case might be represented albeit with individual branch 
ratings scaled down to represent the need for pre/fault loadings to be low so as to leave some 
headroom for post/outage conditions (an adjustment analogous to that of the ‘security factor’ 
in ICRP). Some experimentation would be needed to calibrate the model initially and 
determine an appropriate number of conditions to model or the scaling of branch ratings so as 
to reasonably reflect actual costs without requiring what users might see as excessive 
complexity. (Note that voltage or stability limits would normally be neglected – it would be 
assumed that most system reinforcements or balancing actions would be due to thermal limits 
being reached, and these can be quite well approximated by so/called ‘DC optimal power 
flow’ which has the advantage of being simpler and more robust than the ‘AC’ version. 
However, transfer limits arising from voltage or stability constraints might be added 
artificially, based on offline analysis, although it would remain to be determined how to cost 
remedies to such limits). 
 
Some points of detail apply to all the approaches that use an annual capacity factor and would 
relate to the way in which that capacity factor is calculated.  
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• In order to minimise opportunities for playing the ‘dec game’, the capacity factor 
might be calculated based on the ‘final physical notifications’ (FPNs) submitted by 
individual ‘balancing mechanism units’ rather than by final physical output that may 
have been subject to balancing actions. (Generators tempted to ‘over declare’ their 
FPNs would end up paying higher TNUoS charges than if they had submitted lower 
FPNs).  
• To smooth out year/by/year variations caused by changes in, for example, wind 
conditions, rainfall or major generator outages, the ‘capacity factor’ used in the 
methodology might be based on, say, 5 year averages of FPNs. (For new generators, 
in the first year, a forecast would be used and thereafter outturns used as they become 
available). 
 
A further design option would concern whether the industry is content with a zonal approach 
in which nodal costs are averaged across nodes with comparable nodal costs, or whether a 
nodal approach is preferred. (One disadvantage with a zonal approach is that if a zonal 
boundary change seems to be required, a transmission user at a node that is moved from one 
zone to another might see a significant step change in their charges). 
 
The above implementation suggestions are simply that: suggestions. We offer them not as the 
last word but simply as ideas from which to start and in order to help readers begin to form a 
view of what ICREP might look like. 
 
We envisage a programme of work that would investigate the above options and make 
recommendations for the detailed implementation. We would foresee such a programme of 
work being much simpler and shorter than that to effect the regulatory changes necessary to 
implement LMP and FTRs, for example.  
